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Abstract 
Marine ecosystems provide a variety of benefits to humans, including nature-based tourism, food 
production, and livelihoods for local people. Protected areas have been considered one of the most 
important tools to conserve biodiversity and ecosystem services. Under the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, state parties have pledged to establish comprehensive, representative and effective systems 
of marine protected areas (MPAs) by 2020. Over the past decades, Tasmania has made some progress 
in establishing a system of MPAs. However, in 2009 the process stalled following the contentious 
designation of MPAs in the Bruny Bioregion. The Tasmanian MPA system today covers almost six 
per cent of Tasmanian State Waters, but over half surrounds subantarctic Macquarie Island. Many 
Tasmanian marine bioregions are not adequately represented in the reserve system, and four 
bioregions have no MPAs. Governance plays a key role in the success of MPA designation and 
implementation. The aim of this thesis was to understand how MPA governance could be improved to 
enhance marine conservation in Tasmania. The specific research objectives were:  
1. To analyse the core elements and context of the governance regime for Tasmanian MPAs.
2. To evaluate the extent that Tasmanian MPA governance regime follows good governance
principles.
3. To assess power dynamics in the Tasmanian MPA governance regime and how they have
affected the quality of governance.
4. To make recommendations for improving the Tasmanian MPA governance regime.
5. To draw out lessons from the Tasmanian case study that can inform the design of MPA
governance regimes elsewhere and contribute to the literature on governance of natural
resources.
I used a mixed methods approach to address these objectives, including a review of key documents, 
an Internet questionnaire, key informant semi-structured interviews, Social Network Analysis, and a 
media prominence analysis. The Tasmanian MPA governance regime was analysed against the 
following good governance criteria: 1) inclusiveness and fairness; 2) accountability and transparency; 
3) legitimacy; and 4) performance.
Results indicated that consultation processes for the establishment of an MPA system in Tasmania 
could be considered inclusive. However, methods to engage key stakeholders could be improved to 
increase participation of certain actors and to provide opportunities for rational dialogue between 
different stakeholders. Statutory consultation processes were transparent, but the cumbersome legal 
framework led to fragmentation of management roles and responsibilities. MPA proposals have been 
based on good ecological information, but the use of socio-economic information has been limited. 
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The Tasmanian Government was generally accepted as the legitimate decision-maker, but there were 
low levels of trust. Of particular concern was the tendency of political interventions to privilege 
narrow sectoral interests and override outcomes from statutory consultation processes that were 
informed by wide stakeholder input. Direction, political leadership and coordination across sectors 
and government levels (Australian, State and local) were deemed unsatisfactory. MPA management 
was underfunded and not adaptive. 
Power plays a key role in the performance of a governance regime, having both negative and positive 
impacts on collaborative resource management. Results indicated that influence was concentrated in 
relatively few actors, mostly members of the commercial and recreational fishing sectors, some 
government agencies, and the relevant Minister as the main decision-maker. An analysis of social 
structures in the information exchange network showed that polarisation was not as prevalent as was 
perceived by most participants, and that there were opportunities for instituting collaborative 
approaches to MPA designation and management. Relationships across sectors, however, currently 
depend on a few bridging organisations. 
The recommendations arising from this research are framed around two complementary reform 
options. The first option, a collaborative approach to MPA governance, takes advantage of and builds 
on existing actor networks. The second option involves structural adjustment of the legal framework. 
Under the current circumstances, this legal change is unlikely, because for many years the Tasmanian 
Government has had little political will to advance the conservation of marine ecosystems. If, 
however, a collaborative initiative is successful, sufficient Government support could be mobilised to 
drive legislative reform. Findings and recommendations provide guidance for governance reforms that 
are likely to significantly improve the quality and effectiveness of MPA designation processes in 
Tasmania, and in similar jurisdictions elsewhere. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Rationale 
Marine ecosystems provide a large number of anthropocentric benefits, including nature-based 
tourism, food, protection from natural disasters and climate change effects, spiritual well-being 
and income generation. For example, with respect to tourism, global whale watching 
expenditures reached US$ 2.1 billion in 2008 (O’Connor et al. 2009), and global fisheries 
generated approximately US$217.5 billion in 2010 (FAO 2012). The economic value of healthy 
marine resources, however, is not limited to direct use values. Costanza et al. (1997) estimated 
that the value of services provided by marine ecosystems, such as nutrient cycling and 
disturbance regulation, could be more than US$ 20.9 trillion/year, most of which is unaccounted  
by traditional economic reporting. Some also believe that nature has intrinsic value and that 
humans have a moral duty to protect natural systems (Lockwood et al. 2012). 
Unfortunately, marine ecosystems are under significant threat, both by anthropogenic influences 
and by natural phenomena. Direct threats include overexploitation of marine resources, 
pollution and habitat destruction, while indirect threats can originate from coastal development, 
land-generated pollution and climate change (MEA 2005a). Worboys et al. (2015) consider that 
a rapidly increasing human population and overconsumption constitute underlying phenomena 
driving an increasing negative impact of human development on marine ecosystems. Human 
activities often have cumulative and synergistic effects on ecosystem health, with associated 
loss of ecosystem services (MEA 2005b). 
As such deterioration has become evident, the approach to governing and managing marine 
resources has changed significantly in the past decades, at the local, national and international 
levels. Multi-lateral organisations have promoted sustainable development (World Commission 
on Environment and Development 1987; United Nations 1997), better practices for fisheries 
management (FAO 1995), urged countries to adopt an ecosystem-approach to management 
(United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 2010; CBD Secretariat n.d.-b), and 
incorporated environmental goals in development plans (United Nations n.d.). Protected areas 
are considered one of the most important tools to conserve biodiversity (Dudley 2008), and a 
number of international agreements have urged countries to increase the protection of their 
territories. During several meetings of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), parties 
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have established specific goals regarding marine and terrestrial protected areas; Aichi targets in 
particular, aim to reserve at least 17% of terrestrial areas and 10% of marine areas within the 
countries by 2020 (CBD Secretariat n.d.-a).  
Under international pressure, the number of marine protected areas (MPAs) around the world 
has substantially increased since the establishment of the first global targets (Toropova et al. 
2010). Despite evidence for benefits from MPAs for biodiversity outcomes (e.g. Edgar et al. 
2014) and the socio-economic conditions of local people (e.g. Russ et al. 2004), the designation 
of MPAs has been problematic. In some cases, MPAs have reduced the income of commercial 
fishers, displaced fishing effort (Hilborn et al. 2004), or infringed on indigenous groups rights 
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). Inappropriate understanding of conservation science, as well 
as misconceptions and short-term interests of opposing groups have also affected the acceptance 
of MPAs (Agardy et al. 2003). These factors, added to limited stakeholder involvement, have 
triggered significant opposition to the establishment of MPAs in different parts of the world. For 
example, in California, the process of establishing an MPA network was delayed several years 
after strong opposition from key stakeholders (Weible 2008).  
Governance has been highlighted as one factor that contributes to the effectiveness of protected 
areas (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2012; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013). In this thesis, 
governance will be understood as “a process whereby societies or organizations make their 
important decisions, determine whom they involve in the process and how they render account” 
(Graham et al. 2003 pg 1). A governance regime involves protocols that are institutionalised 
either formally or informally (James 2007). Several types of governance regimes have been 
identified, ranging from governance by government, shared governance, private governance and 
governance by indigenous or local communities (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013). In a top-down 
regime, until recently the dominant approach to resource management, governments are 
responsible for decisions (Dietz et al. 2003). However, top-down governance approaches have 
often been ineffective to manage common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990; Delmas and Young 
2009b).  
Alternative governance regimes have been proposed, where actors other than governments have 
a role to play (Delmas and Young 2009a), or where the role of states, markets and people are 
combined (Jones et al. 2013). Different actors including industry, communities and users, have 
become part of the process of decision-making and implementation of decisions (Lemos and 
Agrawal 2006). Markets (Lyon 2009), community self-regulation (Ostrom 1990; 2010) and 
various forms of collaborative, multi-level and polycentric governance have been proposed as 
plausible alternatives to unilateral governance by governments.  
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The choice of governance arrangements influences the level of success of an MPA system 
(Weible 2008). Through a series of case studies, Sabatier (1986) identified statutory variables 
that affect implementation including: clear objectives, appropriate resources and effective 
compliance mechanisms. External variables can affect implementation, such as socio-economic 
conditions, public support and commitment of implementing officials. 
Regardless of the type of governance, a series of principles of good governance have been 
proposed, both to improve effectiveness and to respect fundamental rights (UNDP 1997; 
European Commission 2001; Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
2013). The most salient principles include: participation, inclusiveness, dialogue, equity, 
fairness, accountability, transparency, legitimacy, integrity, direction, integration, coordination, 
effectiveness and adaptability (UNDP 1997; European Commission 2001; Lockwood 2010; 
Lockwood et al. 2010; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013). Disregarding these principles can have 
significant consequences for the outcomes of a planning process. For example, in Florida Keys 
National Marine Sanctuary, the process of zoning left stakeholders feeling alienated or with 
misconceptions about the consequences of establishing reserved areas (Suman et al. 1999). 
These authors suggest that better involvement of stakeholders and information dissemination 
could have improved the outcomes of the process. In contrast, there are examples where good 
participation methods have increased transparency and commitment of local communities, as in 
the case of Fiji, ultimately reducing operative costs of management (Tawake et al. 2001). 
Several authors have highlighted the importance of governance quality and power structures in 
the success of environmental governance, supported either by empirical research or theoretical 
argument (Forester 1989; Chambers 1994; Raik et al. 2008; Armitage et al. 2009; Lockwood 
2010; Neal and Neal 2011; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013). Power and influence are understood 
throughout this thesis as the capacity of an actor to affect the actions of others in an intended 
and calculated way (Wrong 1979). As discussed in Section 2.5, theoretical developments of 
power tend to be complementary, as they describe different aspects of power. Foucault’s theory 
of power departs from the majority of theories that recognise agency in the exertion of power. 
Foucault posits that power is embedded in the system and is not exerted by specific groups or 
individuals (Gaventa 2003). In this thesis I assumed that power was found both in social 
systems as a whole, as described by Foucault, but I also recognised that certain actors can 
choose to exert power over others. Methods and analyses are focused on theories that recognise 
agency of individuals or groups, namely the identification of influential actors, sources of power 
and social structures that empower specific actors.  
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The distribution of power among key stakeholders in a governance regime can have important 
consequences on the quality and outcomes of a planning process (Forester 1989; Chambers 
1994; Raik et al. 2008; Armitage et al. 2009; Neal and Neal 2011). For example, participation 
in a process can be affected by psychological or political oppression of powerful groups 
(McCullum et al. 2004; Prilleltensky 2008). Kapoor (2002) suggested that simplified concepts 
of “the local” can ignore important power imbalances that affect fairness in a participatory 
process. The exercise of power in decision-making is often covert, compromising the 
transparency of decisions. Lobby capacity varies substantially among different stakeholders, 
affecting their level of influence over decisions and increasing thus unfairness (Sklair 2002). 
Power structures, however, are often overlooked in planning processes (Lane and McDonald 
2005). Understanding power dynamics is necessary to devise methods to overcome such 
problems.  
Power, however, is not necessarily negative in governance processes. In fact, key elements of 
successful governance, such as knowledge, leadership, coordination and brokerage, depend on 
the existence of power structures. For example, knowledge is inextricably linked to power 
(Faubion 2000; Kapoor 2002; Gaventa 2003), and knowledge is a key element of adaptive 
management and planning (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Olsson et al. 2004; Berkes 2009; 
Lockwood et al. 2012). Leadership has been identified as a key requirement for adaptive 
planning and management of natural resources (Ansell and Gash 2008; Gutiérrez et al. 2011; 
Lockwood et al. 2012). For example, Wescott (2006) suggests that the leadership of 
nongovernment organisations (NGOs) and some bureaucrats and politicians were important 
factors in the successful establishment of the MPA system in Victoria, Australia. Coordination 
and brokerage can improve collaborative processes (Gunderson and Holling 2002; Cash et al. 
2006; Long et al. 2013). In this way, power can have both negative and positive impacts on 
governance quality, and outcomes depend on the motivations and interests of powerholders.  
Australia has been recognised for a leading role in MPA management (Bellwood et al. 2004; 
MEA 2005a) and fisheries management (FAO 2012). Australia committed to creating a 
National Representative System of MPAs (NRSMPA) in 1992, making steady progress for 
several years. The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park is one of the most widely known MPAs, both 
for its global ecological significance (UNESCO 2014), and for its innovative governance system 
(Olsson et al. 2008; Day 2016). In 2013, Australia announced that it had established the largest 
MPA system of the world, exceeding the 10% Aichi target. This announcement overlooked the 
fact that it was not a representative system, as it covered mostly offshore waters with significant 
conservation gaps on the continental shelf (Barr and Possingham 2013). The Barr and 
Possingham (2013) analysis was limited to marine areas under the jurisdiction of the Australian 
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Government, namely offshore waters. The analysis, however, excluded coastal waters under the 
jurisdiction of states and the Northern Territory, which are under significantly larger 
anthropocentric pressure and might hold more diversity value. These coastal waters have been 
subject to a diversity of processes in relation to designation of MPAs, with substantial variation 
evident in their governance and management arrangements and the extent to which they are 
representative of marine biodiversity (Wescott 2006; Clarke 2016; Edyvane and Blanch 2016; 
Kriwoken 2016; Ogilvie 2016; Thomas and Hughes 2016; Wescott 2016). 
Tasmania, in particular, made some initial progress to establish a representative MPA system in 
the early 1990s, and then in the 2000s (see Section 4.4 for details). As described in Section 4.7, 
eight mesoscale bioregions were identified around Tasmania: Boags, Central Bass Strait, 
Otway, Franklin, Davey, Bruny, Freycinet, Flinders and Twofold Shelf. Additionally, Tasmania 
has jurisdiction over the coastal waters around sub-Antarctic Macquarie Island (IMCRA 1998). 
After developing the Tasmanian MPA Strategy (TMPAS) (Marine and Marine Industries 
Council 2001), the Tasmanian Government decided to work one bioregion at a time. After 
making progress in two bioregions in the early 2000s, the process of establishing an MPA 
system stopped altogether in 2009, after a contentious designation of MPAs in the Bruny 
Bioregion. Excluding Macquarie Island, the Tasmanian MPA system covers fewer than three 
per cent of Tasmanian State Waters (TSW), and four bioregions have no representation 
(Kriwoken 2016). This is a marked contrast to MPA progress in other states and 
Commonwealth waters – a fact that motivated this investigation, and my focus on understanding 
the role of governance and power in MPA establishment. 
I posit that issues with governance quality and power structures are partly responsible for the 
current stagnation in the establishment and implementation of the Tasmanian MPA system. 
Governance issues around Tasmanian MPAs have received limited attention in academic 
documents (Hislop; Stump and Kriwoken 2006; Lockwood et al. 2013; Kriwoken 2016). In 
particular, few studies refer the effect of power structures on governance performance. This 
thesis thus aims to understand how the Tasmanian marine governance regime affected the 
process of establishing an effective MPA system, and how that governance regime could be 
improved to enhance marine conservation. With this study, I will explore governance quality 
and the effect of power structures in the Tasmanian MPA governance regime. The results of this 
thesis provide guidance on how to improve the Tasmanian MPA governance regime and 
elsewhere. 
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1.2 Thesis aim and objectives 
The general aim of this thesis was to understand how MPA governance could be improved to 
enhance marine conservation. The scope of this research was limited to Tasmanian State Waters 
and the governance regime at the State level. The following objectives were developed to 
provide more specific indication of the purposes of the research: 
1. To analyse the core elements and context of the governance regime for Tasmanian MPAs. 
2. To evaluate the extent that the Tasmanian MPA governance regime follows good 
governance principles.  
3. To assess power dynamics in the Tasmanian MPA governance regime and how they have 
affected the quality of governance. 
4. To make recommendations for improving the Tasmanian MPA governance regime. 
5. To draw out lessons from the Tasmanian case study that can inform the design of MPA 
governance regimes elsewhere and contribute to the academic literature. 
 
1.3 Chapter outline 
Chapter 2 explores the concept of governance in the academic literature and its importance for 
conservation management. After identifying specific governance issues for the marine 
environment and MPAs in particular, I review the role that participation plays in governance. I 
then analyse the different aspects of power in decision-making, and the theoretical development 
of Social Network Analysis. This review makes a significant contribution to power theoretical 
development, by questioning the emphasis on negative aspects of power and disregarding its 
need in society functioning.  
Chapter 3 explains the research design and methods of inquiry chosen to answer the objectives 
of the study. I start by situating this study in the pragmatic research paradigm. I then develop the 
analytical framework used to structure the inquiry, and explain the rationale behind the case 
study selection. The chapter finishes by describing the inquiry methods used to answer each of 
the research objectives. I propose a novel approach to understanding governance issues that 
might interfere with outcomes of MPAs and particularly to dealing with the issue of power 
dynamics in governance.  
Chapter 4 situates the case study, following the structure of the analytical framework developed 
in Chapter 3. I use documentary sources and empirical data to analyse key components of the 
Tasmanian MPA governance regime: legal and policy framework, actors, decision arenas and 
problems that the regime needs to address. Likewise, key influences of the regime are described 
including: political context, socio-economic and cultural context, and natural context.  
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Chapter 5 focuses on applying principles of good governance identified in the literature to the 
Tasmanian MPA regime. Using qualitative results from interviews and questionnaires, I analyse 
the regime in terms of inclusiveness and fairness; accountability and transparency; legitimacy; 
and performance. These results are discussed in relation to the various processes used in the 
development of the Tasmanian MPA system. This discussion explores how performance in 
relation to each of the good governance criteria interacted in the Tasmanian case, emphasizing 
the interdependencies. 
Chapter 6 uses the results from interviews and questionnaires to analyse both positive and 
negative aspects of power structures in the governance regime. In the first sections, I describe 
the hierarchy of different actors, and then analyse how uneven power distribution has affected 
governance of MPAs. A related issue, the polarisation of opinion, is also described for the 
Tasmanian case. I finish this chapter by analysing social structures that can enable improved 
coordination and collaboration between different actors.  
Chapter 7 discusses the results of previous chapters, highlighting the interdependence between 
good governance principles and the existence of power structures. I use relevant literature to 
compare and contrast the Tasmanian case with empirical and theoretical studies in other parts of 
the world. The analysis explores causes and consequences of governance quality; power 
structures that advance particular interests; polarisation; reduced trust; the existence of common 
ground between different actors; and power structures that advance common interests. The final 
section highlights relevant contributions to the governance literature. 
Chapter 8 demonstrates to what extent the methods and results of the thesis answer the research 
objectives, discussing also limitations of the selected inquiry methods. I then explain the 
significance of my findings and their contribution to the literature, suggesting future research 
that can address limitations and build on my findings. I conclude by making specific 
recommendations to improve the MPA governance regime in Tasmania, most of which can be 
generalised to improve governance regimes elsewhere. 
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Chapter 2 Power struggles in marine conservation: A review of 
participation and power dynamics on governance of marine 
protected areas 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Human life depends on the oceans due to the wide range of direct and indirect benefits or 
ecosystem services derived from marine and coastal environments (MEA 2005b). Protected 
areas are one of the most important management tools to safeguard regions that have key 
biodiversity elements and provide ecosystem services. According to the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) protected areas are a:  
[c]learly defined geographical space, recognised, dedicated and managed, through legal or 
other effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated 
ecosystem services and cultural values (Dudley 2008).  
The IUCN definition of protected areas can range from strict no-take areas to culturally 
modified landscapes or seascapes. The definition, however, can exclude important areas for 
conservation, such as fisheries management areas or indigenous territories where nature 
conservation might not be the main or specified priority. For example, it is still unclear if the 
Locally Marine Managed Areas of the Pacific islands would be classified under the IUCN 
definition, as livelihood conservation is their main objective, rather than nature conservation 
(Govan et al. 2009a). Other terms have been used to include these areas that do not strictly 
match IUCN’s definition, such as Marine Managed Areas (Baird et al. 1999), Community 
Conserved Areas (Kothari 2006) and Indigenous and Local Communities Protected Areas 
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004) and other effective area-based conservation measures (CBD 
Secretariat n.d.-a)  
Human activities are interconnected to ecosystems, as they depend on the provision of 
ecosystem services, and at the same time affect the capacity of ecosystems to provide those 
services (Ranganathan et al. 2008). These benefits have been categorised as supporting, 
provisioning, regulating and cultural services (MEA 2005b). Several studies have shown 
concrete benefits from MPAs, such as improved biodiversity, organism size and density (Edgar 
and Barrett 1999; Russ et al. 2003; Lester et al. 2009), and increased fisheries catch surrounding 
MPAs (Roberts et al. 2001; Gell and Roberts 2003; Russ et al. 2003; Claudet et al. 2006). 
Healthy ecosystems can also support a nature-based tourism industry (Lindberg et al. 1996).  
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However, to be effective MPAs need to be managed such that the values and range of services 
provided by specific ecosystems are maintained or enhanced (Lester et al. 2009). Overall 
effectiveness is determined by: the understanding of the context and an appropriate design to 
achieve both ecological and social objectives; strategic planning and implementation of 
ecological and social objectives; the availability of necessary resources and skills; and a 
governance scheme that fits the local circumstances and ultimately serves to achieve expected 
outcomes (Hockings et al. 2006). There is a complex interaction between natural values and 
different users. MPAs can only be effective if governance systems are fit for purpose across 
national, sub-national jurisdictional and local scales. A supporting legal framework and good 
governance quality are necessary elements for tailored governance arrangements. The following 
sections will examine in more detail the concept of governance, and the consequences of 
participation, governance quality and distribution of power on MPA designation and 
management. 
 
2.2 The importance of governance in conservation  
During the past few years, use of the term “governance” has increased substantially in several 
contexts, from official documents, to political discourses and the academic literature. A search 
of “governance” in 2013 in the academic database Web of Knowledge (now Web of Science) 
showed an increase of more than fifty times from 1970-1989 to 1990-2009. The term is now 
widely used in a range of disciplines including government studies, public administration, 
economics, political science, and environmental science. 
The meaning of “governance”, however, can be hazy, and in different fields, governance has 
had various interpretations. While it was originally used as a synonym of government, more 
recently, it has referred to: the steering of complex organisations (corporate governance); a tool 
for political transformation according to modern Western ideology; and a “replacement 
mechanism” of a weakening state or unfair decision-making process (Hufty 2011). In this 
review, governance will be understood as the process by which different government and 
nongovernment actors make decisions, establish who is involved, and how they are held 
accountable (Graham et al. 2003). 
The top-down or command-and-control paradigm, in which governments have sole 
responsibility for decisions, has dominated environmental governance (Dietz et al. 2003). Under 
certain circumstances, this approach has been effective. Through a series of case studies, 
Sabatier (1986) identified statutory variables that affect implementation, including clear 
Chapter 2 – Power struggles in marine conservation 
 
10 
objectives, appropriate resources and effective compliance mechanisms. This author also 
mentions external variables that can affect implementation, such as socio-economic conditions, 
public support and commitment of implementing officials.  
A top-down approach, however, has often failed to solve common-pool resource management 
and other environmental problems (Delmas and Young 2009b). This limited efficacy has 
reduced confidence in the government as the main actor, triggering a variety of new governance 
arrangements, where different actors have a role (Delmas and Young 2009a). Today 
corporations, nongovernment organisations and communities are increasingly involved in the 
management of the environment (Lemos and Agrawal 2006). Even single-actor mechanisms are 
dependent on the support of other actors (Lemos and Agrawal 2009). Markets (Lyon 2009), 
community self-regulation (Ostrom 1990; 2010) and various forms of collaborative, multi-level 
and polycentric governance have been proposed as plausible alternatives to failing top-down 
governance.  
Each governance approach has both advantages and disadvantages. Market mechanisms can be 
effective when they take advantage of potential benefits for private actors. For example, eco-
certifications can help both reduce environmental impact and improve profits (Lemos and 
Agrawal 2009). Other mechanisms, like the Clean Development Mechanism to reduce carbon 
emissions, have had an uneven distribution of benefits (Hultman 2009) and can have negative 
impacts on biodiversity (Bradshaw et al. 2013). In the same way, under certain circumstances, 
community-based governance has proved a better fit to local needs and circumstances than top-
down arrangements (e.g. Govan et al. 2009b; García et al. 2014). Bottom-up approaches are not 
devoid of problems. Their success depends on the scale of the problem, enabling legal 
framework and institutions, enforcement capability, a system of conflict resolution and  the 
recognition of inequalities and power distribution (Ostrom 1990; Lane and McDonald 2005; 
Delmas and Young 2009a; Levine and Richmond 2014).  
Nested and polycentric institutions have been advocated to deal with multiscale common pool 
resources (Ostrom 2010), where ecological, social and jurisdictional boundaries seldom match 
each other. Polycentric governance refers to a number of decision-making centres, which are 
partly independent of each other. These are nested, when smaller institutions or organisations 
are part of larger institutional layers. Gruby and Basurto (2014) explain how these two concepts 
are not necessarily complementary. Analysing the process of scaling up marine conservation in 
Palau, these authors posit that nesting institutions to coordinate a national-level system of MPAs 
has come at the expense of the autonomy of resource-users. In this way, governance has become 
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more centralised, losing some of the advantages of polycentric institutions, such as fitness for 
local circumstances and innovation potential.  
Any governance regime has advantages and disadvantages. The set of mechanisms to improve 
performance is determined by specific conditions (see Chapter 3 and Figure 3.1 for a list of 
conditions considered important in this study). Ostrom and colleagues (2007) criticise a 
widespread use of “panaceas”, or universal solutions to natural resource management. On their 
own, government control, privatisation or collaborative management, have been frequently 
unsuccessful. It can be more appropriate to develop a combination of governance mechanisms 
tailored to fit specific circumstances (Delmas and Young 2009a).   
In the case of protected areas, governance has been broadly classified according to the level of 
involvement of different actors (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013). Governance by government 
refers to schemes where the national, subnational or local government is in charge of a protected 
area. This is the most widespread approach to designation, planning and management of 
protected areas, particularly in the marine environment (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013).  
Shared governance involves two or more actors in the decision-making process. Actors sharing 
governance include: two or more governments; two or more bodies of government (including at 
different levels); government and local communities; government and corporations; government 
and NGOs; and a combination of government, corporations, NGOs and local communities 
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013). For example, in the case of transnational parks, like La 
Amistad, a formal arrangement between the governments of Panama and Costa Rica provides 
for the conservation of a shared ecosystem (UNESCO 2013). Another example can be found in 
Colombia, where two authorities - National Parks and Indigenous Authorities – are required to 
established a joint management system of overlapping areas; this is necessary because both have 
the same level of authority and cannot make planning decisions without the other party’s 
approval (Laborde 2007). In Australia, recent legal reform has improved participation of 
Indigenous communities in the governance and management of protected areas (Smyth and 
Isherwood 2016). Although a few examples exist in the marine realm, further work is needed in 
other states to enhance the participation of Indigenous groups in the governance of MPAs (Ross 
et al. 2009). Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2013) provide two examples of shared governance in 
MPAs between government and local communities: Bunaken National Park in Indonesia and 
Apo Island Protected Landscape and Seascape in the Philippines. Some important conditions for 
their success include a supporting legal framework, active participation of local communities, 
and respect of customary rights. 
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Private governance can be undertaken by an individual, a corporation or an NGO. This type of 
governance is rare in marine ecosystems, but an innovative approach to marine area leases, 
which are traditionally used for exploitation purposes, can be a valuable tool for conservation 
(Beck et al. 2004). These authors caution against possible negative impacts, such as resentment 
of traditional users, and increased prices due to higher demand. In another example, Chile has 
developed a legal framework that supports private management and conservation of marine 
resources (Fernández and Castilla 2005).  
In community governance, the rights of local or indigenous communities, usually to govern 
common pool resources, have been recognised and they are in charge of making major 
decisions. Either their whole territory or part are protected or managed sustainably. These areas 
are not necessarily accepted by government as part of their national system of protected areas. 
As previously mentioned, the definition of protected area by IUCN is restricted to areas 
“dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity” (Dudley 2008). As many 
communities do not designate their areas with the specific purpose of biodiversity conservation, 
several areas around the world are not recognised as protected areas by international standards 
(Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004). Such areas can nevertheless significantly contribute to 
conservation. Many examples of terrestrial protected areas governed by local and indigenous 
communities are found around the world. These are less common in the marine environment, 
MPAs being usually under the jurisdiction of governments. Even in places like Fiji, where a 
large system of traditional locally managed marine areas has been established (Govan et al. 
2009a), legal gaps still limit official support (Techera and Troniak 2009).  
Neoliberalism has had considerable impact on environmental governance around the world. 
This widely adopted economic philosophy promotes free-market policies and de-regulation to 
improve functioning of markets. Today, most environmental policies contain elements that can 
be traced back to the neoliberal rationality, including the commodification of nature, 
privatisation of natural resources and territories, environmental services markets, austerity in 
public agencies, and delegation of public responsibilities to the private sector or local 
communities. Neoliberalism has had both negative and positive impacts, as discussed by 
Liverman and Vilas (2006). There are varied views about the impact of neoliberal approaches to 
conservation. It can be argued that privatisation and commodification increase efficiency, but 
these processes can also lead to unequal distribution of costs and benefits (Igoe and Brockington 
2007). In some cases, however, it has enhanced democratic political systems, by recognising 
property rights of traditional users and by decentralising decision-making (Liverman and Vilas 
2006).   
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The proliferation of different governance modes has prompted the need to establish guidance to 
improve the quality of governance, regardless of type. Good-governance principles have been 
adopted widely in documents and discourses at international levels (UNDP 1997; European 
Commission 2001; Graham et al. 2003; Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2012; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013). Table 2.1 indicates four broad criteria 
for good governance and related concepts identified in the literature.  
Table 2.1 Good-governance criteria in relation to concepts discussed in the literature 
 
Good governance criteria Related concepts in the literature 
Inclusiveness and fairness 
Direct or indirect participation of stakeholders, especially disadvantaged 
groups 
Respect of rights, different points of view and diversity of cultures. 
Appropriate communication ways 
Dialogue and conflict resolution 
Unbiased decision making 
Fair sharing of costs and benefits 
Participation (1, 2) 
Voice (3, 6, 7) 
Inclusiveness (4, 5) 
Rule of law (1, 3) 
Equity (1, 3, 6, 7) 
Fairness (3, 4, 5, 6, 7) 
Consensus (1, 3, 6, 7) 
Accountability and transparency 
Clear allocation of roles 
Clear procedures for decision making 
Responsible bodies answer for outcomes and consequences 
Available information about who, how and the justification of decisions 
Accountability (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) 
Transparency/openness (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7) 
Legitimacy 
Authority conferred by law or customary rule 
Earned legitimacy through stakeholder support or strong links with the 
region 
Integrity 
Subsidiarity 
Evidence-based decisions 
Commitment to action of responsible actors 
Legitimacy (3, 4, 5, 6, 7) 
Subsidiarity (2, 4, 5, 6, 7) 
Integrity (4, 5) 
Performance 
Long-term vision in accordance with relevant policies and MPA 
management plans 
Appropriate strategic and operational planning 
Social, economic and ecological aspects considered in decisions.  
Appropriate skills and resources available 
Efficiency and effectiveness in management of natural resources 
Resilience of social-ecological systems 
Coordination and integration of governance and management 
Performance (3, 6, 7) 
Direction and strategic vision (1, 3, 4, 
6, 7)  
Connectivity/ coherence/ integration 
(2, 4, 5, 7)  
Capability/ capacity (2, 5, 6, 7) 
Responsiveness (1, 3, 7) 
Effectiveness and efficiency (1, 2, 3, 6)  
Resilience/adaptability (4, 5, 6, 7) 
Numbers indicate the following sources: 1. UNDP (1997); 2 European Commission (2001); 3. Graham et al. (2003); 
4. Lockwood (2010); 5 Lockwood et al. (2010); 6. Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2012); 7 Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
(2013). 
 
The following section describes in detail each criterion:  
a) Inclusiveness and fairness – These two principles are closely related, because decisions 
can only be fair if the needs of all stakeholders are included in the decision process, especially 
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minorities and marginalised groups. Either direct or indirect participation is necessary to 
account for different stakeholders’ positions. Some authors, like Smith and McDonough (2001), 
believe that fairness is more important than participation mechanisms. This is particularly 
important considering that a process can be unfair even with a high level of participation, 
particularly if unbalanced power structures are in place. This is further discussed in Section 2.7.  
The equitable sharing of costs and benefits is mentioned by several authors, but this is a 
problematic concept, as in most cases, decisions will leave some stakeholders better off than 
others (Lockwood 2010). For example, if the development of tourism infrastructure in an MPA 
requires substantial financial investment, local investors might not have the chance to compete 
against a large developer. For this reason, final decisions should openly balance different 
interests, rights, benefits and costs. If decisions are not completely fair, this should be 
recognised and if appropriate, those disadvantaged could be compensated (Lockwood 2010).  
Another key aspect of participation is the involvement of stakeholders from the beginning and 
throughout the process, rather than being limited to particular stages (Reed 2008). Methods used 
to implement participatory governance approaches need to be appropriate for the specific 
settings, including options to facilitate the participation of marginalized sectors of the 
population (Chambers 1994; Reed 2008; Lockwood et al. 2010).   
b) Accountability and transparency – Although closely linked and complementary, 
accountability and transparency need to be considered separately in the design or assessment of 
a governance system, as transparency does not necessarily result in accountability (Lockwood 
2010). Transparency calls for clear procedures, availability of relevant information, open 
justification of decisions and clear allocation of roles. It involves open access to all stakeholders 
about how, who and why decisions are made and includes reporting of accomplishments and 
challenges (Lockwood et al. 2012). Transparency is necessary on ethical grounds, given the 
right of stakeholders to information about decisions that affect them (Lockwood 2010). 
Transparency is also closely related to accountability, as responsible bodies should have 
transparent procedures and decision-making processes. Accountability refers to the 
establishment of clear roles; the allocation of responsibilities to specific organisations or bodies; 
the acceptance and fulfilment of those responsibilities. Responsible actors usually need to 
answer for their actions, achievements and failures to their constituencies and to higher levels of 
governance (Lockwood 2010).   
c) Legitimacy – Legitimacy is mainly understood as official authority given or conferred 
by legal mandate, but other forms of legitimacy are many times disregarded. For example, 
legitimacy can be gained by support of stakeholders (Lockwood 2010; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
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2013), or by the long-term link of indigenous people to their territories (Lockwood 2010). 
Either ancestral or legal legitimacy can be in place, but the recognition and support of the 
stakeholders is crucial in either case. Only with this support is it possible to consider that this 
principle has been fulfilled. Recognition, in turn, can come from different sources. An authority 
can be accepted because it is taken for granted (Bachrach and Baratz 1962), because of its 
capacity to bring about positive changes (Lockwood et al. 2010), or if a leader is highly 
charismatic or considered an expert in a specific field (Forsyth 1999). Decisions supported by 
robust evidence - ecological, cultural and socio-economic - also increase their legitimacy. In 
particular, performance evidence has been used increasingly to legitimise policies (Sanderson 
2002). 
Subsidiarity refers to the allocation of authority and responsibility to the level closest to the 
issue. Before devolving responsibility, however, it is necessary to consider the capacity and 
relevance of the entity. In a devolution process, responsible actors should have the mandate to 
deal with MPA decisions at that level, and the capacity to do so, including funds and skills 
(Lockwood et al. 2010). While legitimacy may increase when responsible entities are closer to 
actors affected by decisions, poor implementation of a decentralisation process can in fact 
reduce legitimacy (Stoker 1998).  
Performance – Management refers more to actions and means to fulfil specific objectives, while 
governance refers to the process of making decisions, including who and how (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2013) . Performance is more often used to describe management processes 
rather than governance. Management and governance, however, are closely linked, and criteria 
like efficiency and effectiveness, are equally important in both cases. Other issues that affect 
governance performance include long-term vision and direction; connectivity and coherence; 
capacity; and resilience and adaptability (UNDP 1997; European Commission 2001; Graham et 
al. 2003; Lockwood 2010; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2012; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013; 
Lockwood et al. 2013).  
Efficiency in governance refers to the optimal use of funds, prioritising decisions to be 
discussed and the means to do it. For example, face-to-face meetings can be costly, so these can 
be alternated with other discussion mechanisms such as online forums. Long-term vision and 
direction are fundamental to guide planning, management and governance arrangements. Strong 
leadership is a fundamental skill to generate and maintain a common vision, to secure the 
necessary support and resources for effective management, and for facing change (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2012). Connectivity and coherence refer to the integration of policies across 
different levels of governance and sectors. Capacity is closely related to management 
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effectiveness, but it is relevant to governance because relevant actors need to make decisions to 
provide or enhance capacity of responsible bodies. Resilience has been defined as the capacity 
of a linked social-ecological system to withstand and adapt to change (Gunderson and Holling 
2002). On-going evaluation and adjustment of the governance system needs to be balanced to 
avoid excessive changes, but to allow the flexibility necessary to be resilient to emergent issues 
(Lockwood 2010). This evaluation should be part of an overall MPA effectiveness, as the 
purpose of governance is to improve MPA outcomes and not a goal in itself. Coordination 
across governance levels, coherence of policies and direction, and integration across sectors are 
considered key requirements for effective and resilient governance regimes (European 
Commission 2001; Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; Lockwood et al. 2012; Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2013).  
Classification of principles of good governance is useful for analytical purposes, but these need 
to be considered in an integrated fashion. Principles can be closely linked; for example if a 
process is not fair and transparent, it can lose legitimacy before key stakeholders. Principles can 
also compromise each other, as in the case of lengthy consultation processes that reduce 
efficiency in the decision-making process.  
 
2.3 Governance issues for MPAs 
MPAs in particular have challenges that are not found in terrestrial areas. Marine ecosystems 
have a higher connectivity than terrestrial ecosystems, hindering the establishment of clear 
boundaries between different habitats, and between terrestrial and marine ecosystems. 
Traditional cultures such as coastal communities in Fiji (Govan et al. 2009a), do not establish a 
rigid divide between terrestrial and marine resource management. In contrast, many 
governments typically establish such divisions in mapping the coastline, locating jurisdictional 
boundaries and defining associated planning and management systems. These artificial divisions 
have shaped the spatial management of marine and coastal activities and are often reflected in 
the institutional arrangements, with governance and management agencies often having 
responsibilities that are limited to a particular sector or to a political jurisdiction that ignore 
natural connectivity. Such arrangements can lead to problems for system-wide coordination 
(Underdal 1980; McLeod and Leslie 2009).  
Marine ecosystems are linked to terrestrial habitats and anthropogenic activities that occur 
inland or on the coast. This connectivity is seldom matched by governance and management 
levels within a country or between countries (Karkkainen 2002). For example, pollution from 
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cities, agriculture and industries in the upper part of a river can have major impacts on an MPA 
(Cicin-Sain and Belfiore 2005). If that river crosses several countries, the reduction of pollution 
would require coordination between local and national government agencies, between the 
polluting countries and the affected country, and across different sectors, like polluting 
industries, solid waste management agencies and MPA managers (Haas 1989). Even in cases 
where coordination across levels of government is in place, like in the Great Barrier Reef, key 
threats are originated beyond the limits of MPAs (Day 2016). Another clear case is the 
management of highly migratory species, which necessitates the coordination between different 
countries to ensure sustainability (Stokke 2000). Consequently, MPA governance cannot be 
undertaken in isolation (Toropova et al. 2010), increasing the complexity of management and 
governance.  
The public nature of the sea often results in an open-access exploitation of resources, which can 
lead to “the tragedy of the commons” if it is not privatised or controlled by the state (Hardin 
1968). Evidence from several case studies have challenged the limited options proposed by 
Hardin (Ostrom 1990; Basurto 2008; Cinner et al. 2012a), and a variety of novel governance 
tools have emerged to counter this problem (Delmas and Young 2009a). New arrangements are 
being implemented around the world, such as community-based management (Kothari 2006), 
private-public partnerships (Jennings 1998), social-private partnerships (Fondo Acción 2013), 
allocation of property rights to local communities (Fernández and Castilla 2005), and 
conservation agreements or concessions (Beck et al. 2004). Unfortunately, most of the oceans 
remain mostly as common property where resources are extracted without control (World Bank 
2008; Agnew et al. 2009), or are used as a common dump (Sheavly and Register 2007).  
A related issue is the convergence of several human activities in the marine environment. 
Inevitably, some of these activities are incompatible, generating substantial conflict among 
users. This is many times accompanied by a one-by-one approach, in which different levels or 
sectors overlook the plans and priorities of others (Norse et al. 2007). Marine Spatial Planning 
(MSP) or Ocean Planning is a method to counter part of these issues. Its main goal is to map all 
the different activities, and through a participatory process, decide the distribution of user rights 
according to the best development scenario (Ehler et al. 2009). The general guidelines proposed 
by this author call for an inclusive, adaptive and integrated approach to managing different 
activities and conflicts. MSP has been proposed as the method to apply ecosystem based 
management (EBM) in the marine environment (Norse et al. 2007). There are good examples of 
MSP advances in Europe (Douvere 2008), the United States (Interagency Ocean Policy Task 
Force 2009; NOAA and MCBI 2010; Swett 2010) and Australia (Day et al. 2008; Kenchington 
and Day 2011, Day 2016).  
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Another problem arises from the limited visibility of impacts to marine habitats and species, 
because most of them occur underwater and, unlike the clear cutting of a forest, are not readily 
apparent to a casual observer. This difficulty to see changes in the marine environment is 
aggravated by the “shifting baselines syndrome”. In this syndrome, people forget or are unaware 
of previous abundance and diversity, and assume that the depleted ecosystem is the “natural 
state” (Pauly 1995). Empirical studies have confirmed this observation (Sáenz-Arroyo et al. 
2005; Papworth et al. 2009). The combination of a reduced perceptibility and the “shifting 
baselines syndrome” reduce the potential commitment of people to protect marine ecosystems. 
Without such commitment, sharing responsibilities between authorities, stakeholders and the 
general public is less likely. 
Most knowledge has been mainly generated for terrestrial environments. Marine knowledge 
started to accumulate first from coastal exploration, observations from the surface and fisheries 
landings. Only relatively recently new technology allowed science to explore the underwater 
world in better detail, with advances like scuba diving, oceanographic equipment, remote 
operated vessels, satellite tags and deep sea cameras (Levinton 2009). This technology, 
however, tends to be expensive, so most of the sea and its dynamics remain unexplored.  
In a similar vein, everyday management activities in an MPA tend to be more challenging than 
in their terrestrial counterparts. MPAs are often isolated, particularly in the case of islands, 
making transportation difficult and expensive. In addition, boundaries are less evident because it 
is not easy to put markers in deep maritime zones. Surveillance and control activities, therefore, 
require different approaches that involve specialised technology, such as on-board electronic 
monitoring systems, real-time satellite imaging and un-manned aircraft (Brooke et al. 2010). 
Marine rangers need to have regular training in specialised skills like aquatic first aid and 
rescue, scuba diving, marine surveillance operations or navigation (Worboys and Winkler 
2012). All these challenges make MPA management not only more complicated, but more 
expensive (Toropova et al. 2010).  
 
2.4 The role of participation in governance  
Participation is the mechanism by which citizens can have a say in the decisions that affect 
them. As shown in Table 2.2, participatory processes range from no participation, to informing 
the community, to empowering local communities (IAP2 2007). These diverse processes are not 
necessarily associated with a specific type of governance, as a top-down governance scheme 
can use active participation to assist decisions. Inappropriate participation can occur in symbolic 
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participatory processes, where information is manipulated to “educate” or “cure” people 
(Arnstein 1969). The danger of the latter is that powerful actors not only maintain their status 
quo of control over outcomes, but they can also claim that all interests have been considered. If 
participants realise that their inputs are not significantly included in final decisions, they can be 
left dissatisfied and with low motivation to participate in future processes (Jones 2009). 
Symbolic participation (described in Table 2.2), can lead to the disadvantages of participatory 
processes (e.g. lengthy and costly, (Coglianese 1997; Muro and Jeffrey 2008)) and of non-
participatory processes (e.g. lack of trust and support (Halvorsen 2003)). 
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Table 2.2 Spectrum of participation 
 
 No-participation 
No-participation Misinformation/ manipulation 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 Communities and other stakeholders are not 
considered in the decision-making process. 
Incomplete or false information is given to the public. 
Powerful actors other than the relevant authorities or 
stakeholders directly affected might influence the 
process. 
G
o
o
d
-
p
ra
ct
ic
e 
Decisions are taken without public input, but are 
based on sound information and intend to be fair. 
- 
M
et
h
o
d
s - Leaflets, media communications (newspapers, TV, 
radio, internet), meetings. 
 Symbolic participation 
Information Consultation 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 Accurate information might be given to the 
public, although it might not be complete. 
Powerful actors other than the relevant 
authorities or stakeholders directly affected 
might influence the process. 
Official information is given to the public (might be 
accurate but not necessarily complete). Feedback from 
the public is received, but not necessarily considered. 
G
o
o
d
-
p
ra
ct
ic
e Information is complete, accurate and objective. 
There are tools in place for citizens to ask for 
and receive specific information. 
Consultation is undertaken during different phases of the 
process. Feedback is considered and final decisions 
explain why the public’s opinion is included or not. 
M
et
h
o
d
s 
Leaflets, media communications (newspapers, 
TV, radio, internet), meetings. 
Public comments received online or by mail. Public 
meetings, surveys and workshops. 
 Active participation 
Involvement/ co-management Empowerment 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 
Stakeholders are involved in the decision-making 
process. It can include some information-only 
phases, but the process as a whole actively 
engages the public. Final decisions might be 
taken by one of the parties (involvement), or they 
can be taken jointly (co-management). Power 
structures are often overlooked. 
Decisions are taken by local communities or agencies. 
Power structures can still be in place. 
G
o
o
d
-p
ra
ct
ic
e All relevant stakeholders are included, regardless 
of local, subnational, national or international 
power structures. The public’s opinions are built 
into the statement of problems and possible 
solutions. Decisions give priority to the most 
affected or disadvantaged stakeholders. 
Local governance structures are fair and inclusive, have 
a clear vision of communal long-term benefits and have 
the necessary resources to execute agreed plans. 
Local participation processes in place. 
M
et
h
o
d
s 
Workshops, committees. Other communication 
tools are subsidiary. 
Local governance structures, delegated or statutory 
decision authority given to local communities, agencies 
or decision bodies. 
Adapted from Arnstein (1969) and IAP2 (2007)  
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Participation has an ethical justification to make fairer decisions, and a number of theoretical 
and empirical benefits are highlighted in the literature. According to the social learning 
approach (Keen et al. 2005), individuals and groups meet to improve the management of the 
environment through reflection and deliberation. This approach is characterised by open 
thinking and communication, facilitation and knowledge sharing (Schusler et al. 2003). 
Participation is a necessary step for conflict resolution (Pahl-Wostl 2002), creation of a shared 
purpose (Biedenweg and Monroe 2013) and collective action (Rydin and Pennington 2000). 
Participation in policy inquiry, planning and implementation might help solving environmental 
‘wicked problems’ (Fischer 1993; Pahl-Wostl 2002; Schusler et al. 2003; Alcala and Russ 2006; 
Pomeroy 2007). 
Participatory processes help bring together scientific, local and traditional ecological 
knowledge. While each kind of knowledge has advantages and limitations, the combination can 
greatly enhance the adaptive management of natural resources (McLeod and Leslie 2009). In 
time, participatory processes have been shown to build understanding and trust between 
participants, including members of different sectors and backgrounds (Pahl-Wostl 2002; Keen 
et al. 2005; Muro and Jeffrey 2008). This trust is the building block for increased social capital, 
which has been highlighted as an essential component for collective action and self-organisation 
(Folke et al. 2005). This, coupled with enhanced organisational skills (Lane and McDonald 
2005) can make a significant difference when various stakeholders are involved in the 
management and decision making of MPAs. 
The active involvement of different actors in the governance of MPAs also leads to local 
empowerment and increased stewardship for natural resources. This is particularly so in cases 
where involvement goes beyond meetings, and communities or stakeholders are involved in 
monitoring, surveillance, or other management activities (Agrawal 2005). Throughout the 
process people sometimes learn through experience (Kolb et al. 2001) and in some cases might 
change their worldviews and attitudes towards a more pro-environment position, as well as 
more pro-social (Biedenweg and Monroe 2013; Walton 2013). 
A more active involvement can be related to an elevated “sense of place” or the responsibility 
that people feel towards a natural setting (Agrawal 2005). This, combined with skills and 
knowledge acquired through a meaningful participatory process, can lead to the empowerment 
of local actors in the governance and management of a protected area, as well as better 
acceptance of and compliance with regulations (Keen et al. 2005). In the long term, this 
acquired commitment of local actors results in a reduced costs of management (Tawake et al. 
2001).  
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Place-based knowledge, in combination with scientific knowledge, can provide the basis for a 
timely and innovative response to unexpected changes (Berkes and Folke 2002). In the longer 
term, increasing levels of trust and capacity lead to the possibility of solving emergent problems 
that were not the initial focus of the participatory process (Berkes 2009). As Pahl-Wostl (2002) 
highlights, where both stakes and uncertainties are high, social learning is more appropriate than 
conventional top-down management. Most environmental problems are characterised by 
significant uncertainty. 
However, designing and implementing effective participation processes and securing local 
involvement often pose significant challenges. The romantic view of “the local”, where external 
practitioners neglect local power dynamics and internal heterogeneity, introduces serious 
problems in the design of participatory processes (Mohan and Stokke 2000; Armitage et al. 
2009; Armitage and Plummer 2010). Local involvement alone is not enough for sustainable 
management of natural resources, as has been shown in different studies (Govan et al. 2009a), 
and many factors need to be accounted for in the planning of MPAs. Additional issues to 
consider include biological aspects such as productivity and ecological connections; socio-
economic aspects, such as income and financial capacity of affected parties; and cultural issues, 
such as traditional management arrangements or the level of dependence on the natural 
environment of local communities.  
 
2.5 Power-dynamics in decision-making 
Power can be defined as the capacity of an actor to affect the actions of others in an intended 
and calculated way (Wrong 1979). Different terms have been used to describe power, including 
influence, domination, coercion and manipulation. These terms are used throughout the 
literature, sometimes interchangeably but also to distinguish different kinds of power (see for 
example Figure 1 in Lukes 2005). In this review and throughout the thesis, the terms influence 
and power will be used interchangeably. The use of the term influence will not include 
unconscious or unintended effects on others’ opinions and decisions.  
The sources of power in political settings have been categorised as: ideological, political, , 
economic, and military (the IEMP model) (Mann 1986). In addition to these categories, some 
authors allude to “information power”, either as the capacity to build arguments to convince 
others (Forsyth 1999), or to access and manipulate information (Forester 1989; Lukes 2005; 
Armitage and Plummer 2010; Schneier 2012).  
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Political power refers “to regulations and coercion centrally administered and territorially 
bounded - that is, to state power” (Mann 1986). It includes the statutory authority given to 
entities such as government agencies, or delegated to other organisations. Most modern states, 
as opposed to despotic states, depend mainly on institutionalised infrastructural power and 
bureaucracy, penetrating and exercising power through civil society (Mann 1986). An actor who 
can influence key political actors acquires political power, most of the times indirect or covert. 
Ideological power is possible because of the human need of finding meaning in life and 
belonging to a group (Mann 1986). The better-known sources of ideological power are 
religions, and their leaders can be in a position to influence followers to act in a way consistent 
with their personal goals. Other kinds of ideological manipulation are possible when people 
identify with a specific set of arguments or beliefs, as in the case of environmentalists (Menz 
1989). 
Economic power, as its name suggests, involves the capacity of mobilizing resources, including 
financial, to reach a specific goal. Direct financial exchanges are not necessary to exert pressure 
over policy decisions, but potential opportunities can be enough to change outcomes in a 
process. For instance, funding of development programmes by international donors or by 
government might be linked to policy preferences (Woods 2008; Head 2010). 
Military power, as Mann (2006) defines it, is not limited to a nation’s armed forces, but to any 
group that through violence takes control over a region or an issue. The term military, however, 
is misleading, as it is usually associated with government establishments such as the police or 
the navy.  
Another source of power is the capacity of an individual or group to construct an argument to 
impact decisions according to their points of view (Forsyth 1999). This information power is 
related to a central position within a communication network (Emirbayer 1997). It can provide 
significant power to an actor who can share, withhold or manipulate information in order to 
affect a decision (Forester 1989). An individual or organisation can also acquire power within a 
network if other actors consider them knowledgeable or “expert” (Forsyth 1999). This source of 
power is also related to the concept of “governmentality” discussed by Michel Foucault, where 
knowledge and the construction of truth are inevitably linked to political control, and are used 
as an instrument to exert that power (Faubion 2000). Powerful actors can then manipulate 
sources of information such as education institutions and mass media to create needs and 
priorities in the population, effectively reducing conflict and possible challenges to their status 
quo.  
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Information power can lie in technical knowledge, understanding of the institutional structures 
and processes that can be modified, or the understanding of the psychology of people or groups 
open for manipulation. Forester (1989) makes an in-depth analysis of how misinformation is 
used to influence policy decisions at the levels described by Lukes (2005) – decisions, agenda 
setting and shaping of needs. This author distinguishes between inevitable information gaps and 
unnecessary distortions; the former might result from either personal idiosyncrasies or 
systematic differences in access to information, while the latter involves interpersonal 
manipulation and the strategic use of misinformation to legitimate power or institutional 
structures. Structural manipulations can become embedded social structures (Schneider and 
Ingram 1993; Lukes 2005). 
The categorisation of power according to their sources is useful to study power structures and 
dynamics within an MPA system, but it is important to bear in mind that actors usually use 
multiple sources of power. The holding of one source of power, often reinforces the ability to 
obtain other sources of power; for example wealth can be used to obtain political power and 
vice versa (Wrong 1979). Another complication to the study of power is that it is many times 
covert. Dahl (1961) analyses the differences between direct or overt power, where individuals 
are involved in the decision-making processes, and indirect or covert power, where individuals 
can influence the decisions, but not make them. Studying informal linkages and ideological 
homologies, lobby strategies, and actions instead of only discourses can help understand diffuse 
power (Gorski 2006). 
According to Max Weber, the response of individuals in a social setting to the exercise of 
power, referred to as social action, can be classified as instrumental, value-oriented, emotional 
or habitual (Kiser 2006). Instrumental responses to power refer to behaviours motivated by the 
need to accomplish a target. For example, a superior in an organisation can manipulate a 
subordinate through negative or positive incentives related to their contract or salary. The 
person yields to the possibility of punishment or reward because they want to keep their job or 
receive increased income. This goal determines their behaviour. On the other hand, value-
oriented reactions are informed by ethical motivations and beliefs. Charity organisations usually 
target people’s sense of rightfulness to raise funds for a specific cause. If an environmental 
organisation mobilizes a number of people to volunteer for a communal goal, most people will 
choose to participate because they feel it is the “right thing” to do, rather than expecting an 
individual outcome. Emotional social actions are determined by personal feelings, rather than 
principles or goals. For instance, if non-compliance of a person may affect their family or 
friends, the person might yield even if it contradicts their personal interests or ethical standards. 
Finally, some behaviours are not oriented by any of the previous reasons, but are habitual. 
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These habits can be developed by individuals or by social groups, and is the case of many 
norms and rules that shape everyday social behaviour. 
Lukes’ three-dimensional view of power (Lukes 2005) posits that power can be exercised in 
three ways. The first one is the most recognised in power studies, and refers to the success of 
proposing or vetoing decisions. This focus however ignores the importance of the power over 
the agenda, or the capacity to prevent opening certain issues to discussion. Schattschneider 
(1961) called this “the mobilisation of bias”. In their analysis of the issue, Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962) fail to acknowledge that the bias can be out of the control of an individual, but be 
embedded in a social construction. Decision-makers might even be unaware of such barriers and 
where power is exercised by a legitimate authority, conflict might not be openly present (Lukes 
2005). The third dimension refers to the shaping of preferences of constituencies, so people 
accept their situation as normal and do not consider different alternatives. In this way, conflict is 
prevented at an even deeper level and powerful actors easily maintain their status quo. 
Lukes’ third dimension of power can be compared to Foucault’s theory, in that it can occur at an 
unconscious level. Foucault understands power as a strategy, which is both diffuse and 
embodied in society, and is reinforced through discourses and institutions (Gaventa 2003). In 
this strategy, power is constituted through actions that affect the actions of others, and is 
focused on shaping the conduct of individuals (Foucault 1982). In contrast to Lukes’ theory, 
however, Foucault sees influential individuals or groups as a construction of the strategy of 
power, rather than as possessors of power. Power is a necessary aspect of society, being present 
in all aspects of life, and is constantly reinforced through education, political structures and 
institutions. 
Most of the literature on governance and planning refers to negative aspects of power, such as 
manipulation of information and undue influence on decisions. In contrast to mainstream 
literature, I posit that power is also a necessary feature of any social group to function properly. 
Social roles such as coordinators, mediators and leaders need to exert power over others to be 
effective. Such roles have been identified as key requirements for resilient governance (Olsson 
et al. 2004; Charles 2007; Lockwood et al. 2012; Berkes and Ross 2013). In governance, the 
concept of empowerment in co-management or community-based management entails an 
increased ability of specific actors to control certain aspects of society (Jentoft 2005). The 
consequences of power depend thus on the values, motivations and objectives of the powerful. 
The different theoretical developments of power tend to be complementary, as they tend to 
analyse different aspects of power: sources of power, means to exert influence and responses to 
power, and the several levels at which power can be exerted. Foucault’s theory, however, is 
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fundamentally different in that power is not wielded by specific agents (Gaventa 2003). In this 
thesis I assume that power is found both in social systems as a whole, as described by Foucault. 
I also acknowledge that certain actors could choose to exert power over others. For practical 
reasons, I focus the analysis on views of power that recognise agency of individuals or groups, 
namely the identification of influential actors, sources of power and social structures that 
empower specific actors. This does not mean that I do not accept that some types of power are 
embedded in society through social constructs like culture, education, political systems and the 
media. Studying such aspects of power, however, is more difficult, because subjects are often 
unconscious of influences, objectives, means and origins of power.  
Power is closely linked to the existence of social networks, and there is a specific actor-network 
theory in relation to power (Gaventa 2003). According to this theory, power is not only a 
function of what an actor has at their disposition to exert influence, but it also depends on the 
number of actors that are driven to support that exertion of influence. Murdoch and Marsden 
(1995), for example, bring together aspects of structure, discourse and agency in the analysis of 
power, looking at the connection across networks at different levels of action. Taking into 
consideration the importance of networks in the analysis of power, the next section is explores 
the theoretical bases of social networks and Social Network Analysis (SNA).  
 
2.6 Theoretical development of Social Network Analysis 
Power is fundamentally relational so it needs to be organised in a network to have an impact on 
decision processes (Mann 1986; Collins 2006). Social networks are groups of people or 
organisations that are linked together through social relations (Prell 2011). One person might 
belong to different groups, and their social relations and roles in the network will vary across 
groups. Different social networks might be linked through specific actors, and small networks 
are usually nested within larger ones (Moody and White 2003). For example, the governance of 
a World Heritage MPA like the Great Barrier Reef involves interlinked local, state, federal and 
international advisory and decision bodies (GBRMPA 2011). Actors might have connections 
both within and between levels of action. These connections can have commercial, kinship, 
friendship, or official origins. These multiple linkages between networks allow power structures 
to permeate through different decision levels and arenas, typically combining different sources 
of power. For example, large transnational corporations can use their economic power to 
support strong lobby to further their interests at both national and international political arenas 
(Sklair 2002). Similarly, corporate power can be used to support personal political views of 
Chief Executive Officers, through social responsibility allocations (Chin et al. 2013). In this 
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way, an economic power source is used to influence political decisions, which in turn might 
have consequences in decisions at all levels.  
Power is not only a result of individual or organisational attributes, but it is also embedded in a 
particular social setting. In fact, the powerful needs to wield that power through networks, in 
order to obtain the expected results. Therefore, SNA methods are a useful tool to complement 
qualitative analyses of power, as it provides a graphical and analytical way of understanding 
underlying social structures. A short overview of the theoretical background of SNA methods 
will examine how social structures are relevant for the study of governance regimes.  
Social sciences have relied mostly on characterisation of the individual or group to explain 
social phenomena (Borgatti et al. 2009). Relational sciences recognise that actors are embedded 
in different networks; those networks are made up of nodes (individuals or groups) and links. 
Network relations and structures influence the attributes of nodes, as well as the links 
themselves. This means that the study of networks considers an extra level of complexity in 
social sciences, given a strong dependence between nodes and links data (Robins et al. 2012).  
For example, there is a concept often referred to as social influence or contagion. In this case, 
two linked nodes influence each other through their connection, resulting in shared attributes. A 
different concept, which can yield a similar configuration of the relationship, is called social 
selection or homophily. In this case, two nodes who share certain attributes form a relationship 
because they share that attribute. Figure 2.1 explains the difference between these concepts 
graphically. Analytically distinguishing between these two concepts is complicated, unless the 
study specifically focuses on network changes over time. 
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Figure 2.1 Comparison between social influence and social selection 
Circles indicate nodes (individuals or groups) with the same (blue) or different (white) attributes. Lines indicate links.  
 
 
       
 
 
Source: Modified from Robins et al. (2012) 
 
Node attributes might also be influenced by their position in a network. For example, the 
directors of two companies might share certain attributes, such as leadership skills. Again, 
without a longitudinal assessment, it will be difficult to understand if those skills were 
developed due to their position in the network (generalised influence), or if the directors are in 
that position because they possessed those skills beforehand (generalised selection) (Robins et 
al. 2012).  
Links can also develop due to existing patterns in a network, a concept known as structural 
processes or network self-organisation (Robins et al. 2012). Reciprocity in a directed network 
refers to the tendency to form a link from node B to node A, when a link from node A to node B 
already exists (Figure 2.2). Another key structural characteristic is closure, where a link 
between A and C develops, because A is connected to B and B is connected to C. In this way, a 
2-path structure tends to become a triangle (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The absence of 
closure, usually known as structural holes, has been recognised as an important structure that 
influences social processes. In the 2-path relationship (Figure 2.2), actor B acquires more power 
in the network, as it can act as a broker. The level of brokerage influence of an actor within a 
given network has been measured with a metric called betweenness centrality (Freeman 1979). 
Padgett and Ansell (1993) argue that in the 1400s, such position in a number of networks 
allowed the Medici family in Italy to become the most influential family. On the other hand, this 
position has also been related to effective collaboration and coordination among different 
stakeholders in natural resource management (Bodin and Crona 2009). Brokers can therefore 
wield their power to further their own interests, but depending on their motivations, they can 
also significantly improve natural resource governance. A related structure, the star (Figure 2.2), 
refers to the level of centralisation of an actor, and is measured by the degree centrality. It is 
Influence 
Selection 
Time 1 Time 2 
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important to keep in mind, though, that brokerage and centralisation can come at a cost. The 
role of intermediating between different people or groups can be overwhelming (Long et al. 
2013), and sometimes it can even result in economic penalties (Barnes et al. 2016). 
 
Figure 2.2 Important network structures 
Circles indicate nodes (individuals or groups), lines indicate links and arrowheads directionality. 
 
 
       
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
Source: Modified from Robins et al. (2012) 
 
A closed network, on the other hand, can increase collaboration, trust and social scrutiny. 
Robins et al. (2011) consider that structural signatures such as reciprocation and triangulation 
are a precondition for effective network governance. According to the risk hypothesis of 
Reciprocity 
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Berardo and Scholz (2010), depending on the perceived risks, actors in a network might choose 
coordination over cooperation, as coordination by a central actor can be more efficient. Under 
more risky conditions, however, cooperation might be preferable, because a higher level of 
triangulation can result in closer scrutiny of norms and agreements.  
Schneider et al. (2003) found that such structures are not necessarily pre-existing, but can 
develop from an intervention to improve community-based initiatives. These authors compared 
networks where the National Estuary Program in the United States had worked, with others that 
were not part of the Program. They found that National Estuary Program networks were better 
connected to different levels of government, had stronger links between members, and people 
were more positive about policy processes.    
As discussed here, there is consequently significant power that can be determined by a network 
position and configuration. Power holders can choose to use it in a way that affects 
collaborative ventures either positively or negatively. With this in mind, the next section 
considers the implications that power and participation have on MPA governance. 
 
2.7 Implications of power and participation in MPA governance 
Participatory and collaborative processes of natural resource management are becoming more 
common. Many of these processes intend to counter the historical marginalisation of certain 
groups (Rydin and Pennington 2000), particularly local communities that depend on the 
resources at stake. Powerful actors, however, can substantially influence decisions in an MPA 
designation process and at the same time affect the quality of governance.  
As discussed in Section 2.2, governance quality has become an important issue at the 
international level and in some places at the national and local levels. Unfortunately, power 
structures can be overlooked (Lane and McDonald 2005) and the implementation of good-
governance principles can be affected in several intertwined ways. For example, Prilleltensky 
(2008) posit that political oppression, a manifestation of unequal power distribution, can 
establish obstacles to participation. If individuals believe that they do not deserve to participate 
(psychological oppression), unequal power distribution is reinforced. For instance, McCullum et 
al. (2004) found that a food-security planning process in the United States was manipulated by 
influential members of the community. They reported disenfranchised participants changing 
their priority issues throughout the process eventually reflecting those of the most powerful 
members of the community. The “groupthink” phenomenon is characterised by individual 
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reason and moral being overridden by group pressure, resulting in bad decisions (Forsyth 1999). 
This concept is similar to “mistaken learning”, observed in the planning of the Lake Ontario 
Islands Wildlife Management Area (Schusler et al. 2003). In this last case, authorities noticed 
that incorrect assumptions were accepted by the majority of participants and were included as 
important inputs for planning decisions. Some authors suggest that this occurs because 
individuals in a cohesive group try to avoid confrontation (Turner and Pratkanis 1998). 
However, Kramer (1998) posits that the will to maintain political power is a stronger reason 
behind some major bad decisions in politics. Understanding power dynamics in a group can 
therefore inform why a group conforms to a less than optimal decision. This knowledge in turn, 
is necessary to devise possible solutions.  
Even in participatory processes, where all stakeholders have an opportunity to express their 
views, decision-makers can be influenced in undisclosed meetings by powerful actors. While 
participation can increase stakeholder involvement, decisions might still be unfair, if they 
mainly reflect the interests of powerful actors. Covert influence, such as lobbying decision-
makers, also affects accountability and transparency. Information about covert or unconscious 
manipulations, undisclosed meetings and deliberations is often not available to the public. In 
this case, the responsible agency would not be able to explain how decisions were taken or why 
they did not correspond to public deliberations.   
Unfairness and lack of transparency can in turn reduce the trust of people in public deliberation, 
affecting their future willingness to participate in decision-making processes (Carpini et al. 
2004). At the same time, the responsible agency can lose legitimacy in the eyes of participants, 
especially if the public believes that an external individual or organisation consistently 
influences or makes the decisions. Poor legitimacy combined with disenchanted stakeholders 
can affect performance, as social support and compliance are fundamental to MPA effectiveness 
and resilience (Armitage and Plummer 2010; Lockwood 2010).  
The implementation of good-governance principles can also face difficult challenges. For 
example, inclusiveness and fairness principles call for the participation of all stakeholders in 
decision processes. Participation of the full range of relevant actors might not be viable, because 
logistic or financial resources are insufficient or when motivation to participate is low. 
Therefore, participation is often achieved through representatives of the different stakeholders. 
Choosing appropriate representatives can be difficult, as they might not represent the 
community or sector or might lack enough authority to decide (Parkinson 2003; Living Oceans 
Society and World Wildlife Fund Canada 2005). An organisation leading a participatory process 
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needs to question the limits between influencing a process to make it fairer and the right of self-
determination of a community (Armitage and Plummer 2010).  
Another issue related to fairness refers to the variable resources and capabilities of the different 
stakeholders. While open and inclusive discussions might be in place, powerful actors can have 
a stronger influence on final decisions for several reasons. It is believed that “affectors” or users 
that significantly impact an ecosystem have more political power, as they tend to be better 
organised as a sector (Scheffer et al. 2000). Some actors might lack the capability to attend 
meetings, communicate directly with the top decision-makers, or to argument their point of 
view convincingly. Powerful actors can often organise informal talks with top decision-makers, 
or pay lobbyists to attend all marginally relevant meetings to constantly forward their interests. 
Because such cases are not uncommon (Sklair 2002), a leading agency or facilitator might need 
to balance the opportunities of different stakeholders to include all needs and expectations in the 
agenda (Lane and McDonald 2005).  
In relation to performance, efficiency is a key element, including the appropriate use of funds. 
The costs of governance activities should be balanced in relation to investments on MPA 
management. A participatory process can be expensive, time-consuming, and tiring for 
participants and leading agencies (Coglianese 1997; Muro and Jeffrey 2008). It is therefore 
necessary to evaluate previously which decisions are to be made in a collaborative way, or if 
alternative discussion methods should complement face-to-face deliberations.  
 
2.8 Chapter summary 
In summary, power dynamics can affect the quality of governance in several ways, but power is 
also a necessary feature for the functioning of social groups (Forsyth 1999). For instance, overt 
power is essential for leadership to exist in a community, and this leadership in turn is 
considered important for the management of marine resources (Gutiérrez et al. 2011). In a 
different example, environmental education campaigns use covert power to influence 
sustainable attitudes (Vaughan et al. 2003). As already discussed, however, unbalanced power 
can harm both outcomes and governance quality. The questions that arise from the literature are 
essential to guide power dynamics studies. Understanding power dynamics in turn, is a 
necessary first step before designing ways to overcome unbalanced decisions (Forester 1989). 
Therefore, advancing towards more socially and environmentally sustainable governance 
arrangements will necessarily have to include power dynamics research. Because power 
structures depend mainly on individuals and particular networks, each case is unique and 
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requires a focused study. Power structures are not stable (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Bodin and 
Prell 2011), so any study will only reflect a specific point in time. However, as researchers start 
to better understand power dynamics, their findings will point to common issues that can help 
conceptualise and guide natural resources governance practice. In this thesis, I focus on the 
governance quality of MPAs in Tasmania, and on how the distribution of power has affected 
this quality. Considering that power has both positive and negative aspects, I also explore the 
existence of powerful social structures that can enhance coordination and collaboration in the 
governance of marine resources in Tasmania. The next chapter explains the research design, 
describing the methodological stand, the analytical framework and the specific methods to 
answer the objectives of this study.    
 34 
 
Chapter 3 Research design 
 
In previous chapters, I discussed the importance of governance quality for MPA effectiveness, 
and the effect of power structures on key elements of a governance regime. Developing an 
understanding of the complexity of a governance regime and the associated interplay with 
power structures requires a multi-method approach. This chapter first explains the 
methodological underpinnings for my choice of a pragmatic research approach and a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Then I develop the analytical framework 
that guided my thesis and explain why I selected the Tasmanian case study. Finally, I describe 
the methods used to address the research objectives introduced in Chapter 1. 
  
3.1 Pragmatism as a research paradigm 
Several philosophical research paradigms have been proposed to explain the different 
ontological, epistemological and methodological
1
 stands in the social sciences. The most 
important ones, positivism/post-positivism and constructivism, are usually seen as opposing 
philosophies (Feilzer 2010). Positivism and post-positivism assume that reality exists and that 
the researcher can be an objective observer of that reality. Quantitative methods are favoured, 
although qualitative methods can be used to complement the main findings. In contrast, 
constructivism sees reality as social constructions, so it can vary depending on the 
interpretations of individuals or groups. As the researcher is linked to that reality, results are 
created through the inquiry process (Guba and Lincoln 1994). Constructivists prefer qualitative 
methods (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004).  
The dichotomy between these main research paradigms gives priority to either quantitative or 
qualitative methods, restricting the choice of methods that researchers can use (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie 2004; Feilzer 2010). In fact, both quantitative and qualitative methods have 
advantages and limitations. To overcome these constraints on researchers, pragmatism has been 
proposed as an alternative research paradigm that can combine the advantages of several 
research methods, and overcome the weaknesses of specific methods (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie 2004).  
                                                     
1
 Ontology refers to the nature of reality, epistemology to the relationship between the researcher and 
reality, and methodology to the process of acquiring knowledge about that reality (Mason 2002). 
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There are conflicting understandings of pragmatism as a research paradigm, but in general, 
pragmatists accept that reality is composed of several elements; some of these elements can be 
objectively understood, while others are subjectively constructed. Feilzer (2010) proposes that 
causality and subjectivity can be reconciled, if one accepts that there are regular patterns that 
can be predicted, but are subject to singularities derived from the multiple perceptions of the 
same reality. Pragmatism is ultimately “problem-centred” and the choice of methods depends 
more on their usefulness to answer a research question, than on specific methodological 
prescriptions (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006). It is thus a suitable philosophical framework for 
mixed-methods research.  
Governance of MPAs and of social ecological systems in general involves objective realities 
(biophysical elements), and social constructs (e.g. culture, economic systems, political settings, 
values, institutions). I believe that both objective and subjective elements exist regardless of the 
research process. These elements are complex and dynamic, and are subject to the specificities 
of the local circumstances, preventing a universal understanding. As a researcher, my own story 
and values influence what I consider important and therefore what merits investigation. Because 
one of the objectives of this thesis is to make recommendations to improve the governance 
regime, the results of the research have the potential of changing this reality.  
From this point of view, I chose a number of methods, both qualitative and quantitative, based 
on their usefulness in answering the specific objectives. I do not believe that one is superior to 
the other, as the constructivist and positivist/post-positivist purists posit. A mixed-methods 
approach allowed me to take advantage of the benefits of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods, capturing as much of the inherent complexity of a governance regime as possible. 
Instead of perpetuating the dichotomy posed by purists on any side of the philosophical 
spectrum (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004), I assume that these two approaches are 
complementary. 
 
3.2 Analytical framework 
In order to structure the analysis, I created a framework, based on the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework (Ostrom 2011), and the framework for analysing the sustainability of 
social-ecological systems (Ostrom 2009). Unlike Ostrom’s frameworks, the one used here is not 
exclusively focused on the extraction of resources. I distinguish between core governance 
components of the governance system (instruments, actors, decision arenas and the problems 
that the governance regime faces), and influences on these components (socio-economic, 
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cultural, political and natural settings). The framework in Figure 3.1 shows influences, core 
components of the governance regime, and key elements for each component. It is important to 
note that there are significant interrelations between the different influences, components and 
specific elements. Elements in the framework are thus used to structure analysis, rather than 
represent independent categories. Table 3.1 lists the sources that were used to justify the choice 
of each element in the framework. 
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Figure 3.1 Analytical Framework for analysing MPA governance 
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Table 3.1 Influences, components and elements in a governance regime  
Influence/ 
Component 
Element Supporting sources 
Socio-
economic 
context 
Demographics of study area population (Gunderson and Holling 2002; 
Ostrom 2009; 2011; Jones 2013; 
García et al. 2014; Worboys et al. 
2015) 
Economic system (Kelly 1997; Gunderson and Holling 
2002; Worboys et al. 2015) 
Economic status of the population in general and of 
specific stakeholders.  
(Ostrom 2009; 2011; García et al. 
2014) 
External and internal market influences  (Krien 2010) 
Relative importance of main industry sectors (Kelly 1997) 
Financial capacity for implementation (Kelly 1997) 
Cultural 
context 
Main worldviews, principles, values and assumptions  (Gunderson and Holling 2002; 
Ostrom 2009; 2011; Ban et al. 2013) 
Respect for rules and norms (Kelly 1997) 
Activities associated with well-being in the study area, 
such as recreational fishing 
(Franklin 1996; Frawley 2015),  
Political 
context 
Relative dominance of political parties and their 
associated ideological stands and policies 
(Worboys et al. 2015) 
Level of politicisation of decisions - 
Natural 
context 
Bio-geography (e.g. endemism, distribution patterns) (Cowen et al. 2000) 
Physical influences (e.g. currents) (Carr and Reed 1993; Edgar et al. 
2000) 
Fauna and flora characteristics (e.g. resilience, life 
history) 
(Carr and Reed 1993) 
Biodiversity and ecological dynamics (Gunderson and Holling 2002) 
Instruments 
Legal and policy framework  (Ostrom 2009; 2011; Ban et al. 2013; 
Jones et al. 2013) 
Quality of governance  (European Commission 2001; 
Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 
2010; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2012) 
Rules and clarity of rules (Ostrom 2009; 2011) 
Formal incentives and perverse incentives (Gunderson and Holling 2002)  
Norms and cultural incentives (Ostrom 2009; 2011) 
Compliance determinants (Arias et al. 2015) 
Effectiveness measurement (Pomeroy et al. 2004; Ban et al. 
2013) 
Actors 
Sectors – actor map (Ostrom 2009; 2011; Ban et al. 2013) 
Relationships (networks) (Gunderson and Holling 2002; 
Ostrom 2009; 2011) 
Power structures – imbalances, leadership, brokerage (Gunderson and Holling 2002; 
Ostrom 2009; 2011) 
Dependence on natural resources and specific 
livelihoods 
(Ostrom 2009; 2011) 
Knowledge of the socio-ecological system (Gunderson and Holling 2002; 
Ostrom 2009; 2011; Ban et al. 2013),  
Social and organisational capital and capacity (Pretty and Smith 2004) 
Decision 
arenas 
Formal and informal (Ostrom 2009; 2011) 
Meeting frequency (Govan et al. 2009a) 
Rational deliberation opportunities (Gunderson and Holling 2002; 
Armitage et al. 2007) 
Inclusiveness (Schirmer et al. 2016) 
Problems 
Impact of different uses and synergistic effects (Craig 2012)  
Natural productivity vs extraction (Ostrom 2009; 2011) 
Conflicts between users (Ban and Klein 2009; Ostrom 2009; 
2011) 
Unknowns and uncertainties (Kelly 1997; Gunderson and Holling 
2002) 
Regime deficiencies (Lockwood et al. 2012) 
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3.2.1 Influences 
Key analytical elements of the socio-economic context for MPAs affect political priorities and 
include demographics of the population living in the study area; economic status of the 
population in general and of specific stakeholders; external and internal market influences; 
relative importance of the main industry sectors; and the degree of dependence on the extractive 
and non-extractive use of natural resources. These economic factors also shape preferences in 
the population for choosing a particular livelihood. For instance, the growth of tourism in 
certain regions has provided new opportunities for fishers, representing not only alternative 
livelihoods, but also changing MPA perceptions (Arias et al. 2015). In the same manner, market 
factors have driven preferences in fishing practices, such as modifications of the tuna fishery to 
reduce dolphin bycatch (Hall et al. 2000). Cultural influences include worldviews, principles, 
knowledge, values given to the resources at stake and assumptions; these elements can affect 
attitudes and behaviours. Activities associated with well-being in the study area, such as 
recreational fishing, also shape priorities and the perception of problems in the governance 
system. The political context is mainly given by the relative dominance of political parties and 
their associated ideological stands and policies. The level of politicisation of decisions partly 
determines the extent that the governance regime is affected by these issues. Finally, natural 
context elements, like bio-geographical history, physical influences, fauna and flora 
characteristics, biodiversity and ecological dynamics, influence the success of specific 
governance arrangements.  
3.2.2 Core elements 
Instruments. Legislation and policies are fundamental components of an MPA governance 
regime, establishing agencies, responsibilities and rules. In some cases, they can also specify 
incentives for specific practices, like punishments and rewards. Sometimes they can create 
unanticipated or perverse incentives. Although legislation and policy can be configured in 
accordance with good governance practices, often the implementation of good governance 
principles depends on the willingness of governors or facilitating agencies. There are cultural 
elements such as norms, which affect behaviour, including compliance with formal rules. 
Finally, the measurement of effectiveness of both governance and management systems is 
fundamental to track progress, to report on progress and to remedy shortcomings. 
Actors. A first step in understanding a governance regime is identifying the actors who can 
affect and who are affected by the regime. It is important to assess which actors have statutory 
powers, have indirect influence over decisions and have been marginalised or overlooked. More 
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in depth analysis can also shed light on capacities of different actors, the knowledge they have 
of the social-ecological system, and the relationships between them. Investigating power 
dynamics includes both imbalances between different actors, but also social structures that can 
either facilitate or impede collaboration. It is also important to understand to what extent 
different actors depend on natural resources, either for their subsistence, for their livelihood, or 
for their well-being. In each case, it is informative to understand what natural resources are 
required to sustain each of the existing activities. I chose to work at the organisational level, 
rather than the individual for two reasons. First, the MPA process in Tasmania has encompassed 
different regions and a diversity of actors, many of which work at the State level. It was thus 
unpractical to focus at individual actors, as this would have added a complex mix of local, 
regional and State levels of analysis. Second, several years have passed since the development 
of the MPA strategy for Tasmania and even from the last designation process (See Chapter 4 for 
details). Organisations tend to be more stable over time than individuals in particular roles. It 
therefore made more sense to focus my analysis at the organisational level. Nevertheless, 
although analyses focused at the organisational level, some personal opinions were asked of 
participants in the Questionnaire (see Section 3.3.4 and Appendix 2) to shed light on the 
different views found about MPAs and the governance regime. The questionnaire clearly states 
which questions explore personal views and which questions refer to their organisation (see 
Appendix 2).    
Decision arenas. Formal decision arenas tend to be easier to identify, especially if they are open 
for public participation (e.g. consultation hearings) or attendance (e.g. legislative discussions), 
or if minutes of each meeting are produced and shared publicly (e.g. Fisheries Advisory 
Committees (FAC)). Other meetings occur in private, minutes are possibly not written nor are 
results shared with the public (e.g. lobby meetings). These private meetings are more difficult to 
track and can only be analysed through key informants, who might be reluctant to participate if 
dealing with sensitive information. Relevant information about formal and informal decision 
arenas include the periodicity of meetings, inclusiveness, scope of participation (e.g. decision-
making, consultation, informative) and opportunities for cross-sector dialogue.        
Problems. Governance regimes usually need to deal with a number of interactions between the 
natural environment, human activities and institutions. Key issues include the balance between 
extraction and natural productivity, the impact of different uses and synergistic effects, and the 
conflict between different users. A key element in a governance system is the existence of a 
substantial knowledge of the natural environment, to have a good baseline with which to 
compare subsequent changes. Although this is fundamental for establishing and adjusting 
management and governance arrangements, often there are significant information gaps, 
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variability and associated uncertainties. Other problems can be related to regime deficiencies, 
and the possible mismatch between the ecological and governance scales.  
To be able to identify problems and possible solutions for a governance regime, it is important 
to understand the different core components, and the influence of external settings. While I 
briefly explore most elements identified in the framework for the Tasmanian case study, my 
research objectives focus mainly on governance quality and power structures, key elements in 
the “instruments” and “actors” components respectively. The next section describes the specific 
methods used to answer the research objectives. 
 
3.3 Methods 
In this section, I first explain the process of selection of the case study and the participants of 
this study. Table 3.2 summarises how the different methods helps answering the specific 
objectives of this study. I then explain each of the chosen methods.  
3.3.1 Case study selection 
The case study methodology is appropriate in this instance given the complexity of governance 
regimes and the necessity of studying them in their “real-world” setting (Yin 1994). Out-of-
context approaches would probably fail to gain a holistic understanding of all the variables at 
play (Patton 2002). Because so many factors influence a governance system, all findings from a 
particular case study cannot be generalised to other settings. This does not mean that important 
insights cannot be gained to guide governance improvements elsewhere, or contribute to theory 
building.  
Around the world, there has been significant progress in the establishment of MPA systems 
(Toropova et al. 2010). For instance, Australia has declared the largest MPA system in the 
world (Department of the Environment 2014a). Tasmania, however, has designated less than 
three per cent of its surrounding state waters as protected areas, with important conservation 
gaps (Kriwoken 2016). Poor progress in establishing a comprehensive representative MPA 
system is comparable only to the Northern Territory (Edyvane and Blanch 2016). This is 
particularly striking, considering that Australia has been considered a global leader in marine 
conservation, due to systematic planning of reserves (Fernandes et al. 2005), and an innovative 
governance regime for the Great Barrier Reef (Olsson et al. 2008; Day 2016). Tasmania 
therefore made a good case study because of the stark contrast between the State’s limited 
progress and Australia’s global leadership. I aimed to learn how external settings, formal 
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institutions, good governance criteria and power structures interacted to create a unique 
governance regime. Understanding the Tasmanian MPA governance regime could provide 
insights into deficiencies that have prevented progress. Comparing these governance issues to 
other settings can guide better practices for the case study. Additionally, lessons can contribute 
to the improvement of practices elsewhere and to theoretical developments of MPA governance. 
Governance issues tend to cross spatial and temporal scales, complicating the establishment of 
clear boundaries. Nevertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 1, for practical reasons I decided to 
limit my study to those waters within the jurisdiction of the State of Tasmania, up to three 
nautical miles from the Territorial Sea Baseline. This thesis deals mostly with the marine 
environment adjacent to mainland Tasmania and associated islands such as Bruny Island and 
those in Bass Strait. Details of the study area are presented in Chapter 4. 
3.3.2 Selection and recruitment of participants 
The records of contributors to MPA inquiries (see Section 4.4 for a timeline of the process in 
Tasmania) for the Kent Group/Port Davey and the Bruny bioregions (Resources Planning and 
Development Commission 2003a; 2008) were used to create an initial list of potential 
participants for the questionnaire and interviews. Following the Participants were selected to 
represent core organisations. This list was discussed with MPA academic experts who 
participated in any of the processes, to eliminate organisations that were only indirectly 
relevant, and to include organisations that did not participate at the time but have subsequently 
had a direct interest in Tasmanian MPAs. Organisations in this purposeful sample were 
classified as “core” (key to MPA governance) or “peripheral” (only have a potential/indirect 
role in MPA governance). During interviews, participants were also asked to suggest additional 
organisations, and if an organisation was mentioned by initial participants more than three 
times, it was approached to participate in the study. Aboriginal groups were considered “core” 
actors, due to their strong connection with the sea and its resources (sea country). The intricacy 
of the evolving legislation and formal recognition of rights in Australia and Tasmania, imply an 
added level of complexity to the study of governance. This legal framework, in addition to 
distinct worldviews, a different set of values and particular cultural traditions deserve a 
dedicated study of their role in marine governance. I therefore consider that Aboriginal issues, 
although highly relevant, are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Organisations in the list were contacted first by email to answer the questionnaire, explaining 
the purpose of the study, why they had been selected, what was expected and ethical 
considerations (see Appendix 1). Participants were told that they had been invited to participate 
due to their organisation’s role in MPA processes in Tasmania. The first set of questions in the 
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questionnaire clearly stated that they referred to their personal opinions on MPA issues and 
governance regime, while the second part indicated that questions referred to the organisations 
they represented. Interview questions were specifically framed to elicit the points of view of the 
organisation. If an organisation had not responded, a reminder email was sent one week 
afterward and a third email three weeks later. “Core” organisations were further contacted by 
telephone or directly at their office, to ensure their participation if possible. If an organisation 
was “peripheral”, it was not contacted again after three emails. For some organisations such as 
associations, it would have been relevant to include the responses of several members, to obtain 
a general understanding of their views. However, as some organisations only have one member 
working on marine issues or MPAs, they would have been underrepresented in the results. Only 
one or a few participants from each organisation were thus invited to participate. Therefore, the 
questionnaire was not intended to reflect the view of a representative sample of Tasmanian 
MPA stakeholders, but rather as a tool to obtain specialised information about MPA 
management and governance.  
Ethical standards followed the University of Tasmania guidelines, which seek to ensure that 
participants are not negatively impacted by the research, and that their anonymity is respected. 
Therefore, all participants were given an information sheet (Appendix 1) explaining key issues 
about the study, their participation and their rights, and signed a consent form before answering 
the questionnaire or interview questions. 
 
Table 3.2 Methods used to answer each of the specific objectives of this thesis 
Objectives Methods 
1. To analyse the core elements and context of the 
governance regime of Tasmanian MPAs. 
 Document review 
 Internet questionnaire 
2. To evaluate the extent to which the Tasmanian MPA 
governance regime follows good governance principles.  
 Key informant interviews – questions (1-3) 
3. To assess power dynamics of the Tasmanian MPA 
governance regime and how they have affected the 
quality of governance. 
 Key informant interviews – questions (4-7). 
 SNA 
 Media prominence analysis 
4. To make recommendations to improve the governance 
regime. 
 Synthesis of results for objectives 1-3, and 
comparison with findings from the literature  
5. To draw out lessons from the Tasmanian case study 
that can inform the design of MPA governance regimes 
elsewhere. 
 Identification of key lessons that are relevant to 
other settings 
 
3.3.3 Document review  
I searched both academic and non-academic documents, available online and in libraries. This 
search included scientific publications on marine ecology and MPAs in Tasmania, on socio-
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economic issues and on governance of natural resources in Tasmania. Reviewed documents also 
included formal reports, meeting minutes (e.g. Parliament, FACs) and webpages and 
publications of “core” organisations. These documents provided key information on natural, 
socio-economic, political and cultural influences. It was also possible to find key information 
about elements from core components, including the legal framework, participatory methods, 
observance of some good governance principles, some characteristics of decision arenas, 
problems and conflicts, and actor attributes. Results of this analysis are presented in Chapter 4.        
3.3.4 Internet questionnaire 
Twenty-six respondents, belonging to 21 organisations answered the questionnaire. Five core 
organisations declined answering the questionnaire, but accepted to participate in an interview. 
Questionnaires were designed to cover some of the main points from the analysis framework 
(see Appendix 2), including: key personal attributes (link to the marine environment and place 
attachment); personal views on reasons for compliance with rules; understanding of the social 
ecological system (Tasmanian MPAs, ecosystem and socio-economic aspects, governance 
regime); opinion on participatory processes (opportunities, good governance principles, 
recommendations); organisation attributes (link to the marine environment, intellectual capital, 
and relationships); and perception about power structures (preferred information sources, and 
distribution of influence). The construct table in Appendix 3 shows the correspondence between 
constructs, sub-constructs and specific questions. I used SurveyMonkey® to collect responses 
and even though participants had the choice of answering in print or face to face, all answered 
online.  
Most questions used Likert-type scales to allow a quantitative analysis. Data were consolidated 
in an Excel sheet, and I used Excel and SPSS to run statistical analyses. Given the small sample 
size, most data were analysed using descriptive statistics (percentages, means and standard 
deviations). When a series of questions were used to measure a construct (i.e. place attachment, 
intellectual capital),  Cronbach alpha was used to measure reliability (Cronbach 1951). Kruskal-
Wallis tests and post-hoc analysis were used to find differences between mean ranks; these tests 
were used to assess the level of knowledge between types of MPAs (“older no-take reserves”, 
“newer and remote no-take reserves” and areas with lower protection levels – “Marine 
Conservation Areas” (MCAs)  (Chapter 4); to explore the level of understanding of different 
elements of the social-ecological system (Chapter 4); and to determine influence levels (Chapter 
6). The questionnaire included some open-ended questions that were used to complement 
quantitative analyses. Results of questionnaire analyses are presented in Chapters 4 to 6.  
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3.3.5 Key informant interviews 
At least one person from each core organisation was contacted to participate in an in-depth 
interview. An email contact was followed by a telephone call or a visit to establish an 
appointment for the interview. In two cases, it was not possible to interview current members of 
core organisations, so a previous member or employee with relevant knowledge was contacted. 
In this way, the views of all core organisations were included. Twenty-six people were 
interviewed, belonging to 23 organisations
2
. Semi-structured interviews included a set of 
qualitative questions (1 to 3 in Appendix 4). The first question was intended to obtain a general 
idea of the interest of the organisation on MPAs; it also allowed interviewees to start the 
conversation with a familiar topic. The second and third questions were the main source of data 
for analysing the quality of governance. Interviewees were not asked about each good 
governance criteria (see Chapter 2), but instead it was an open question about what could be 
better in the governance system. In this way, rather than leading interviewees to comment on 
each governance criteria, the foremost issues in the mind of interviewees came up, exposing the 
relative importance given to each issue at the time. By focusing on what could be better, 
interviewees talked about the problems they perceived, but provided specific recommendations 
as well. Results on governance quality are analysed in Chapter 5. The rest of the questions were 
used to obtain SNA data (see next section), but comments made while filling in matrixes were 
analysed qualitatively to support good governance and power analyses.  
Interviews were recorded and transcribed. Transcriptions were sent to each interviewee, and if 
they sent any corrections, these were made. Transcriptions were used to conduct a thematic 
analysis. I chose thematic analysis because it gave me enough flexibility to analyse how 
different interviewees perceived issues of governance quality and power. Thematic analysis was 
deductive or theoretical (Braun and Clarke 2006), as I used pre-conceived themes (good 
governance criteria and sub-criteria in Table 2.1) to identify relevant transcript extracts and to 
classify them. These extracts, comprising phrases, sentences or paragraphs, were coded against 
each criteria/ sub-criteria using an Excel spreadsheet. The spreadsheet was sorted to group 
statements by criteria/ sub-criteria. A preliminary sort was individually checked by the two 
supervisors, disputed coding allocations noted, followed by a team discussion that achieved 
consensus on the appropriate code for each extract. 
                                                     
2
 The total number of organisations that participated in the study (questionnaire and/or interview) was 27. 
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3.3.6 Social network analysis 
These analyses focused on understanding the distribution of power, existence of coalitions and 
the presence of key social structures in an information exchange network. Studies that use SNA 
usually focus on relationships at the individual level. I acknowledge that studying individual 
rather than organisational relationships provides a more nuanced picture of networks, but such 
networks are usually more dynamic as well. One of the criticisms of SNA is precisely that its 
scope is significantly limited in time (Bodin and Prell 2011). Considering that the last MPA 
declarations in Tasmania were in 2009 (see Chapter 4), and that many individuals who 
participated were no longer involved, I chose to focus my analysis at the organisational level, 
rather than the individual, as organisations tend to remain stable for longer. Considering the 
scope of the study described in Chapter 1 and in Section 3.3.1 of this chapter, key organisations 
were those with a role at the Tasmanian State level.  
The method of eliciting relationships has important consequences on the resulting networks. To 
discover network relationships, I chose what Doreian and Woodard (1992) termed “expanding 
sampling”. In this method, participants are presented with a list of actors, but they can add 
organisations to this list if they consider them relevant. In this study, participants were presented 
with a list of key actors to collect network data (Appendix 5 and questions 4 to 7 in appendix 4). 
This list was generated following the procedure explained in section 2.3.2. Question 4 inquired 
about the relationships with other organisations to exchange information; question 5 asked 
participants to rank actors according to their influence level, while question 6 asked which 
sources of power were used by highly influential actors. Participants were also asked if they 
were aware of the existence of any coalitions regarding marine conservation issues (question 7). 
If more than three people identified additional organisations from those in the original list, these 
were also invited to participate in an interview (to answer both qualitative questions from 
section 3.3.5, and SNA questions). Two such organisations were included in the sample, and 
two answered to the request saying that they did not have an interest in Tasmanian MPAs. 
For cognitive methods (information provided by a third party, rather than reporting about their 
own relationships) all actors in the list were included. Cognitive analyses included Hubs and 
Authorities and Social Cognitive Mapping (see below). For the information exchange network 
and exponential random graph models (ERGMs - see below), only interviewed organisations 
were included. Multi-sector groups, such as advisory committees, were excluded from the 
analysis. I made this decision because no representative would have been able to provide a 
unified depiction of the group’s networks. In a similar way, roles, such as the Minister for 
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Primary Industries, fluctuate too much to provide a reliable idea of social networks, unless these 
are very specific in time. 
Most SNA data were analysed with UCINET 6 (Borgatti et al. 2002) and the PNet software was 
used for estimation of ERGMs (Wang et al. 2009). Results on the distribution of influence were 
analysed in UCINET 6 to obtain the Hubs and Authorities score for each stakeholder, E-I 
indexes (explained below), to calculate centrality measures (Freeman 1979) and to visualise the 
information exchange network.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, power needs to be organized in a network to have an impact, and 
SNA therefore provides a useful method to study power (Domhoff 2014). In this thesis I used 
the Hubs and Authorities score (Kleinberg 1999) to identify influential actors in the network. 
Rather than just counting the number of times each actor is identified, this method takes into 
consideration the “knowledge” that each nominator has of the network. In this way, an 
influential actor (Authority) is considered as such if more “knowledgeable” actors (Hubs) 
nominate them. The sum of squared Authority scores is one, so squared Authority scores 
provide an overall idea of power distribution in the network of actors.  
Social Cognitive Mapping can be used to identify groups within a network, and it partly relies 
on the understanding of social dynamics by a third party. As several members of the network 
identify existing ties, this tool provides a method of triangulation of information. Additionally, 
it is useful when not all members of a network participate in the collection of data (Neal 2008). 
Question 7 in this study aimed at identifying coalitions. The most relevant stage of the analysis 
(Neal and Neal 2013) was the identification of co-membership groups. The answers were 
organised in a valued matrix, in which higher numbers indicated more agreement about the 
existence of the link. An E-I index provides a measure of clustering of subgroups in a network 
according to specified attributes by counting external links, subtracting internal links and 
dividing by the total number of links (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). The index value ranges 
from -1 (all links are internal) to 1 (all links are external). Actors in this study were divided into 
three categories: those with a specific interest on the extraction of resources (“extractive”), those 
with a specific interest on conservation (“conservation”), and those with more indirect or 
ambiguous interests (“other”). As the E-I index only measures the presence or absence of links, 
the valued matrix was dichotomised, including only values greater than two (three or more 
people assumed that the actors were part of a coalition). After counting internal and external 
links, the procedure runs 5,000 permutations, calculating the probability of obtaining the same 
index by chance. 
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To understand the social structures across sectors in the Tasmanian MPA information exchange 
network, I conducted a statistical analysis using ERGMs. For this network, only reciprocated 
ties from interviewed organisations were included. Standard statistical models assume data 
independence, while ERGMs account for the inherent dependence of relational data. ERGMs 
allow the comparison between the observed network and a series of random configurations of 
similar networks (Robins et al. 2004). In this way, statistical inferences can be made regarding 
the prevalence or absence of key configurations. To understand relationships across sectors, I 
used non-directed graphs for actors with attributes (Wang et al. 2009). Attributes followed the 
same division of actors as for the E-I indexes, namely “extractive”, “conservation” and “other”. 
First, I ran an estimation of how many of each structure were present in the network. Any 
configuration that was not present was excluded from models; configurations with low numbers 
were also explored cautiously and eventually excluded in the model if they were preventing 
convergence or a reasonable goodness of fit. The best model I ran included structures that 
indicate “closure” of the network (see Chapter 2 for an explanation) or triangles; structures that 
indicate brokerage or stars; and links across sectors. These structures are shown in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Main social structures analysed in exponential random graph models (ERGMs) in this 
study 
Black circles in structures indicate nodes with specific attributes. 
 
Effects Structure 
2-star    
 
Triangle  
 
Cross sector collaboration 
(extractive) 
 Cross sector collaboration 
(conservation) 
Cross sector bridging 
(extractive) 
 
Cross sector bridging 
(conservation) 
Cross sector links 
(extractive) 
 
Cross sector links 
(conservation) 
 
Effects with significant positive estimates indicate that the observed network has more of that 
configuration than expected by chance, while significant negative values indicate that the 
configuration occurs less frequently than expected by chance. The presence/absence of different 
configurations can be interpreted based on the theoretical background (see Chapter 2). 
3.3.7 Media prominence analysis  
This analysis counts how many times each actor is mentioned in the mass media. As Grossmann 
(2013) suggests, not all influential actors are necessarily mentioned, but all actors that are 
frequently mentioned are most likely influential. I chose to complement other power analysis 
with this method, because most of my data provided mixed information of past and present 
perceptions of power. Media prominence could give me an idea of the distribution of power at 
the time debates about a particular MPA issue were taking place. I focused on two important 
media outlets: Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) rural news and The Mercury 
newspaper. Search words included “marine protected area”, “marine reserve”, “marine park”, 
“MPA” and “no-take”. The search was limited to between 2000 and 2009, as some archives did 
not have previous issues readily available and after 2009 the debate on MPAs died out. Further 
date restrictions, when necessary, were set as one week before key dates in the consultation 
processes detailed in Chapter 4, and one month afterwards. I found 15 relevant articles in ABC 
rural news and 21 articles in The Mercury newspaper. In those 36 articles, I counted how many 
times specific actors were mentioned.  
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3.4 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, I explained the choice of a pragmatic paradigm and a mixed-methods approach. 
I described each of the methods deployed to address the research objectives introduced in 
Chapter 1. I propose a modification of analytical frameworks found in the literature to suit an 
analysis of governance regimes that deal principally with non-extractive uses, even if extractive 
users need to be considered. To understand the implications of power structures on governance, 
I proposed a novel combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. This collection of 
methods aimed to expose some of the nuances of power dynamics in a governance regime, 
including both negative and positive effects. The next chapter describes the case study area in 
detail, including consideration of each of the key elements in Figure 3.1. Information sources 
for Chapter 4 are primarily derived from the review of key documents, with questionnaire 
results also providing supporting information about some elements. 
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Chapter 4 The governance regime for MPAs in Tasmania 
 
In the analysis framework developed in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.1), I propose that the core 
components of a governance regime include legal and policy instruments, actors, decision 
arenas, and the problems that the regime should address. Influences that affect the structure and 
functioning of the regime are the natural, political, socio-economic and cultural contexts in 
which the core elements are embedded. In this chapter, I describe these core and context 
elements based on the available literature and using information gathered in this study. First, I 
summarise the core elements, with a focus on the legislation, policies, organisations and 
decision arenas relevant to MPAs in Tasmania. With this background information, I explain the 
development of the Tasmanian MPA system. Then I review the external elements that influence 
the regime (natural, socio-economic, cultural and political contexts). In Section 4.2, responses to 
selected questions from the Internet questionnaire (Section 3.3.4) are used to characterise 
actors’ marine-based activities; levels of place attachment; knowledge, values and perceived 
impacts of MPAs; understanding of the social-ecological system; and perceived intellectual 
capital of key organisations. This information on framework core elements and influences 
provides a basis for identifying problematic features of the governance regime, which are 
summarised in the final section of the Chapter. As key organisations and advisory bodies often 
change names and responsibilities, in this document I will use organisation/body names and 
roles as of 2016. 
 
4.1 Legal and policy framework 
Numerous legal and policy instruments, originating at international, national and State levels, 
shape the governance of MPAs. Table 4.1 shows the most relevant legislation. At the 
international level, Australia is signatory to several agreements that establish guidelines on the 
use and management of natural resources. In particular, the CBD aims to conserve global 
biodiversity. Two CBD programmes are relevant to MPAs: the Programme of Work on Marine 
and Coastal Areas, and the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. In 2004, the parties 
decided that by 2012 a comprehensive, effectively managed, and ecologically representative 
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system of MPAs would be established and maintained. In 2010 it became apparent that this 
objective would not be accomplished, and the date was reset to 2020 (De Santo 2013).  
Australia first showed an interest in international MPA developments in 1984, when the Council 
of Nature Conservation Ministers established MPA objectives. These reflected the objectives 
proposed by IUCN in the 1975 International Conference on Marine Parks and Reserves 
(Kriwoken and Haward 1991). Australia reiterated its international commitment to establish a 
system of protected areas in 1992, as signatory of the CBD.  
That year the Australian, state and territory governments signed the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the Environment, where the parties agreed to cooperate in fulfilling those 
commitments (Department of the Environment 1992). Under the Australia and New Zealand 
Environment and Conservation Council, the Task Force on Marine Protected Areas was created 
to guide the advancement towards a national system, the NRSMPA. This body developed the 
marine regionalisation of Australia, as a basis for ensuring proper representation in the reserve 
system of the most important habitats and ecosystems (IMCRA 1998). It also developed a set of 
guidelines and a plan of action (ANZECC 1998; 1999). This initial development and subsequent 
processes Australia-wide referred to IUCN guidelines on protected areas. Both the definition of 
protected area
3
 and categories of protection (Appendix 6) follow IUCN guidelines (Dudley 
2008; Day et al. 2012). The Australian Government provided financial support to state 
governments for the development of the NRSMPA (Kelleher et al. 2005). Some references in 
the Estimates Committees and other Parliamentary proceedings of Tasmania suggest that the 
State Government had indeed a commitment with the Australian Government to advance in the 
establishment of an MPA system (Parliament of Tasmania n.d.).  
The Australian Government led initial efforts for a cooperative approach to establish a 
NRSMPA. Nevertheless, after the last report of progress in 2008 (Department of the 
Environment 2008), which collated the efforts of the Australian, state and territory 
governments, references gradually focused more on offshore reserves. For example, in its fifth 
report to the CBD (2014), Australia claimed it had established the “largest representative 
network of marine protected areas in the world”, exceeding the Aichi target 114. The 
                                                     
3
 “An area of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological 
diversity, and of natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective 
means” (Marine and Marine Industries Council 2001 pg. 8). 
4
 Aichi targets were established during the meeting of the CBD in 2010. Aichi Target 11 states: “By 2020, 
at least 17 per cent of terrestrial and inland water areas and 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, 
especially areas of particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services, are conserved through 
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Collaborative Australian Protected Areas Database from 2014 reported almost 328,000,000 
hectares of MPAs. Most of these areas correspond to Commonwealth Marine Reserves 
(Department of the Environment 2014b). However, even excluding coastal waters, Barr and 
Possingham (2013) found that many ecosystems were not appropriately represented in the 
Australian MPA system.  
The management of marine ecosystems is shared between the Australian Government and 
state/territory governments. The Offshore Constitutional Settlement resolved several years of 
conflict between these different levels of government over the jurisdiction of marine territories 
(Haward 1989). The Coastal Waters (State Powers) Act 1980 establishes that state governments 
are responsible for the management of coastal waters, i.e. up to three nautical miles from the 
Territorial Sea Baseline. From that point, the Australian Government is responsible for the 
management of its Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical miles. 
Cooperative arrangements between the national and state/territory governments allow the joint 
management of certain issues, such as some fisheries, or the surveillance of offshore reserves. 
At the national level, several instruments have tried to align the advances on biodiversity 
protection at all levels of government (Table 4.1). The most important Federal legislation is the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. Under this Act, Australian 
Government powers are limited to “matters of national environmental significance”; this 
includes Commonwealth marine areas, World Heritage properties, nationally endangered 
species, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park and migratory species protected under international 
agreements. Other instruments, such as policies and strategies detailed in Table 4.1, are not 
legally binding, but provide guidance to harmonize actions across levels. Unfortunately, policies 
and strategies aiming to integrate efforts at all levels, and across sectors, as in the case of the 
Australian Ocean’s Policy, have failed to produce expected results (Vince et al. 2015).    
Tasmania is one of six states of the Commonwealth of Australia, which is a federal 
constitutional monarchy under a parliamentary democracy. Tasmania follows the Westminster 
system, in which the Parliament (House of Assembly and Legislative Council) has legislative 
powers, while executive powers rest with the Premier and Ministers. Ministers are elected 
members of Parliament and in practice are appointed by the Premier. Elections for the State 
Government occur approximately every four years, using a proportional representation system 
                                                                                                                                                           
effectively and equitably managed, ecologically representative and well-connected systems of protected 
areas and other effective area-based conservation measures, and integrated into the wider landscape and 
seascape”. 
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known as Hare-Clark. Five electorates, each with five seats in the House of Assembly or Lower 
House, determine the makeup of the majority or coalition government. The Premier and Cabinet 
positions are determined by the majority party. The Legislative Council or Upper House 
represents 15 one-seat electorates. The majority of these seats are held by independent 
representatives, rather than party members. Elections for two or three seats of the Upper House 
occur every year (Parliament of Tasmania 2005). The executive and legislative powers are not 
completely separated in this system, and the Lower House tends to be dominated by the political 
party in power. As members of political parties in Australia usually support the views of the 
party, the Upper House plays an important role of political counterbalance (Stone 2008). This 
control, however, is mostly limited to decisions that need to be approved by both Houses of 
Parliament. 
In Tasmania, difficult environmental debates, such as the Franklin dam and Wesley Vale pulp 
mill, started a long dispute in politics and society in general, between pro-development interests 
and conservationists. These debates raised concern over the transparency of environmental 
impact assessment processes, and at the same time decreased the trust of investors. In order to 
integrate planning with environmental assessments, the Resource Management and Planning 
System was developed in 1993 (Davies 2000). The intention was to align Acts, policies and 
procedures in a whole-of-government framework, ensuring that sustainability
5
 was included in 
the planning of any development. This initiative also provided citizens with rights to appeal, if 
they believed these principles were not respected (Environmental Defenders Office 2014). 
Nevertheless, legal instruments governing the designation and management of MPAs continue 
to divide responsibilities between government agencies with different priorities (Kriwoken 
2016).  
  
                                                     
5Sustainable development is legally defined as “managing the use, development and protection of natural 
and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their 
social, economic and cultural well-being and for their health and safety while a) sustaining the potential 
of natural and physical resources to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and b) 
safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil and ecosystems; and c) avoiding, remedying 
or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment” (Environment Protection Authority 
(TAS) 2013). 
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Table 4.1 Most relevant MPA legal framework and guiding instruments. 
Level Instrument Purpose and management 
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
Convention on Biological 
Diversity 1992 
Purpose: the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable 
use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits.  
Management: The responsible body in Australia is the Department 
of the Environment (Australian Government). However, under the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment, all states and 
territories cooperate to achieve national environmental goals. The 
Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council and the 
Biological Diversity Advisory Committee have been the primary 
coordination forums. 
World Heritage Convention 
1972 
Purpose: to protect cultural and natural heritage around the world 
considered to be of outstanding value to humanity. 
Management: The responsible body before the World Heritage 
Committee is the Australian Government, particularly the 
Department of the Environment. Different sites have different 
management arrangements; for example, Tasmania is responsible 
for the Tasmanian Wilderness and Macquarie Island World 
Heritage areas.   
A
u
st
ra
li
a
n
 
Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999 
Purpose: To protect and manage nationally and internationally 
important flora, fauna, ecological communities and heritage places 
(“matters of national environmental significance”). It includes 
nationally threatened species and commonwealth marine reserves. 
Management: The responsible body is the Department of the 
Environment (Australian Government). It needs to coordinate 
certain issues with state/territory governments. 
Australia's Biodiversity 
Conservation Strategy 2010-
2030 
Purpose: To provide guidance in the implementation of the CBD.  
At the time of writing this thesis, a review of this strategy aimed to 
update it and account for other international obligations, such as 
the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and the Ramsar Convention on 
Wetlands.  
Management: The responsible body is the Department of the 
Environment (Australian Government). It coordinates with 
state/territory governments and the Australian Local Government 
Association. 
National Representative 
Marine Protected Area 
Strategy 1998 (NRSMPA) 
Purpose: The Commonwealth, states and territories agreed to 
establish and manage a comprehensive, adequate and 
representative system of MPAs, to contribute to the long-term 
ecological viability of marine and estuarine systems, maintain 
ecological processes and systems, and protect Australia’s 
biological diversity at all levels. Today, its focus is mainly on the 
system of Commonwealth Marine Reserves (CMR). 
Management: The responsible body is the Department of the 
Environment (Australian Government). 
Australia’s Oceans Policy 
(1998) 
Purpose: To set a framework for integrated and ecosystem-based 
planning and management for Australia’s marine jurisdictions. 
Management: All institutional arrangements have been dismantled 
and integrated into the Department of the Environment (Australian 
Government).  
S
t
a
t e 
Nature Conservation Act 
2002 (NCA) 
Purpose: To make provision with respect to the conservation and 
protection of the fauna, flora and geological diversity of the State 
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Level Instrument Purpose and management 
and to provide for the declaration of national parks and other 
reserved land. It does not provide for marine organisms other than 
marine mammals or birds. 
Management: Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and 
Environment (DPIPWE) – Minister for Environment, Parks and 
Heritage 
National Parks & Reserve 
Management Act 2002 
(NPRMA) 
Purpose: To provide for the management of national parks and 
other reserved land. 
Management: DPIPWE, in particular Parks & Wildlife Service 
Tasmania (PWS) – Minister for Environment, Parks and Heritage 
Living Marine Resources 
Management Act 1995 
(LMRMA) 
Purpose: To promote the sustainable management of living marine 
resources, to provide for management plans relating to fish 
resources and to protect marine habitats. Fish is defined as “any 
aquatic organism of any species, whether dead or alive, which, in 
the normal course of events, spends part or all of its life in the 
aquatic environment”. This definition excludes marine mammals 
and birds. 
Management: DPIPWE, in particular the Marine Resources Branch 
– Minister for Primary Industries and Water  
Fisheries Rules 2009 Purpose: Regulates fisheries. The NCA does not regulate “fish”, as 
defined in LMRMA, so fishing restrictions in MPAs need to be 
established via these rules. 
Management: DPIPWE, in particular the Marine Resources Branch 
–  Minister for Primary Industries and Water 
Public Land (Administration 
and Forests) Act 1991 
Purpose: One of its main purposes is to set up the procedure that 
the Tasmanian Planning Commission (TPC) has to follow in order 
to enquire and make recommendations on the use of public land. 
This includes the designation of new MPAs. 
Management: Department of Justice and the Minister for Planning 
and Local Government. The TPC advises the Minister on planning 
issues. 
Tasmanian Marine 
Protected Areas Strategy 
2001 (TMPAS) 
Purpose: To establish and manage a comprehensive, adequate and 
representative system of marine protected areas, to contribute to 
the long-term ecological viability of marine and estuarine systems, 
to maintain ecological processes and systems, and to protect 
Tasmania’s biological diversity. 
Management: unclear. In the two instances were new MPAs have 
been proposed after 2001, the Minister for Primary Industries and 
Water, rather than the Minister for Environment, Parks and 
Heritage, has issued a reference to the TPC to conduct the inquiry 
and gazetted the final decision. At some point both Ministries were 
in the same portfolio.  
 
Other instruments relevant to the conservation of the marine environment include: 
At an international level 
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat –the Ramsar Convention 
 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
 
At a national level 
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 Environment Protection (Sea Dumping) Act 1981 
 Some fisheries legislation (Australian Fisheries Management Authority) 
 Some site specific legislation, like the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 
At the Tasmanian level 
 Natural Heritage Strategy for Tasmania (2013 – 2030), which calls for a more 
coordinated management of the marine environment. 
 Marine Farming Planning Act, and several fisheries/marine farming rules and 
regulations (Department of Primary Industries Parks Water and Environment 2015). 
 Pollution of Waters by Oil and Noxious Substances Act 1987 
 State Coastal Policy 1996 
 State Policy on Water Quality Management 1997 
 Threatened Species Protection Act 1995. 
 
A legal framework, however, requires a level of compliance in order to be effective. 
Compliance depends on a number of factors, such as severity of penalties, probability of being 
caught during an infraction, understanding of the reasoning behind regulations and levels of 
public support. Questionnaires explored the perceived motivations behind compliance of MPA 
regulations (Table 4.2). The Tasmanian State Government was unquestionably considered the 
legitimate decision-maker and enforcer (100% agreed or strongly agreed). Participants believed 
that the most important motives to obey regulations were the risk of incurring in penalties (96% 
agreed or strongly agreed) and social pressure (88.5% agreed or strongly agreed). Most 
respondents accepted that participating in the design (73% agreed or strongly agreed), 
understanding the reasons behind regulations (73% agreed or strongly agreed) and regulations 
that were in the interest of the community (69% agreed or strongly agreed) were important 
components of compliance, although there was less agreement about these points.  
 
Table 4.2 Perceived motivations for the acceptance of MPA regulations.  
Answer scale: 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (neutral), 4 (agree), 5 (strongly agree). N=26. 
 
Statement Mean SD 
Governments have a legitimate role in regulating the use of MPAs 4.65 0.49 
Regulations are effective if there is a high risk of incurring penalties for 
non-compliance 
4.35 0.56 
Most people obey regulations when there is social pressure to do so 4.19 0.63 
People are more likely to obey regulations if they have participated in 
their design 
3.85 0.83 
Most people obey regulations that are in the interest of the community, 
even if they personally affect them in a negative way 
3.77 1.21 
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Regulations are effective only if people understand their purpose 3.73 1.04 
 
 
 
4.2 Actors 
The most important sectors formally and informally involved in the governance of MPAs are 
political parties, decision makers, government agencies, commercial and recreational fishers, 
conservation organisations, some tourism operators, divers and community members and 
groups. Over time, Ministries, Departments and government bureaucracy have changed, along 
with their associated responsibilities. Since the early initiatives on MPAs, conservation NGOs 
have increased their involvement with marine issues; for example, Environment Tasmania only 
began its Marine Program in 2008. Since the first MPA initiatives in Tasmania, some 
organisations have disappeared, and others have started. The main actors involved in the 
governance of MPAs in Tasmania are described in Table 4.3.  
 
 
Table 4.3 Stakeholders with an interest in MPAs in Tasmania. 
 
Sector Subsector Organisation Short description and relation to MPAs/marine issues 
Political parties 
Greens 
Political party that follows principles of environmental and 
social justice. This party originated from “United Tasmania 
Group”, a party created in 1972 to counterbalance the lack of 
interest of the two major parties in protecting native forests. 
Negotiated with Liberal (1996-1998) and Labor (1989-1992; 
2010-2014) to set the balance of minority governments. It 
openly supports the creation of MPAs: “The Tasmanian Greens 
will work … to establish a comprehensive, adequate and 
representative system of marine, wetland, estuarine and coastal 
reserves Greens” (The Greens 2014) 
Labor 
This party supports a mixed economy, where the Government 
needs to intervene to address market imbalances. It held power 
in 1989-1992; 1998-2002; 2002-2006; 2006-2010. Progress on 
MPAs was mostly during Labor governments. It supports MPAs 
under certain conditions: “Labor will support the development 
of a balanced strategy that includes the Tasmanian Marine 
Protected Areas Strategy whilst providing fair and equitable 
access to all those with interests in fish and fishing” (Labor 
2014) 
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Sector Subsector Organisation Short description and relation to MPAs/marine issues 
Liberals 
The main orientations of this party are based on Liberalism as a 
political philosophy, with its emphasis on the individual and 
enterprise as main agents to meet challenging social and 
economic conditions. Overtly against new MPAs: “A majority 
Hodgman Liberal Government will impose a moratorium on any 
new Marine Protected Areas in the State’s waters (Tasmanian 
Liberals 2014)”. 
Politicians/Ministers 
Houses of 
Parliament 
Major planning decisions on MPAs need to be tabled in 
Parliament, and the following reserved land classes need their 
approval: national park, State reserve, nature reserve or historic 
site.   
Minister for 
Environment, 
Parks and Heritage 
Responsible for NPRMA, NCA, as well as the Environmental 
Management and Pollution Control Act 1994.  
Minister for 
Primary Industries 
and Water 
Responsible for LMRMA and several Fisheries Rules and 
Regulations. Previously, this portfolio also included 
Environment. This Ministry referred inquiries to TPC and 
gazetted designations of new MPAs in 2004 and 2009. 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t 
a
g
en
ci
es
/d
iv
is
io
n
s/
a
d
v
is
o
ry
 c
o
u
n
ci
ls
 
Planning 
Tasmanian 
Planning 
Commission (TPC) 
Provides planning advice to the Minister for Planning and Local 
Government. By reference of the appropriate Minister, 
undertakes inquiries into the future use of public land and 
reviews reports and representations on draft management plans.  
Fisheries and 
aquaculture 
DPIPWE - Marine 
Resources Branch 
Responsible for marine fisheries, and the administration of the 
LMRMA. Within MPAs, marine resources other than marine 
mammals and birds are their responsibility. Under the LMRMA, 
a “marine resources protected area” can be proclaimed, although 
none has been declared to date.  
Fisheries Advisory 
Committees (FAC) 
Advice the Minister on issues related to each fishery (e.g. 
abalone, scalefish, recreational). Major stakeholder groups are 
members. 
Conservation 
DPIPWE - Parks 
and Wildlife 
Service 
Administration of NPRMA.  
Responsible for the development of management plans, site 
plans and management policies for the conservation and 
sustainable use of marine reserves.  
Implementation of educational programs, and coordination of 
surveillance (with the Tasmania Police), research and 
monitoring (with research organisations).  
Environmental impact assessments for activities in marine 
reserves and issue of permits and licences.  
National Parks and 
Wildlife Advisory 
Council (NPWAC) 
Provides advice to the State and National Governments on 
issues related to the protected area system and World Heritage 
sites. Members are individuals with expertise in relevant themes 
such as conservation, social issues and tourism. MPAs are 
occasionally discussed by this body.  
Surveillance 
and 
compliance 
Marine and Safety 
Tasmania (MAST) 
Responsible for the safety of commercial and recreational 
boating, management of marine facilities (including inside 
MPAs) and management of environmental issues relating to 
vessels. They have disputed MPAs that would increase safety 
risk to fishers if they needed to navigate further offshore than 
usual. 
Tasmania Police - 
Marine Safety and 
Rescue 
Responsible for compliance of MPA regulations. Little input 
into the designation of new MPAs. 
Tourism Tourism Tasmania 
Agency responsible for the promotion of tourism values of the 
State. MPAs are not of major interest.  
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Sector Subsector Organisation Short description and relation to MPAs/marine issues 
Multi-sector/multi-level 
groups or projects 
Natural Resource 
Management 
(NRM) South 
NRMs tend to focus more on terrestrial issues, but NRM South 
has participated and supported several marine initiatives. 
Current Commonwealth funding is tied to non-marine activities, 
limiting their involvement in marine conservation. 
Derwent Estuary 
Program (DEP) 
Partnership between industry, State and local governments, and 
community-based groups. It aims to reduce pollution, monitor 
water quality, conserve habitats and species, and promote the 
sustainable use and enjoyment of the estuary.  
 
Education and research 
organisations 
Institute for 
Marine and 
Antarctic Studies 
(IMAS) 
Affiliated to the University of Tasmania (UTAS). Provides key 
information about MPAs and fisheries in Tasmania, among 
other studies.   
Commonwealth 
Scientific and 
Industrial Research 
Organisation 
(CSIRO) - Marine 
and Atmospheric 
Research 
Conducts research on several marine issues, although more at a 
national level.   
Woodbridge 
Marine Centre 
It is part of the Department of Education and provides schools 
with the opportunity to learn about the marine environment and 
marine science with hands-on activities. Some of their activities 
are conducted in MPAs. 
High schools 
Some high schools offer units with an emphasis on marine 
science, and use MPAs for some of their activities. 
C
o
m
m
er
ci
a
l 
fi
sh
er
s 
Aquaculture 
and Fishing 
Industry 
Tasmanian 
Seafood Industry 
Council (TSIC) 
This is the representative body of the fishing and marine 
farming industries. MPAs can affect these industries and the 
Council represents their interests before the Government. 
Sector groups (e.g. 
Rock Lobster 
Fishermen’s 
Association 
(TRLFA), Abalone 
Council) 
Each major sector within the seafood industry has an 
association, to represent their interests. MPAs can affect these 
industries, and these bodies allow them to voice their concerns 
in a unified manner. 
Tourism 
Tourism 
operators 
e.g. Cruise 
Tasmania, 
Pennicott 
Wilderness 
Journeys, 
Wild Ocean 
Tasmania, 
Stanley Seal 
Cruises, 
East Coast Cruises 
Most tourism operators were not involved in the designation of 
MPAs, but some have shown an interest in marine conservation. 
Diving 
operators 
e.g. Southern 
Ocean Sport, 
Eaglehawk Dive 
Centre, Go Dive, 
Bicheno Dive 
Centre 
Very few dive operators were strongly involved in the 
designation of MPAs.  
Game-
fishing 
operators 
Sea Charter Boat 
Operators of 
Tasmania 
(SCBOOT) 
Peak organisation representing marine charters. Many charters 
focus on game-fishing, although other services like diving and 
whale watching are offered.   
Conservation 
organisations 
Tasmanian 
Conservation Trust 
(TCT) 
Was established in 1968. Some of their actions are focused on 
marine issues. It represents the conservation sector in FACs and 
had an active role in designation processes. 
Environment 
Tasmania (ET) 
A representative body created in 2006 to represent several local 
conservation groups. The marine program started in 2008 and 
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Sector Subsector Organisation Short description and relation to MPAs/marine issues 
includes several campaigns to promote MPAs and marine 
conservation.  
Ocean Planet 
A small group focused on providing information and 
campaigning for the conservation of Tasmanian marine 
resources. 
Environmental 
Defenders Office 
(EDO) Tasmania 
Provides advice to the general public and community groups 
about environmental and planning laws. 
Recreational fishers 
Tasmanian 
Association for 
Recreational 
Fishing (TARFish) 
Representative body representing the interests of recreational 
marine fishers. It was established in 2004. According to its 
policies, it supports MPAs under a series of criteria. 
Game fishing clubs 
Four clubs in Tasmania (Tasman Peninsula, St. Helens, 
Northern Area and Hobart) are represented by the Tasmanian 
Game Fishing Association. 
Divers Diving Clubs 
There are several diving clubs in Tasmania, but there is no 
unified organisation to represent their interests. Clubs have not 
been strongly involved in MPA debates. 
Media 
(Newspapers, TV, 
radio)  
The main newspaper in Tasmania is The Mercury, and most 
national media outlets, such as ABC, Nine Network and Seven 
Network, have programs specific for Tasmania.  
Other 
(e.g. Aboriginal 
organisations, local 
coastal 
communities)  
There are several organisations dealing with Aboriginal issues, 
including the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre, the Tasmanian 
Aboriginal Land & Sea Council, the Aboriginal Heritage 
Council, Aboriginal Heritage Tasmania within DPIPWE, and 
the Tasmanian Regional Aboriginal Communities Alliance 
formed in 2015. There have been several attempts to gain access 
to traditional marine and coastal resources (Lockwood, pers. 
comm. 2016). 
 
There are other local groups and organisations with an interest 
on coastal conservation, such as Coastcare groups (Southern 
Coastcare Association of Tasmania (SCAT) supporting groups 
in the South and East coasts) and local communities.  
 
 
The questionnaire explored the activities in which representatives of key organisations were 
involved. Results showed that, independent of the main objectives of the organisation, most 
respondents were involved in providing education or communication about marine issues (69% 
dedicated more than 10 days per year), working with Government agencies (62% dedicated 
more than 10 days per year), and with NGOs (58% dedicated more than 10 days per year). Less 
people were involved in activities directly related to the marine environment, such as no-take 
diving and snorkelling (42% dedicated more than 10 days per year), recreational fishing (42% 
dedicated more than 10 days per year) research (38% dedicated more than 10 days per year), 
and volunteering (23% dedicated more than 10 days per year). Only one commercial fishing 
organisation and no marine farming organisation answered the questionnaire, so these activities 
were underrepresented (8% and 0% dedicated more than 10 days per year) (Table 4.4).    
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Table 4.4 Frequency with which respondents engaged in different activities related to the marine 
environment.  
Answer scale: 0 (never), 1 (less than 10 times/year), 2 (between 10 and 20 times/year), 3 (more than 20 times/year). 
N=26. 
 
Activity Mean SD 
Providing education/communication about marine issues 2.00 0.96 
Work with a Government agency involved in marine issues 1.81 1.27 
Work with a non-governmental agency involved in marine issues 1.69 1.10 
Marine-related research 1.69 1.23 
Recreational no-take diving/snorkelling 1.31 1.23 
Recreational fishing (nets, pots, handline fishing, spearfishing, diving for 
seafood) 1.31 1.17 
Boating, jet skiing, water skiing 1.27 1.16 
Coastal or marine care volunteering 1.08 1.07 
Surfing, kayaking, sailing, windsurfing, kitesurfing 1.04 1.09 
Commercial fishing 0.27 0.81 
Marine farming 0.00 0.00 
 
A series of items in the questionnaire provided a scale of place attachment to Tasmanian marine 
environments (Table 4.5). There was a strong agreement about most statements, except the 
importance of fishing and the dependence on the marine environment. Excluding those two 
questions, a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.80 indicated a good reliability of the scale. Surprisingly, 
even though there was only one respondent representing the commercial fishing sector, 62% of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that their livelihoods depended on Tasmania’s marine 
environment. This dependence is therefore not limited to those who make a living by extracting 
resources, but it is also perceived by tourism operators, researchers and individuals working on 
conservation. 
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Table 4.5 Level of place attachment to marine environments 
Answer scale: 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (neutral), 4 (agree), 5 (strongly agree). N=26. 
 
Statement Mean SD 
I am very attached to Tasmania’s marine environments 4.81 0.40 
I identify strongly with Tasmania’s marine environments 4.77 0.43 
Tasmania’s marine environments mean a lot to me 4.77 0.43 
Recreation in Tasmania’s marine environments is an important part of 
my life 4.77 0.43 
Tasmania’s marine environments are the best places for doing what I like 
to do 4.31 0.97 
Fishing and obtaining seafood from Tasmania’s marine environments is 
an important part of my life 3.65 1.35 
My livelihood depends on Tasmania’s marine environments 3.46 1.27 
 
When asked about the effects of MPAs on different activities, respondents had more divergent 
views (Table 4.6). Most respondents agreed that MPAs had more positive than negative effects 
on education and research (96% answered mostly positive or more positive than negative) and 
on no-take recreational diving and snorkelling (92% answered mostly positive or more positive 
than negative). People were more undecided regarding recreational (62% answered mostly 
positive or more positive than negative) and commercial fishing (54% answered mostly positive 
or more positive than negative). MPAs were regarded to have no effect on marine farming (46% 
answered no effect), surfing/kayaking/sailing (77% answered no effect) and boating/jet skiing 
(77% answered no effect). 
 
Table 4.6 Perceived effects of MPA on different activities 
Answer scale: 1 (mostly negative), 2 (more negative than positive), 3 (no effect), 4 (more positive than negative), 5 
(mostly positive). N=26. 
 
Activities Mean SD 
Education and/or research 4.85 0.28 
Recreational no-take diving/snorkelling 4.73 0.75 
Recreational fishing (nets, pots, handline fishing, spearfishing, diving for 
seafood) 3.69 1.31 
Commercial fishing 3.38 1.35 
Surfing, kayaking, sailing, windsurfing, kitesurfing 3.35 0.62 
Boating, jet skiing, water skiing 3.04 0.58 
Marine farming 2.85 1.08 
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Most respondents believe MPAs have value for research and education (92% very important or 
extremely important), for future generations (81%) and for the conservation of biological 
diversity (81%). There was less agreement about the importance of MPAs for ecosystem 
functions (73%), personal well-being (69%) and recreational opportunities (54%) (Table 4.7).  
 
Table 4.7 Perceived values of MPAs 
Answer scale: 1 (not important), 2 (not very important), 3 (somewhat important), 4 (very important), 5 (extremely 
important). N=26.  
 
Values Mean SD 
Research and education 4.42 0.88 
Future generations (allowing others in the future to enjoy the above 
values) 
4.38 1.02 
Conservation of biological diversity 4.27 1.20 
Maintenance of ecosystem functions (trophic interactions nutrient 
cycling, water quality) 
4.04 1.38 
Sense of personal well being 3.54 1.31 
Recreational opportunities (diving, kayaking, sailing) 3.42 1.32 
 
The overall high level of attachment to the marine environments indicates that members of all 
sectors have a general interest in their conservation. The more divergent views on the effects 
and value of MPAs, however, suggest that some respondents believe that there are other more 
valuable or effective conservation tools.  
To have an idea of how familiar representatives of the main organisations were with the MPA 
system respondents scored their general knowledge about specific MPAs from 1 (I have not 
heard about it) to 4 (I am very familiar with its location, rules and objectives). MPAs were 
classified as “older no-take reserves” (Tinderbox, Maria Island, Ninepin Point and Governor 
Island), “newer and remote no-take reserves” (Macquarie Island, Kent Group and Port Davey) 
and “MCAs” (Hippolyte Rocks, Sloping Island, Roberts Point, Monk Bay). Respondents were 
more familiar with no-take marine reserves, particularly older ones, than with multiple use 
MCAs (Figure 4.1). A Kruskal-Wallis test was significant (chi-square=69.5, p<0.05) and a post-
hoc analysis detected differences between all three subgroups.  
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Figure 4.1 Knowledge level about different MPAs 
Answer scale: 1 (I have not heard about it), 2 (I have heard about it, but I don’t know much about its location, rules or 
objectives), 3 (I have a general idea about its location, rules and objectives) and 4 (I am very familiar with its 
location, rules and objectives). N=26. Kruskal-Wallis results suggest significant differences between different kinds 
of MPAs (chi-square=69.5, p<0.05). Dark grey: “older no-take reserves”; light grey: “newer and remote no-take 
reserves”; white: “MCAs”.  
 
 
A series of questions were included in the questionnaire to understand how much organisations 
knew about socio-economic, biological and governance aspects of the marine environment in 
Tasmania (questions 6 and 7, Appendix 2). The results indicate that most respondents had a 
relatively good knowledge of the system in general (Table 4.8); issues with the lowest scores 
included reasons behind the designation of MPAs, mechanisms to voice an opinion, key marine 
habitats and reasons behind other stakeholder’s opinion. Issues were sorted into four categories: 
MPA, ecological, socio-economic and governance knowledge. A Kruskal-Wallis test indicated 
that there were no significant differences between these categories (chi-square=4.83, p=0.18). 
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Table 4.8 Self-reported understanding of different elements of the social-ecological system.  
Answer scale for each statement: 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (neutral), 4 (agree), 5 (strongly agree). N=26. 
Kruskal-Wallis results suggest there are no significant differences between different kinds of knowledge (chi-
square=4.83, p=0.18). 
 
Issues Mean SD 
I know the advantages, disadvantages and limitations of MPAs 4.42 0.86 
I understand the social and economic costs of declines in marine species 
and ecosystems 
4.23 0.82 
I know which Tasmanian marine species  are endangered 4.15 0.92 
I understand the impacts of different industries and activities on marine 
ecosystems 
4.15 0.88 
I understand the role of each government organisation 4.08 1.02 
I know roughly the magnitude of the economic contributions of each 
marine industry in Tasmania (major fisheries, aquaculture, recreational 
diving)  
4.00 0.98 
I understand the reasons behind each stakeholder’s position regarding 
MPAs 
3.88 0.95 
I know which are the key habitats (e.g. spawning or nursery areas) for 
marine species in Tasmania 
3.81 0.98 
I know the mechanisms by which my opinions can be considered by 
decision makers responsible for the designation and management of 
MPAs 
3.77 1.07 
I understand the reasons behind each MPA designation and their 
regulations 
3.73 1.08 
 
In order to understand the intellectual capital
6
 of the main organisations, a scale of seven 
questions was included in the questionnaire (Appendix 2). For most organisations, only one 
representative answered the questionnaire. One of the research organisations, however, was 
known for the divergent points of view on MPAs. For this reason, the result indicates the 
average of the responses of six individuals. A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.79 indicates a good 
reliability of the scale. A higher intellectual capital can be related to an organisation’s success 
(Bounfour and Edvinsson 2005). In combination with other factors, organisations that are more 
successful could be in a better position to lead a collaborative approach to marine conservation. 
Mean scores for key organisations as perceived by respondents to the questionnaire are 
presented in Table 4.9.   
 
                                                     
6
 The term intellectual capital refers to the intangible assets of an organisation. It is composed of human, 
relational and structural capital (Bounfour and Edvinsson 2005). 
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Table 4.9 Intellectual capital of key organisations in the Tasmanian MPA governance system 
Response scale for positive statements on different aspects of intellectual capital referring to social activities, trust, 
collective problem-solving, leadership, strategic direction, outcomes and financial capacity: -2 (strongly disagree), -1 
(mostly disagree), 0 (neither agree nor disagree), 1 (mostly agree), 2 (strongly agree). Standard deviation (SD) refers 
to agreement level between the seven different questions.  
 
Organisation Mean SD 
Divers 1 2.00 0.00 
Research organisation 3 2.00 0.00 
Partnership 2 1.86 0.38 
Conservation NGO 4 1.71 0.49 
Recreational fishers 2 1.71 0.49 
Tourism operators 1 1.57 0.53 
Research organisation 2 1.29 1.11 
Conservation NGO 3 1.29 0.76 
Government agency 3 1.29 0.76 
Conservation NGO 1 1.14 0.69 
Conservation NGO 2 1.14 1.46 
Advisory body 2 1.14 1.46 
Commercial fishers 1 0.86 0.38 
Political party 1 0.86 0.38 
Recreational fishers 1 0.86 0.38 
Partnership 1 0.71 0.49 
Research organisation 1 0.51 1.01 
Advisory body 1 0.43 1.51 
Divers 2 0.14 0.90 
Government agency 1 -0.57 0.53 
 
4.3 Decision arenas 
The most prominent decision arena corresponds to sitting of both Houses of Parliament, which 
are responsible for the approval of State laws. Parliament usually meets approximately 50 days 
per year, between March and May, and between August and December. Select Committees can 
also be appointed to inquire into specific issues. Witnesses can be called before these 
committees to inform debates. Parliamentary sessions are open to the public and the media as 
observers; committees are usually public, but under certain circumstances relating to sensitivity 
and confidentiality, a committee can decide to conduct hearings in private (Parliament of 
Tasmania 2005). These forums are where most policy debates take place, but citizen views are 
only partially represented through elected members. While private member’s bills can be 
considered, Government bills predominate in the parliamentary agenda (Parliament of Tasmania 
2005). The Government in power usually dominates the House of Assembly, so most 
Government bills are approved by this House. The Legislative Council has then an important 
role reviewing and then ratifying, amending or rejecting proposed legislation (Stone 2008). 
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Government bills are usually first proposed by the relevant Minister and discussed in Cabinet. 
Only when Cabinet has agreed on a bill is it tabled in Parliament. Cabinet meetings are therefore 
another important decision arena. This is especially true regarding decisions that do not need 
Parliamentary approval, as in the case of designation of Conservation Areas. Cabinet meetings, 
however, are not open to the public or the media. 
Fisheries Advisory Committees (FACs) have been established for the most important fishing 
sectors: abalone, crustacean, recreational, scalefish and scallop. Committees usually meet four 
times per year, and members include sector representatives, fisheries authorities, peak bodies 
and the conservation sector. These committees aim to have open discussions, if possible 
reaching a consensus to provide advice to the Minister. While such meetings are not strictly 
decision arenas, many recommendations are taken on board by the Minister. For example, the 
recent changes in bag limits for popular recreational species at the end of 2015 (Department of 
Primary Industries Parks Water and Environment 2015) were discussed at length during 
meetings of the Recreational FAC (see Meeting Agendas and Chair's Summaries in Department 
of Primary Industries Parks Water and Environment 2015). Unfortunately, as each fishing sector 
has its own committee, recommendations tend to reinforce a species by species management, 
rather than having an ecosystem approach (Stump 2009).      
The National Parks and Wildlife Advisory Council, also provides advice to the Minister on 
Tasmanian parks and reserves declared under the NCA 2002, and on World Heritage issues to 
the Australian Government. Rather than representing specific organisations, members of this 
body are appointed by the Minister according to their expertise on issues such as conservation, 
social science, tourism and cultural heritage. Meetings depend on the issues at hand. Meetings 
are not open to the public, and their role is advisory. Over the past decade, MPAs have 
occasionally been a topic of discussion at NPWAC meetings, with associated recommendations 
being made to the Minister on the representativeness of the system and the resources allocated 
to MPA planning and management (Lockwood, M. pers. comm. 2016).  
The Tasmanian planning system has undergone a series of changes over time. The most 
significant was the establishment of the Resource Management and Planning System in 1993. 
This framework aims to integrate laws, policies and procedures to achieve environmental 
sustainability, but also to provide for public involvement (Environmental Defenders Office 
2014). Several planning issues, including the reservation of land for conservation purposes, are 
considered through specific public inquiries. The TPC, created in 1997, is responsible for 
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inquiries into public land planning, including reservation. Inquiry processes follow the steps 
outlined in the Public Land (Administration and Forests) Act 1999 (Figure 4.2). Before 
producing final recommendations reports, the TPC invites the public to comment on each of the 
preliminary documents exhibited. Submissions on each of these documents are considered for 
the next step in an inquiry. These inquiries are not on-going discussion arenas, but specific 
consultations, limited in time and scope. Certain activities and specific cases have been 
exempted from this consultation process. For example, a specific Act, the Pulp Mill Doubts 
Removal Act was developed to override some of the consultation requirements, to make more 
expedient the Tamar Valley pulp mill assessment (Gale 2008).  
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Figure 4.2 Steps in a planning inquiry process in Tasmania  
 
Source: (Tasmanian Planning Commission n.d.) 
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4.4 The development of the Tasmanian MPA system 
Adjustments in the planning framework over time means that early designation processes 
followed different procedures. Figure 4.3 shows a timeline of the development of MPAs in the 
State, in relation to major milestones at the national and international levels. Major events are 
then explained in detail.  
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Figure 4.3 Timeline of the MPA process in Tasmania in relation to developments at the national 
and international levels. 
 
 
1980s 
1990s 
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1980s 
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Until 1991, only coastal and estuarine areas were declared as reserved land (Ivanovici 1984). 
Conclusions of a scientific assessment of most regions around Tasmania were the base of 
subsequent designation of marine reserves (Edgar 1984). In 1990, a draft MPA policy was 
released, and the first marine reserves, Ninepin Point, Tinderbox, Maria Island and Governor 
Island, were proposed. After public consultation, including a series of meetings in Bicheno, 
Triabunna and Woodbridge (Kriwoken and Haward 1991), these were declared in 1991. In 
2000, the Macquarie Island Nature Reserve was extended to include 74,738 hectares. 
In 1999 the Marine and Marine Industries Council was formed. In 2000, it produced a 
Background Report for the MPA strategy and in August 2001, the TMPAS was adopted. The 
intention of this strategy was to provide guidance on the establishment of a comprehensive, 
adequate and representative system of MPAs. The legal framework was not changed or adjusted 
to support this goal.  
The Government decided to approach the establishment of an MPA system bioregion by 
bioregion (see bioregions below, under “natural context”). The first two bioregions, Davey and 
Twofold Shelf, corresponded to areas of conservation significance according to previous 
surveys (Edgar 1984). As the TPC was already in place, in August 2001 the Minister for 
Primary Industries, Water and Environment sent it a reference to initiate an inquiry into these 
two regions. The reference limited the inquiry to TSW around the Kent Group of Islands in the 
Twofold Shelf Bioregion, and to a fraction of the Davey Bioregion, namely Port Davey and 
Bathurst Harbour. In October 2002, the TPC delegated its functions to a panel. This panel 
consisted of four members, including one commissioner, two scientific experts and a 
representative of the fishing industry. Following the steps in Figure 4.2, a Background Report 
was prepared and exhibited for public comment in April 2002. In November that year, a hearing 
allowed the Commission to gather extra information to prepare the Draft Recommendations. 
Individuals and organisations who made submissions were invited to participate, as well as 
those who the Commission considered could improve the information they needed. Draft 
Recommendations were exhibited in March 2003. A public hearing in June 2003 assisted the 
Commission to assess the comments from submissions. In July 2003, the Final 
Recommendations Report was sent to the Minister, justifying the boundaries and levels of 
protection proposed. The final decision was announced in February 2004.  
In June 2005, the Minister for Environment and Planning issued a reference to the Commission 
to undertake an inquiry into the establishment of MPAs in the Bruny Bioregion. This reference 
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was amended in August 2007 to extend the time of the inquiry and to exclude the Ralphs Bay 
Conservation Area from the inquiry, due to an interest in a marina development (Prahalad and 
Kriwoken 2010). In this case, the Commission also delegated its functions to a Panel, which 
members were commissioners and advisors with specific expertise. It additionally established a 
Reference Body of scientific experts to provide further advice. Most interviewees referred to 
“the Panel” during this study, and I assumed that they referred to both members of the Panel and 
the Reference Body, present during the hearings. A Background Report was exhibited in June 
2006, followed by a hearing in November. In March 2007, an Interim Report was exhibited, 
followed by the Draft Recommendations Report in August. Another hearing in November 2007 
provided additional information before the Final Recommendations Report was presented to the 
Minister in February 2008. The final decision was gazetted in December 2009.  
In the Final Recommendations Report, the Commission acknowledged that the Bruny Bioregion 
was the most complex of all Tasmanian bioregions. Specifically, it has a diversity of habitats, 
and a high number of species with restricted ranges. At the same time, it has a concentration of 
industrial activities, commercial fishing, marine farming, tourism and recreation. The diversity 
of activities is also related to a diversity of attitudes towards protected areas. The Commission 
tried to balance conservation and extractive activities, and while the Minister’s final decision 
roughly respected proposed boundaries, it disregarded the proposed levels of protection. All 
new areas were designated as MCAs, which are IUCN Category VI
7. The extraction of “fish”, 
as defined by LMRMA, has not been regulated inside these areas, so that the level of protection 
is similar to non-reserved waters. 
Since then, the State has made no further progress in the designation of new MPAs, and very 
little to improve effectiveness of those that exist. Most areas do not have a management plan, 
except for Macquarie Island (2006) and Maria Island (1998). The Kent Group Management 
Plan (2005) explicitly excludes the marine portion. The Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage 
Area Management Plan (1999), which includes Port Davey and Bathurst Harbour, is in the final 
stage of being updated. The rest of the existing MPAs do not have a plan to guide their 
management. Management strategies in the current management plans have not been 
implemented. For example, the Maria Island Plan suggested that the whole range of marine 
habitats should be protected and the Macquarie Island Plan stated that a consultative committee 
should be created. None of these prioritised actions have been implemented. Until recently, a 
                                                     
7
 Protected area with sustainable use of natural resources (Dudley 2008). 
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marine officer based in Bicheno was responsible for all marine reserves in the State, but at the 
time of writing, there were no staff within PWS assigned specifically to deal with marine issues. 
Table 4.10 briefly describes MPAs in Tasmania. Including Macquarie Island Marine Reserve, 
approximately 135,000 ha are protected, representing 5.75% of TSW. Excluding this remote 
area, the percentage around Tasmania is approximately 2.67%, but if only no-take zones are 
considered, this percentage shrinks to 1.12% (Kriwoken 2016). Although the original intention 
of the State Government was to replicate the consultation process in all bioregions, four 
bioregions, Boags, Flinders, Franklin, Otway, have to date no representation. Previous Labor 
Governments made little progress after the Bruny Bioregion process, even though their policy 
platform supports the TMPAS (Labor 2014). The current Liberal Government has no plans to 
advance on the establishment of an MPA system (Tasmanian Liberals).   
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Table 4.10 Description of Tasmanian MPAs 
  
Name Description 
Tinderbox Marine Reserve Proclaimed 1991. Extended 2009. 
Area: 144 ha 
Bruny Bioregion 
Maria Island Marine Reserve Proclaimed 1991.  
Area: 1,878 ha (1,282 ha as no-take). 
Freycinet Bioregion 
Part of Maria Island National Park. 
Ninepin Point Marine Reserve Proclaimed 1991. Extended 2009. 
Area: 732 ha. 
Bruny Bioregion 
Governor Island Marine 
Reserve 
Proclaimed 1991.  
Area:60 ha 
Freycinet Bioregion 
Kent Group Marine Reserve Proclaimed 2004.  
Area: 29,000 ha (13,837 ha as no-take) 
Bruny Bioregion 
Part of Kent Group National Park 
Port Davey Marine Reserve Proclaimed 2004.  
Area: 17,753 (9,943 ha as no-take). 
Bruny Bioregion 
Part of the Southwest National Park 
Macquarie Island Marine 
Reserve 
Proclaimed 2000.  
Area: 74,738 ha. 
Macquarie Island Province 
Part of Macquarie Island Nature Reserve and adjacent to the Commonwealth 
Macquarie Island Marine 
Bruny Bioregion - Marine 
Conservation Areas 
14 MCA proclaimed 2009: Opossum Bay, Monk Bay, Cloudy Bay, Central 
Channel, Simpsons Point, Roberts Point, Huon Estuary, Hippolyte Rocks, Sloping 
Island, Waterfall – Fortescue, Blackman Rivulet, South Arm, Port Cygnet, River 
Derwent. 
Area: 11,766 ha. 
Bruny Bioregion  
No zoning or specific management strategies have been proposed since designation. 
They offer little additional protection for marine resources when compared to non-
reserved waters.  
 
  
Chapter 4 – The governance regime for MPAs in Tasmania  
79 
 
Figure 4.4 Map of Tasmanian Marine Reserves and Marine Conservation Areas 
 
  
Source: (Kriwoken 2016) 
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4.5 Political context 
The recent political arena in Tasmania has been dominated by Labor (1976, 1979, 1989, 1998, 
2002, 2006, 2010) and Liberal (1982, 1986, 1992, 1996, 2014) governments. Labor’s official 
position on MPAs has been “balanced”, supporting their development “whilst providing fair and 
equitable access to all those with interests in fish and fishing” (Labor 2014). In fact, most MPA 
developments occurred during Labor governments. The current Liberal party policy position, on 
the other hand, is openly against the designation of any new MPA (Tasmanian Liberals). 
However, even during Labor governments, Hislop (2004) maintains that MPA interest was 
mainly limited to pre-election rhetoric and that progress was actually minimal, or at best slow, 
once in power. The Greens’ policies strongly support the development of MPAs and a more 
participatory approach. The Greens, however have only had marginal influence, particularly 
during minority governments in 1989, 1996 and 2010. During the Labor-Green Coalition in 
2010, the Greens held positions in Cabinet, although not related to natural resource 
management.  
One of the consequences of a political system with incomplete separation of executive and 
legislative powers is that decisions are highly politicised. Decision makers are typically 
politicians whose position in Parliament is dependent on the next voting period; there is then a 
strong incentive to make decisions that will show positive electoral results in the short-term. 
Accordingly, long-term impacts of those decisions can be under emphasised or overlooked. This 
focus on short-term outcomes is discussed in Chapter 5 to 8. 
 
4.6 Socio-economic and cultural context 
Tasmania had a population of 516,600 in June 2015 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2015); 40% 
of this population is settled in Hobart and surroundings, and another 40% inhabit Launceston 
and the North-West coast. The rest of the population is scattered in sparsely populated small 
towns, with the lowest density along the West and South-West regions (Tasmania Top Ten 
2011). The growth rate in Tasmania is low (0.4%) with a significant portion of young people 
(15-29 years old) emigrating to the mainland or overseas.  
Tasmania consistently has a low level of economic performance when compared to the rest of 
Australia. Having a small economy, Tasmania is also subject to more pronounced periodic 
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variations than other regions in Australia. A high proportion of Tasmania’s production is 
export-oriented, which results in external forces having a strong influence on Tasmania’s 
economy. These external forces include the exchange rate and commodity price movements. 
These cycles are closely related to population levels, creating vicious and virtuous cycles; when 
the economy is low, more people emigrate, and a lower population slows the economy; on the 
other hand, when the economy grows, more people are attracted to live in Tasmania, and a 
larger population helps the economy to grow even more (Bureau of Infrastructure Transport and 
Regional Economics 2008). Skilled labour also has an impact on these cycles, and the fact that 
the population seems to be “maturing”, further affects potential external investment (West et al. 
2012). 
The economy in Tasmania has been historically linked to the extraction and export of natural 
resources. Forestry, for example, has a long history in Tasmania, having been one of the main 
economic sectors for many years. Very early on, in 1885, Tasmania started to regulate forestry 
activities and research (Elliott et al. 2008). Due to several factors, forestry has gradually 
decreased its contribution to the State Gross Product and employment levels (Krien 2010). 
Being an island, the extraction of marine resources has also been important. For early European 
settlers, whaling and sealing were prosperous ventures, attracting many people in search of 
financial opportunities. By the end of the 1800s, however, the stocks had been depleted to the 
point that most operations were no longer profitable (Crowther 1919; Parks and Wildlife 
Service 2008). Prior to the current system of fisheries management, a lack of regulation 
accelerated the decline in catches of some fisheries, such as crayfish or rock lobster (Jasus 
edwardsii) and scallops (Pecten fumatus) (Harrison 1994). Today, most fisheries in Tasmania 
are regarded by the Department of the Environment as sustainable (Department of the 
Environment). Fisheries contributed around A$152 million to the State’s economy in 2012. The 
largest contributors were wild-caught abalone (A$84 million) and rock lobster (A$63.4 million), 
most of which were exported to China (Tasmanian Seafood Industry Council 2014). To put it in 
perspective, Bennett et al. (2015) calculated that these two fisheries in the Southern Reef 
(temperate reefs of South Australia, Victoria, Tasmania and the South of New South Wales) are 
worth over four times all commercial fishing operations in the Great Barrier Reef.  
Agriculture and aquaculture have been identified as some of the most promising sectors for 
diversifying the economy, both for their current contribution and for their innovation capacity 
(West et al. 2012). In particular, the growing marine farming sector contributed over A$500 
million dollars to the State economy in 2011-12 (Tasmanian Seafood Industry Council 2014).      
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The natural resources of Tasmania are the base of the more recent tourism industry. Tourism 
has grown substantially, becoming a key element of the economy in Tasmania, particularly 
nature-based tourism. Tourism contributes over A$1 billion to the Gross State Product, and 
employs 16,000 and 22,000 people directly and indirectly (Tourism Industry Council Tasmania 
2013). An important fraction of the tourism development benefits for coastal communities is 
driven by an interest in ocean activities, such as diving, fishing, surfing and whale watching 
(Bennett et al. 2015). In Tasmania, around 5,000 tourists participate in diving or snorkelling 
activities, over 15,000 sail and/or kayak, and more than 25,000 fish (Tourism Tasmania 2015). 
While tourism has grown rapidly over the last few years, and is currently an important 
component of the economy, the analysis by West et al. (2012) suggests that it has a low 
innovative capacity; this would make it less competitive in the face of external factors, when 
compared with other countries and regions. Recent recognitions, however, suggest otherwise, as 
Tasmania won more medals than other states and territories in the Qantas Australian Tourism 
Awards 2015 and was in the top ten regions to visit according to Lonely Planet in 2015 
(Tourism Tasmania 2015).     
Bennett et al. (2015) calculate that there are many economic benefits derived from the marine 
environment in the Southern Reef that are not accounted for in traditional economic indicators. 
For example, they highlight that the substantial productivity, which is often higher than 
intensive agricultural systems, supports not only important commercial fisheries, but also 
recreational fisheries. In the last report on recreational fisheries in Tasmania, Lyle et al. (2014b) 
estimated that around 98,000 people fished during the previous year, of which 91% fished in 
saltwater. There are approximately A$439 million invested in boats, and during 2012-13 the 
expenditure was A$93 million on goods and services related to fishing.  
Other benefits derived from the ocean that are usually unaccounted for include: climate 
regulation, carbon stocks, and recreation and well-being (Bennett et al. 2015). Australians have 
a strong connection with the coast and the ocean (Hammer 2012). This is reflected in the high 
proportion of the Australian population (85%) living within 50 km from the coast; this 
proportion is even higher (99%) in Tasmania (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006). A survey in 
2000 indicated that around 18,500 and 17,000 Tasmanians participated in kayaking and 
diving/snorkelling activities respectively (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2000). Your Marine 
Values project identified what local residents in the lower Huon Estuary and D’Entrecasteaux 
Channel in Tasmania valued most about their coastal and marine environments. Seventeen 
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values were highlighted, ranging from Aboriginal, to social, economic and ecological aspects 
(Ogier and MacLeod 2013). 
This economic and cultural context influences the MPA governance system in several ways. 
The economy of the State is small and vulnerable to external forces. For this reason, it is 
expected that politicians give priority to development, rather than conservation. The only 
exception is when there is a strong link to an economic activity, as in the case of nature-based 
tourism. Diving, however, is not considered an important economic activity, and therefore 
marine resources are not valued for their contribution to such tourism-related activities. A 
divide between development and conservation is particularly apparent in Tasmania, given the 
economy is strongly connected to the extraction of natural resources. Kellow (1989) suggests 
that in fact certain pro-development positions are already embedded in existing institutions. 
Assumptions that inform decisions can therefore be biased, even if they are not apparent, 
explicit or even conscious. 
Another important influence is the large proportion of Tasmanian recreational fishers. Members 
of this sector have been among the most notorious opponents to MPAs, although the policies of 
the representative body accept them under certain conditions (TARFish n.d.). As recreational 
fishers can potentially make an appreciable difference to electoral outcomes, it is not surprising 
that politicians pay particular attention to their perceived preferences. On the other hand, fishers 
and others who enjoy beach and water activities, or who live next to the sea, usually have an 
interest in marine and coastal conservation. Not surprisingly, there are many local volunteer 
groups along the coasts of Tasmania focusing on conservation activities. This interest in the 
health of marine ecosystems and species, under certain circumstances, can result in important 
political support for MPAs or other relevant conservation measures.   
 
4.7 Natural context  
The Australian continent has been isolated from other landmasses for millions of years. The 
tropical marine fauna and flora have mixed with those of the Indo-Pacific since 10-15 million 
years ago, when the tectonic plates collided (Butler et al. 2010). The southern temperate regions 
of Australia, however, have remained isolated for over 65 million years (Poore 1995). 
Biogeographical, ecological and evolutionary factors have allowed the development of a unique 
ensemble of species (Phillips 2001) in what Bennett et al. (2015), called the “Great Southern 
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Reef”. Considering only faunal species, the South-Eastern Marine Domain is the third most 
speciose of Australia, after the East-Central and North-Eastern Domains (Butler et al. 2010). 
Moreover, levels of endemism are much higher for the southern regions, possibly reaching 90% 
(IMCRA 1998; Butler et al. 2010). Certain taxonomic groups are more diverse in the southern 
regions of Australia, including macroalgae (Womersley 1990; Phillips 2001; Poloczanska et al. 
2012), Porifera and Annelida (Butler et al. 2010).   
Tasmania is part of the Southeast Australian Shelf Marine Province (Spalding et al. 2007). The 
Integrated Marine and Coastal Regionalisation for Australia (IMCRA 1998) identified eight 
mesoscale bioregions around Tasmania: Boags, Central Bass Strait, Otway, Franklin, Davey, 
Bruny, Freycinet, Flinders and Twofold shelf bioregions (Figure 4.4). Additionally, Tasmania 
has jurisdiction over the coastal waters around sub-Antarctic Macquarie Island. The Macquarie 
Island Province encompasses both coastal and off-shore waters (IMCRA 1998).                                                                        
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Figure 4.5 Meso-scale Bioregions in Tasmanian waters 
 
Source: (Resources Planning and Development Commission 2003b) 
 
The diversity of Tasmanian marine bioregions is influenced by the interplay between climate, 
oceanography, bathymetry and biogeography (Parsons 2011). Average sea-surface temperatures 
are typically 10-12⁰C in winter and 15-20⁰C in summer, although differences of more than 4⁰C 
have been reported across the State (Harris et al. 1987). These temperatures, however, are 
variable depending on seasonal events, freshwater input, geographic features and most 
importantly, oceanographic currents. The major currents that influence the island are the Eastern 
Australian Current, the Zeehan Current and the Antarctic Circumpolar Current. The latter is a 
cold nutrient-rich current that moves mainly eastward (Department of Primary Industries Water 
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and Environment 2000). The Zeehan Current is the last section of the 5,500-km Leewin Current. 
The Leewin Current flows southward along the western coast of Australia, then eastward along 
the southern coast of Australia, to finally flow southward along the West coast of Tasmania 
(Ridgway and Condie 2004)–. The East Australian Current is the major current flowing 
southward along the east coast of Australia. It has a seasonal variation, having a stronger 
influence in Tasmania during summer (Ridgway and Godfrey 1997). The latter two currents 
bring warm nutrient-poor waters. In general, the west coast of Tasmania is a high-energy 
coastline, with significant swells. 
The east coast has much lower wave energy, being affected by the predominant southwest 
winds and low-pressure fronts (Department of Primary Industries Water and Environment 
2000). The east coast, however, has a more convoluted coastline, which determines the presence 
of several estuaries and inlets (Edgar et al. 2000). Estuaries are a key habitat, due to their role as 
nursery and feeding areas for commercial and non-commercial species (Resources Planning and 
Development Commission 2003b). The central Bass Strait has the lowest wave-energy, as it is 
protected from predominant swells and because shallower waters allow the dissipation of wave 
energy (Department of Primary Industries Water and Environment 2000). This variety of 
conditions determines that major marine biomes can be distinguished between the Bass Strait, 
the north, east and western coasts (Edgar et al. 1993; Department of Primary Industries Water 
and Environment 2000). The SEAMAP project mapped a large extent of Tasmanian habitats 
using a combination of methods, including acoustic surveys, remote sensing and video (Institute 
for Marine and Antarctic Studies 2011). The main habitat types identified are rocky reef (high, 
medium or low profile), unvegetated unconsolidated substrate (gravel, sand, silt, cobble) and 
vegetated unconsolidated substrate (seagrasses, algal beds, aquatic macrophytes). Parsons 
(2011) provides a good overview of the marine biodiversity of Tasmania, including species, 
habitat types and sites with particularly high conservation value. Table 4.11 describes the main 
characteristics of Tasmanian bioregions.   
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Table 4.11 Characteristics of Bioregions around Tasmania 
Province/ 
Biotone 
Bioregion Characteristics 
Mean 
number of 
species (fish, 
invertebrates 
and plants) 
T
a
sm
a
n
ia
n
 P
ro
v
in
ce
 
Franklin Extremely exposed, open coastline, long sandy beaches and 
rocky headlands. High energy and dark estuary waters may 
explain its low diversity. Low anthropogenic impact. Important 
for birds. High value sites include Macquarie Harbour, one of 
the largest estuarine systems in Australia with a highly 
stratified water column and habitat to the endangered Maugean 
skate (Zearaja maugeana). Other sites include the Sloop Rocks 
and the unique Wanderer estuary.  
Tidal range: 1.5 m.  
Habitats: seagrass (0%), sand (61.9%), reef (38%). 
27.1 
Davey Extremely exposed coastline, rocky headlands, sandy beaches, 
with a strong influence of the Southern Ocean.  Pristine 
conditions. In high-energy areas, bull kelp is found much 
deeper than is usual. Port Davey/Bathurst Harbour is one of the 
high value sites, recognised as World Heritage. Unique 
conditions, with a shallow entrance, a deep channel and a 
significantly isolated harbour. High stratification, with a tannin 
layer at the surface and a clear salt-water layer at the bottom. 
Typical deep-water species are found here in shallow waters. 
High endemism and unique invertebrate communities. Other 
high value sites include Maatsuyker and Pedra Branca Islands, 
key areas for birds and seals, including endangered elephant 
seals (Mirounga leonine) and shy albatross (Thalassarche 
cauta).       
Tidal range: 1 m.  
Habitats: seagrass (2.5%), sand (49.8%), reef (47.8%). 
34 
Bruny Dissected coastline with large numbers of protected bays, 
headlands, estuaries and cliffs. Exposure is therefore variable. 
Mostly influenced by nutrient-rich subantarctic waters. Two 
large drowned-river estuaries (Huon and Derwent) have an 
effect on sediments, salinity and nutrient levels. Presence of 
cold-water species not found further north, and high species 
richness and endemism, including endangered species such as 
the live-bearing seastar (Parvulastra vivipara) and handfish 
species (Brachionichthyidae). High value sites include the 
Huon estuary entrance, where a tannin layer combined with 
high nutrients from the Southern Ocean result in a unique 
ensemble of species. Other high value sites include Bruny 
Island headlands; Pittwater/Orielton Lagoon as a key saltmarsh 
and shark nursery area; Tasman Peninsula, with outstanding 
cliffs and caves and high diversity, including deep-water 
species like the Southern Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus maccoyii) and 
Albacore (Thunnus alalunga), as well as kelp forests 
(Macrocystis pyrifera). 
Tidal range: 1 m. 
Habitats: seagrass (3%), sand (82.7%), reef (14.3%). 
48.4 
Freycinet Relatively exposed, with rocky headlands, beaches and 
lagoons. Species communities vary along the coast according 
to the level of influence of the East Australian Current. The 
northernmost kelp forest in the Southern Hemisphere is found 
here. Lagoons and estuaries are important habitat for birds. 
High value sites include Schouten Island; Ile the Phoques with 
a unique cave system; the Georges Bay native oyster reef; 
Maria Island with the highest diversity of reef plants and 
animals in Tasmania; and Governor Island.  
43.8 
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Province/ 
Biotone 
Bioregion Characteristics 
Mean 
number of 
species (fish, 
invertebrates 
and plants) 
Tidal range: 1.5 m.  
Habitats: seagrass (3.3%), sand (78.4%), reef (18.3%). 
B
a
ss
ia
n
 P
ro
v
in
ce
 
Boags Sheltered open coastline, long sandy beaches and rocky 
headlands. Shallow areas and strong tidal currents. Important 
marine and shorebird habitats. Extensive seagrass beds, 
including the southernmost distribution of warm temperate 
species. High diversity, including Bass Strait species rare in 
southern bioregions. Rocky cape, the Tamar estuary and 
Waterhouse are considered high value sites. 
Tidal range: 3 m.  
Habitats: seagrass (11.4%), sand (75.3%), reef (13.3%). 
48.6 
Flinders Rocky coastline with sandy beaches on shallow areas. Exposed 
on the east of Flinders Island, moderate to low exposure 
elsewhere. Large number of estuaries with high conservation 
value and extensive seagrass beds. Important bird habitats and 
key breeding area for the Australian Fur Seal. Species not 
present in other regions. High value areas include the North 
East Inlet and the west coast Furneaux seagrass beds, 
Judgement Rocks, and Franklin Sound.  
Tidal range: 3 m. 
Habitats: seagrass (10.5%), sand (82.5%), reef (7%). 
42.9 
Twofold Shelf Relatively exposed with long sandy beaches, rocky headlands 
and lagoons. Sea surface temperature influenced by East 
Australian Current. The Kent Group is considered a high value 
site, as the convergence of three provinces, diversity of habitats 
and good water quality support a high biodiversity, with many 
species not found in southern bioregions. This includes an 
unusual coral community.  
Tidal range: 2 m.  
Habitats not mapped. 
51.4 
W
es
t 
B
a
ss
ia
n
 B
io
to
n
e 
Otway Exposed, steep coastline. Strong currents associated to the 
entrance to Bass Strait. Connected to South Australia and 
Victoria through the Leeuwin current, sharing some marine 
biota. Important for high-energy and oceanic species. High 
value sites include King Island, with diversity of marine 
habitats and bird breeding areas; and the Seabird Islands with 
their colonies of shy albatross and other birds, as well as 
Otariids.  
Tidal range: 0.6 m on the West coast and 1.2 m on the East 
coast. 
Habitats not mapped. 
44.8 
M
a
cq
u
a
ri
e 
Is
la
n
d
 
P
ro
v
in
ce
 
NA It comprises waters surrounding Macquarie Island and 
seamounts. The biota is a mixture of Antarctic and cool 
temperate elements. Important for endangered marine birds 
(albatross and penguins) and mammals. Along with the 
Commonwealth Macquarie Island Marine Park, it has been 
included in the World Heritage List. 
Tidal range: 1m 
Habitats not mapped. 
NA 
Modified from Department of Primary Industries Water and Environment (2000); Parsons (2011). 
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There are several implications on MPA governance of a natural context characterised by high 
diversity, high endemism and rapidly changing conditions. For example, when species have 
small or patchy distributions, conservation actions need to include local actors, be specific in 
location and address threats particular to those species.  On the other hand, as will be detailed in 
the next section, certain threats span over great expanses of the oceans. In this case, good 
coordination across all governance levels, from the local, State and regional, is fundamental to 
managing marine resources. The need to have good coordination across levels is not limited to 
governance regimes, but also for monitoring and sharing of information. Changing conditions, 
accelerated by climate change, require a governance regime that is prepared to deal with those 
changes (Lockwood et al. 2012). 
 
4.8 Problems that the governance regime needs to address 
A governance regime needs to address a series of issues, including ecological, socio-economic, 
institutional and cultural issues, as well as their interrelations. In this section, I first address 
natural and anthropogenic impact on the marine environment. I then briefly discuss other issues 
found in the literature regarding institutional approaches to resource management. This 
particular component is complemented by specific findings of this thesis, presented and 
discussed in subsequent chapters.  
Different pressures and impacts on the marine and coastal environment act synergistically. For 
this reason, they should be addressed in an integrated manner. Some of the main threats 
identified in Tasmania include: climate change and related impacts; siltation and pollution; 
invasive species; direct and indirect impacts from fishing; and inappropriate governance 
regimes (Edgar et al. 2000; Resources Planning and Development Commission 2003b; Edgar et 
al. 2005; Stump 2009; Lockwood et al. 2013).   
Hobday and Pecl (2013) identify Tasmania as a climate change hotspot. One aspect that has 
changed over the past years is the sea level, with an increase of 0.8mm/year recorded in Maria 
Island (Tasmanian Planning Commission 2009). A higher sea level, especially if accompanied 
by more frequent storms and surges, leads to erosion of the coastal line. This has had an impact 
on habitats like beaches, dunes and coastal wetlands, but also on human constructions 
(Tasmanian Planning Commission 2009). Additionally, the main currents affecting Tasmanian 
oceanographic conditions, Leeuwin and the Eastern Australian, have also shown changes in 
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temperature and seasonal effect on Tasmanian waters (Pearce and Feng 2007; Hobday and Pecl 
2013). Off Maria Island, on the East coast, an increase of approximately 2.3°C has been 
recorded since 1994 (Tasmanian Planning Commission 2009).  
Warming waters have had an impact on the distribution of many species, with a poleward shift 
of plankton, macroalgae, crustaceans and several fish; at least 36 species were reported to have 
changes in distribution in the last Tasmanian State of the Environment report  (Tasmanian 
Planning Commission 2009). Sensitive species, like those forming kelp forests, have gradually 
disappeared from previous locations, as there is a limit to where they can move (Hobday et al. 
2006). At the same time, other species from warmer regions have invaded Tasmanian waters, 
sometimes exerting significant ecological changes (Johnson et al. 2011; Last et al. 2011). A 
striking example of cascading effects of climate change and the interaction with other pressures, 
is the case of the sea urchin barrens on kelp beds (Johnson et al. 2011). The long-spined sea 
urchin, Centrostephanus rodgersii, was previously absent from Tasmania, due to its temperature 
tolerance range. As sea temperatures increased, this species invaded Tasmanian waters. They 
consume seaweed, and in the absence of predator control, they will ultimately form barrens, 
completely depleted of seaweeds. Large rock lobsters consume sea urchins, exerting some 
control. In highly fished areas, however, large rock lobsters are absent, and sea urchins 
eventually deplete the seaweed. Once the seaweed is gone, rock lobster larvae are not able to 
settle, limiting the eventual control that they could have on urchin populations (Ling and 
Johnson 2012).  
In addition to species with a range extension, many species have been introduced accidentally or 
on purpose. The Tasmanian State of the Environment report  includes more than 130 marine 
pest species, including the northern Pacific seastar (Asterias amurensis), the long-spined sea 
urchin, European green crab (Carcinus maenas), several molluscs and algae (Tasmanian 
Planning Commission 2009). The impact of invasive species on ecological systems is difficult 
to predict, but research shows that major declines in certain taxonomic groups can be related 
(Ross et al. 2003). Unfortunately, controlling pests in marine environments is extremely 
difficult, so potential interventions are very limited. 
The extraction of selected marine resources can have important effects on ecological 
relationships (Garcia et al. 2012). Commercial fisheries in Tasmania have been closely 
monitored and regulated over the past years through both input and output measures (Stump 
2009). Most fisheries are fully exploited, but have remained stable (Tasmanian Planning 
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Commission 2009), except for the scallop fishery, characterised by strong temporal and spatial 
variability (Tracey and Lyle 2011). Most information is related to catch and effort figures, but 
except for the rock lobster, few species have actual stock assessments (Tasmanian Planning 
Commission 2009). Some fishing practices have also indirect effects, including habitat damage 
and bycatch. 
Recreational fishing, on the other hand, has fewer restrictions and is not closely monitored 
(McPhee et al. 2002). Only certain species and fishing gear require a licence in Tasmania 
(lobster pots, gillnets, scallop, abalone and rock lobster diving); monitoring is therefore based 
on a sample of the entire population (Lyle and Morton 2004; Lyle et al. 2009; Lyle et al. 
2014b), and it depends on the willingness of respondents to participate. In the last recreational 
fishing survey 2012/13, Lyle et al. (2014b) estimated that around 98,000 Tasmanians fished at 
least once that year. For some species, recreational catch estimates exceed the commercial 
catch. Participation rates in recreational fishing and catch effort have declined since the first 
survey in 2002/03. Although bag limits have decreased over the years, people are allowed to 
fish as many times as they want during the open season, and the number of licences issued in a 
single year has no limit. Recreational fishing is therefore, an open-access extractive activity 
(McPhee et al. 2002). The current licence system was introduced in 1995 for high-value or 
high-impact fisheries. Since then, licences for lobsters have increased from approximately 8,500 
to 15,000 in 2002/03, to 83,000 in 2012/13. The number of abalone licences has equally 
increased since then (Lyle and Morton 2004; Lyle et al. 2014a). For instance, despite closures 
and bag limits, rock lobster populations in the Eastern Region have not rebuilt. Recently (end of 
2015), this triggered the need to further decrease the bag limit to only two per day.  
Recreational gillnetting has also raised concern, because gillnets in general can have significant 
impacts on the environment. They are not selective and can catch juveniles and unwanted 
species, and lost nets can become “ghost nets” (Edgar 1984). Several restrictions have been 
introduced to reduce the overall impact, such as banning night netting and reducing soak times. 
Despite this, (Lyle et al. 2014a) found that gillnetting has a high impact on both targeted and 
non-targeted species, including endangered species.  
Pollution and siltation can also have an important impact on marine ecosystems, particularly 
those close to shore and those with low rates of water turnover (Edgar et al. 2000). Impact level 
is closely related to the proximity to centres of human population and agriculture/industrial 
areas. The most affected regions in Tasmania are the Derwent and the Tamar estuaries (Edgar et 
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al. 2000; Tasmanian Planning Commission 2009). Pollution on the Derwent remains relatively 
high, even though control and treatment of effluents of heavy metals and organic matter are 
increasing (Coughanowr et al. 2015). The low population levels and high conservation status of 
the West and Southwest regions of Tasmania, result in highly pristine wetlands (Edgar et al. 
2000).  
Lists of endangered species can contribute to biodiversity conservation if they are used to set 
specific plans for recovery or protection, to establish monitoring priorities and set criteria to 
regulate development. The list of marine endangered species of Tasmania, however, is short 
(35) when compared to terrestrial species. Marine species listed correspond mainly to marine 
mammals, birds and large fish, while some extremely rare species are not included (Edgar et al. 
2005). Extinction rates in marine environments can be naturally much lower than in their 
terrestrial counterparts (Roberts and Hawkins 1999). The small number included in the official 
Tasmanian list, however, might be a result of limited knowledge and status assessment, rather 
than low impact (Edgar et al. 2005). For example, only three handfish species have been 
included in the list, but Last and Gledhill (2009) suggest that up to 11 species occur in 
Tasmania. Given their life history and shrinking distribution, probably all species deserve to be 
included in the list. Edgar et al. (2005) analysed the few databases that contain historical data. 
They conclude that marine extinctions may not be as rare as previously thought, but it is 
possible that they go unnoticed. The national and State efforts to evaluate the state of the 
environment lack appropriate indicators to understand the response of marine communities to 
the various threats.  
One of the main issues highlighted in the Tasmanian State of the Environment  report is that the 
lack of information prevents an appropriate assessment of status (Tasmanian Planning 
Commission 2009). Most indicators focus on pressures, and they tend to be increasing. Low 
research and monitoring investment has been highlighted as one of the drivers of limited 
information to support appropriate management (Edgar et al. 2005; Bennett et al. 2015). 
Monitoring is an essential component of adaptive management, necessary to face changing 
conditions. Governance arrangements are considered inappropriate to deal with marine 
environmental problems, particularly facing rapid changing conditions that include climate 
change, but also emergent pressures. From the requirements identified by Lockwood et al. 
(2012), the adaptive capacity of the Tasmanian governance regime was considered to be mostly 
poor (Lockwood et al. 2013). This is consistent with the findings of the State of the 
Environment report, which highlighted as the main issues: lack of “whole of government” 
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direction; confusion and misunderstandings about environmental policies; and lack of clear lines 
of responsibility/accountability. The State of the Environment report Australia further calls for 
better coordination across the national, state/territory and local levels of governance, and better 
efficiency and effectiveness in environmental action (SOE 2011). An integrated approach to 
conservation would be particularly important considering that MPAs cannot control external 
threats, such as climate change, pollution and invasive species. Additionally, given that 
Tasmania has a high number of endemic species with quite limited distributions, localised 
approaches are sometimes needed.  
 
4.9 Chapter summary 
In this chapter I presented an overview of the core components and context of the Tasmanian 
MPA governance regime. The key points from this overview are: 
Instruments: There are national and international tools that support the creation of MPA 
systems, but states are mostly autonomous regarding their jurisdictional waters. There is limited 
integration of policies across sectors or government levels. The Tasmanian MPA system is not 
ecologically representative, and there are important deficiencies in the governance regime. 
Actors: The main sectors include elected government and bureaucracy, commercial and 
recreational fishers, conservation organisations, divers, research and tourism. Aboriginal 
interests were beyond the scope of this study. 
Decision arenas: There are no official, on-going forums to discuss MPAs or other marine 
conservation tools, other than to discuss fisheries-related issues. Consultation processes have 
been ad-hoc.  
Political context: Labor and Liberal parties have dominated the recent political arena in 
Tasmania. Labor’s policies support MPAs under certain conditions, but progress in establishing 
an MPA system was slow. The Liberal party openly opposes the designation of new MPAs. The 
political system determines that decisions tend to be politicised, and Ministers usually prioritise 
short-term results. 
Socio-economic context: Tasmania is characterised by a small economy, which has been 
strongly dependent on the extraction of marine resources. Activities that represent a short-term 
economic benefit are therefore prioritised in politics. 
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Cultural context: In Tasmania there is a significant connection to the coast and the marine 
environments. Recreational fishing is an important activity, with approximately 98,000 fishers 
in 2013, giving them significant political leverage. 
Natural context: Tasmania is characterised by significant marine diversity and endemism. A 
high productivity has sustained valuable fisheries. 
Problems: Tasmania is a climate change hot-spot, with synergistic impacts from climate 
change, invasive species, fishing and pollution. Research and monitoring are not appropriately 
funded, and there are significant information gaps and uncertainties. There are regime 
deficiencies to deal with change and for an integral approach to marine sustainability. 
This overview of the case study puts the findings of the next two chapters in perspective. 
Chapter 5 focuses on governance quality, mostly based on qualitative information derived from 
semi-structured interviews. Chapter 6 shows results of analyses that aimed to understand the 
effect that power structures have on governance.    
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Chapter 5 Analysis of Tasmanian marine protected areas 
according to good-governance principles 
 
Governance of MPAs in TSW is primarily the responsibility of the State Government and its 
departments and agencies. The quality of governance determines in part if protected areas are 
supported by the community; if protected area establishment and management consider aspects 
other than ecological factors (social, economic, cultural); and whether there is capacity and 
commitment to ongoing evaluation and improvement.  
In this chapter, I analyse the decision processes for MPA designation and management 
according to good governance criteria synthesised from the literature (see Chapter 2). In Section 
5.1, I present the findings of the interview analysis for each of the components and 
subcomponents of good governance. Apart from clarifications and comments, the material in 
the Section 5.1 presents a thematic analysis of interview transcripts. In Section 5.2, I draw out 
the implications of these results for governance quality and Tasmanian planning processes. The 
chapter concludes with a summary of the findings in relation to principles of good governance 
(Section 5.3).  
 
5.1 Results 
I interviewed 26 key informants associated with 24 organisations. Text blocks from the 
interview transcripts (N=496) were coded according to the components and subcomponents of 
good governance in the first two columns of Table 5.1. This table also indicates the frequency 
with which each subcomponent was mentioned by interviewees. These data reflect relative 
emphasis and attention given to each subcomponent. While they are broadly indicative of issues 
that are foremost in the minds of interviewees, they should not be interpreted as an indication of 
overall importance.  
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Table 5.1 Frequency with which good governance subcomponents were mentioned by interviewees 
Component Subcomponent 
Number of 
times 
mentioned 
Number of 
organisations that 
mentioned the 
subcomponent (n=24) 
Inclusiveness and 
fairness 
Participation of all stakeholders 94 22 
Fairness 60 17 
Dialogue (open and rational discussions, 
consensus building vs polarisation) 
116 22 
Engagement methods (tailored, ongoing, 
from the beginning) 
58 18 
Accountability and 
transparency 
Information available (who, how and why 
are decisions made) 
72 17 
Clarity of roles and processes 28 10 
Responsible bodies answer for outcomes 3 3 
Legitimacy 
Authority by law 25 13 
Evidence-based decisions 114 21 
Integrity (honest, stating conflict of 
interests, commitment, decisions not 
based on personal interests) 
78 18 
Stakeholder support 45 17 
Performance 
Direction (strategic goal setting, clear 
guidelines) 
63 19 
Appropriate skills and resources 31 15 
Efficiency and effectiveness 41 16 
Planning (operational)/ management 16 9 
Coordination/coherence/connectivity 41 13 
 
The subcomponents of good governance that were most frequently raised in the interviews by 
participants were ‘dialogue’ and ‘evidence-based decisions’. The prominence of these two 
subcomponents reflects the relative importance that stakeholders gave to rational discussion and 
evidence-based decision making. These topics were often related to participants’ concerns over 
the influence extreme points of view had over decision-making processes. There was also 
concern over manipulation by politicians for party-political ends, and by the media to 
sensationalise issues. Considerable attention was also given to inclusiveness and fairness 
subcomponents. Issues related to performance, and in particular management, were not 
discussed as frequently, and little attention was paid to accountability of the bodies responsible 
for delivering outcomes. This is perhaps a consequence of the emphasis on the controversial 
MPA designation process for the Bruny region. In the following subsections, results from the 
interviews are presented, structured according to each component and associated 
subcomponents. 
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5.1.1 Inclusiveness and fairness  
Meaningful involvement requires that communication and engagement methods be tailored to 
the specific circumstances, involving stakeholders in a constructive, on-going dialogue, and 
minimising unfair decisions. The results of this study pointed to the importance of four 
interrelated subcomponents, namely participation, fairness, dialogue and engagement methods. 
As previously discussed (Chapter 2), the concepts of participation and fairness are closely 
interrelated, as decisions can only be fair if all relevant stakeholders are considered. For this 
reason, these two subcomponents are analysed together.  
Participation and fairness. The current planning process in Tasmania is based on the Tasmanian 
Resource Management and Planning System. This process allows citizen input at several stages, 
through the reception of submissions and, if necessary, public hearings (see Chapter 4). Two 
inquiries (Bruny Bioregion, and Kent Group/Port Davey) followed this process, while previous 
designations did not.  
Most interviewees indicated that their organisation participated in one or more of the MPA 
designation processes, but they tended to refer more often to the Bruny Bioregion case, which 
was the last and most contested. The consultation process for Bruny was mostly regarded as 
inclusive. Some issues, however, limited fair and inclusive participation.  
One interviewee mentioned that “emotional” and “non-factual” information was not easily 
considered by the panel or the Planning Commission, meaning that issues such as place 
attachment, cultural, spiritual and ethical motivations might have been discounted. Another 
problem mentioned by some interviewees was that participation started halfway through the 
process when a background report was released for public consultation. Participation was not 
sought at the beginning, when information was compiled, problems identified and possible 
solutions considered. Because key stakeholders were not involved early on, some interviewees 
indicated that they were more likely to take issue with initial proposals.  
We’re not part of the original process, which is probably half the problem with a lot of 
these things. If you included everybody at the start, you could probably come up with a 
compromise result, which doesn’t start a bonfire later on (Interviewee 13). 
On other issues, such as fisheries management, the State Government seeks the advice of some 
stakeholders informally or through advisory bodies. Decision powers, however, rest solely on 
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government. As Interviewee 18 suggested, not having decision powers tended to reduce 
ownership and responsibility of stakeholders in the implementation of decisions: 
We could implement co-management, where industry was sitting at the table as a 
decision maker, not as a recommender; they would actually have a stake in making the 
decisions, and then would have to live by and implement the decisions (Interviewee 18).  
Another aspect of participation evident in interview statements was that stakeholders were 
differentially treated by both government representatives and by other stakeholders. In MPA 
designation processes, commercial and recreational fishers were consulted before inquiries went 
public, because they were deemed a key stakeholder. On the other hand, other users such as 
divers and Aboriginal groups were not considered as important, even though they could be 
directly affected by conservation decisions. Even government bodies in charge of 
implementation of MPAs, such as PWS and the police, did not participate during the 
development phase of the background report or other documents. Moreover, according to some 
interviewees, public servants are not allowed to get involved in political decisions. As 
Interviewee 11 indicated, practitioners do not plan, they “get planned for”, even though their 
expertise is invaluable for a more grounded planning. PWS in particular, seemed to have had a 
prominent role in the designation of protected areas in the past, but in the most recent processes, 
they did not have a leading role: “Parks were just a stakeholder; … the process is independent 
of Parks” (Interviewee 5). 
Another issue that relates to participation is the presence or absence of a body that represents 
each sector’s interests. An association or similar body usually has more potential of voicing a 
sectoral concern and point of view than scattered individuals. If that organisation is recognised 
by government as a valid representative of the sector, that sector would have a better chance of 
having their views included in any decision-making process: “…when you are recognised by 
government, you are more in an ongoing working relationship, rather than being an adversary” 
(Interviewee 18). 
Interviews indicated that the sectors with an interest in Tasmanian MPAs have varying levels of 
representation through formal bodies. Some are well-structured and highly organised bodies, 
such as within the commercial fishing sector. Others have conflicting representation, where 
more than one body claims to represent the sector. Some groups have no representation at all. 
Even within a sector with a recognised body such as recreational fishers, apparently many 
people are not represented, because they are not members, do not feel that that body represents 
their interests, or are not interested in formal membership. Such differences mean that certain 
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sectors have a better opportunity than others to have their views considered during the 
consultation process.  
A related concern during interviews was that there were some “vocal minorities”, or people that 
spoke up more aggressively and were therefore more likely to be heard. When such vocal 
minorities do not represent the majority of people in that sector, they can in fact obscure or 
confuse the interpretation of a sector’s position. It was recognised that in Tasmania this can be 
true both for sectors that oppose and that advocate for MPAs.   
There is a vocal minority with a particular view. You need to put that percentage of 
people, which generally is less than 5% of the population, in perspective; they are the 
vocal minority (Interviewee 18). 
A factor that was believed to have affected and/or misguided participation was the limited 
understanding of the marine environment, current conservation status of key species and 
ecosystems, and the costs and benefits of MPAs. Interviewees also noted confusion about 
opportunities to participate. This was strongly related not only to information available during 
the process, but to a lack of longer-term strategies that could allow people at all levels to 
understand the marine environment, potential impacts of different activities and management 
strategies, and about their own role in shaping decisions and outcomes.  
As mentioned above, most interviewees regarded the Bruny Bioregion consultation process as 
participative, even considering the problems already explained. However, the final step of the 
process depended on only one person. At the time of the Bruny Bioregion process, the Minister 
of Primary Industries and Water was responsible for that decision. The Minister was not 
required to follow the recommendations made by the TPC or the expert panel. As stated by 
Interviewee 17, “when all the final power rests with the Minister, he does have a lot of power in 
his hands despite the process leading into it”. 
The Minister’s decision to create 14 Marine Conservation Areas, which were considered by 
interviewees to provide little or no additional protection to important marine biodiversity 
features, was mostly viewed negatively. This opinion was shared across the different sectors and 
was not exclusive to conservation-minded organisations: “Conservation focused people will feel 
fairly miffed that there were no additional no-take MPAs, understandably so” (Interviewee 12). 
According to some interviewees, the Minister’s decision was made after strong lobbying by a 
few individuals from the recreational fishing sector. These individuals supposedly managed to 
get the support of a large number of recreational fishers who had the mistaken impression that 
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the TPC proposals would mean they would be locked out of large areas off the Tasman 
Peninsula.  
One of the purposes of engaging the community is to include the views of a range of 
stakeholders and make better decisions that reflect their needs and expectations (Department of 
Premier and Cabinet 2013). If the final decision is independent of that input, the consultation 
process becomes meaningless, turning the whole process into one of token participation. This 
generates mistrust in government, as reflected by the following statement from Interviewee 18: 
“When something did happen, nothing really happened, that was all just smoke and mirrors”. 
Interviewees also noted the effect of politics on decisions. On the one hand, the Bruny 
Bioregion decision was made a few months before the 2010 state elections and the need to get 
re-elected could have likely guided the Minister’s decision. One interviewee blamed the 
Tasmanian electoral system, where Ministers are politicians who do not necessarily represent 
the common interest, but follow the preferences of a minority constituency whose support they 
need to increase their chances of re-election.  
Dialogue. In general most organisations recognised that the TPC, and in particular the panel 
appointed for the Bruny Bioregion process, were objective adjudicators of the various 
viewpoints put to them. Several interviewees, however, pointed out that the process was too 
formal and that the official documents were too complex for some key stakeholders to consider.  
A formal planning process is great from a legal perspective, but it’s not great from a 
human perspective. And we are humans, and we live in communities and we don’t 
function as lawyers (Interviewee 16). 
By not reaching many relevant people and organisations, there was an opportunity for people to 
manipulate information. For example, some interviewees mentioned that during the Bruny 
Bioregion process many recreational fishers were led to believe that a no-take MPA off the 
Tasman Peninsula was going to be larger than the actual proposal. This misconception was 
supported by a note released by the ABC at the time of the controversy: “The plan for a marine 
park for the Bruny Bioregion covers a stretch of water from Marion Bay on the East Coast, 
including the Tasman, Storm Bay and Bruny Island, down to Southport” (Dakis 2007). 
For many fishers this massive MPA would have been unacceptable. According to one 
interviewee, if they had perceived that the proposal was reasonable, at least some fishers would 
have considered it, and this might have brought other sector representatives to negotiate 
outcomes that might have been acceptable to all parties. 
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Everybody was worried about the one [MPA] that they were planning doing at 
Eaglehawk Neck, the Hippolytes and the coastline from Eaglehawk Neck to Tasman 
Island. They were planning an MPA all along there, with a tremendous impact on 
everybody. I can’t even come to grips at this time that they actually proposed it. … They 
had to change the rules to their original plan [Bruny original proposal], because their 
original plan just wasn’t acceptable to anybody! Whereas if a few said maybe we should 
look, the larger group would think about it. They might have had more constructive 
outcomes (Interviewee 19). 
Some interviewees mentioned that fishers and environmentalists both manipulated information 
to suit their interests. According to these interviewees, some environmentalists overstated the 
benefits of MPAs while some fishing interests overstated the costs. In the end, many may have 
had access to partial or manipulated information, and their perception of the MPA process 
depended on which organisations’ information they received. 
A problem mentioned by some interviewees is that marine environmental issues are more 
difficult to understand and explain than their terrestrial counterparts. A high level of uncertainty 
in scientific evidence might explain varying views within the scientific community. As 
Interviewee 15 stated, “the actual advice from IMAS varies depending on who you talk to”. 
This in turn, might have hindered a dialogue based on clear evidence. When strong feelings and 
beliefs, rather than facts, determine the position of stakeholders, then having a rational dialogue 
and negotiating a balanced decision becomes more difficult. 
It’s almost like dealing with a religion. It’s a matter of faith, it’s got nothing to do with 
the truth. If someone believes something to that point that they think the scientists are 
trying to screw them, and these people are all lying, no matter what you say, they’re not 
going to listen to you (Interviewee 14).  
Some interviewees further mentioned that there was a perception of two opposing points of 
view or ideologies regarding MPAs. Although it was an oversimplification of the different 
positions on MPAs, this divide has been exaggerated in political debates.  
In Tasmania there’s this schism between so-called pro-development and pro-
conservation. And I think a lot of political forces in Tasmania try and exploit that … I 
think that has coloured the marine protected area debate. It’s got to the point where it’s 
very hard to discuss issues without that discussion being coloured by where you are 
supposed to sit in the political spectrum (Interviewee 15). 
The need of the two major political parties to distance themselves from “green” positions has 
driven even more extreme positions in politics. 
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As soon as the Greens say something, there seems to be a reflex where the other parties 
don’t want to do it … they don’t want to take on a constituency that is considered sneaky 
green stuff (Interviewee 1). 
This perceived polarisation, however, seems to be overstated, as most interviewees tended to be, 
at least in principle, sympathetic to different points of view and other stakeholder’s needs and 
expectations. Most stated that they would be open to discuss different MPA proposals and 
conservation alternatives. 
My personal opinion is that we should try and get involved with conservation groups 
more heavily than we are … To my opinion you’d better be with them than against them; 
several times you might not agree with everything that they are saying, but it’s better if 
they’re friends than if they are not. (Interviewee 19) 
According to some organisations interviewed, the Kent Group and Port Davey process allowed 
negotiations and revisions to take place before the final decision. As a result, most participants 
felt relatively satisfied with the outcomes.  
It would have been nice to have a little bit more protected (in the Kent Group and Port 
Davey), but they certainly demonstrated that the process could work (Interviewee 15). 
In contrast, the Bruny Bioregion process was particularly contested. There were too many 
conflicting interests concentrated in the bioregion, and limited dialogue exacerbated the 
difficulty to reach a satisfactory agreement. 
Many interviewees stated that there were a number of issues surrounding the general MPA 
discourse. One key point was the lack of clarity about the intentions of the MPA system. In 
particular, the term MPA meant different things to different people. On the one hand, some 
understood the term as a reserved area, or a no-take zone, where all extractive activities were 
restricted. Others understood the term to be an area that accommodated different uses, including 
extractive activities. The Tasmanian Marine Protected Areas Strategy has a flexible definition of 
MPA, which encompasses no-take, limited use and multiple-use areas (Marine and Marine 
Industries Council 2001). Interviewee 5 considered that a unified approach would have been 
preferable: “And that, I think, is one of Tasmania’s major problems in the designation process: 
they haven’t actually defined what the system is going to look like”. 
Such a strategy could have sought to establish large multiple-use MPAs with smaller no-take 
zones, as found in the most recent Western Australia experience (Wilson 2016), or the Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park (Day 2016). An alternative strategy could have been to establish a 
system of relatively small no-take zones or reserves, such as the marine national parks and 
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marine sanctuaries created in Victoria in 2002 (Wescott 2006, 2016). However, there has never 
been clarity around which of these strategies, or perhaps a mixed approach, would be adopted 
for Tasmanian MPAs. As a result, people might have confused perceptions about the intent of a 
Tasmanian MPA system and associated zoning regulations and restrictions.  
If we actually had a very clear system … there would be some clear facts about what we 
were trying to achieve. It wouldn’t be so open to people’s emotive and manipulative 
approaches (Interviewee 5). 
Many interviewees highlighted the role of advisory committees as potentially important 
deliberation forums. In particular, FACs were considered to allow an on-going dialogue about 
management issues between stakeholders.  
These sorts of bodies [FACs] are made up of everybody who has an interest within the 
fishing industry, whether the police, the fishermen, the policy makers. And all these 
people are consulted and finally, based on all the consultations, that’s when DPIPWE will 
make recommendations to the Minister; after consulting all the relevant parties. I’ve only 
been doing this job for a year, but I can’t think of a circumstance where the Minister has 
made a decision that is contrary to common sense … things are put up well in advance 
and talked about (Interviewee 7).  
In these committees, enough time is given to discuss problems and possible management. They 
collect evidence, identify information gaps, and generate more agreement amongst the members 
before decisions are finalised. If most committee members agree on a position, the Minister will 
be faced with a less controversial decision. Therefore, an on-going dialogue can reduce the 
possibility of a Minister ignoring the input of most participants. This is in contrast to the 
consultation process adopted in the Bruny Bioregion case.  
Engagement methods. In general, participants judged participation to be inclusive and the panel 
of experts was considered balanced and reasonable. However, many interviewees were of the 
view that there were issues that affected the participation of relevant stakeholders. For example, 
many potentially interested parties do not read the public notices or formal communications 
such as Government gazettes that inform the public of the opportunity to participate in 
consultation processes. Therefore, some stakeholders heard about the processes after 
participation opportunities were closed and decisions were finalised. The TPC also relied on the 
internet to make available key documents. According to one interviewee, not all individuals 
have easy access to the internet, or they lack the appropriate electronic literacy to download 
relevant documents and send electronic submissions. Some individuals, even though they have 
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access to the internet, may not have the capacity or willingness to read and understand long and 
complex documents and provide well-supported submissions.   
Considering the difficultly in communicating information about the marine environment, some 
interviewees mentioned that there was a lack of a longer-term, more strategic mechanism of 
conveying such information. Interviewee 11 specifically mentioned that, providing formal 
school education on marine issues is challenging, as it depends on individual teachers:  
It’s pretty much up to the individual high school teachers to look at marine issues. Marine 
science as such is not a subject, it’s always an option. Very few schools have someone 
enthusiastic enough about the area to run it, because it’s quite an energy thing to run! It 
means you need to be interested and want to do it. It’s not something you can, for 
example if you leave the school, just hand it over to your replacement. 
The Taroona High School marine program and Woodbridge Marine Centre were praised for 
using experiential activities to teach children about marine values and threats, and to learn about 
the importance of marine science. 
The communication of information to the public by the research sector and government 
agencies is vital for an effective participatory process. A common theme in the interviews was 
the poor communication of key information held by scientists and government agencies. Some 
of the organisations interviewed suggested that the private sector could enhance communication 
exchange with the general public: 
The (consultation) process is fine, but it’s just the execution of the process that could be 
enhanced and improved. And there are opportunities for the government to utilise the 
non-government sector in trying to elicit that information that are much more cost-
effective than public meetings (Interviewee 18) 
Some successful outreach and information exchange activities mentioned by interviewees 
included the DEP’s community outreach and involvement program. TARFish was also 
commended for being present in all major events talking to recreational fishers and trying to 
understand their points of view. Furthermore, the Secretary of TARFish collects scientific 
information and invites experts to their board meetings to support their decisions. Such 
activities have the potential to enhance the government dissemination of information. 
5.1.2 Accountability and transparency 
A transparent process should make available all information relevant to the decision making 
process. This information should include who makes the decisions, which decision methods are 
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used and the information on which decisions are based (Lockwood 2010). Desirable information 
to explain or support decisions includes arguments for and against the decisions under 
discussion, the reasons behind the inclusion or exclusion of certain information, and any 
information gaps or assumptions. In the same vein, there should be bodies or designated officers 
responsible both for the decisions made, and for their implementation. These responsible bodies 
or officers are accountable for their actions to their immediate superiors and ministers, and to 
the public (Parker and Gould 1999). The interviews highlighted issues related to the following 
subcomponents: information availability; clarity of roles; and responsible bodies.  
Information availability. Some interviewees argued that issues of marine conservation were 
difficult to study. They also remarked that society’s relationship with the sea, if any, occurs 
mostly above the surface. Therefore, most of the dynamics and impacts are invisible and 
consequently out of mind. This low awareness of anthropogenic impacts on the marine 
environment is augmented by the sliding baseline syndrome.
8
 The limited information that 
results from the combination of all of the above factors means that many people do not know 
why closing off areas might support marine biodiversity conservation. 
The quality of marine research in Tasmania was widely recognised by interviewees. They 
believed there were good data about the most representative habitats and species that needed 
protection. This scientific information was provided in the MPA consultation processes and was 
available to all stakeholders. The consultation processes allowed the inclusion of additional 
information provided by stakeholders. The panel in charge of evaluating the Bruny Bioregion 
case, was considered by interviewees to be independent and balanced: “The panel had a wide 
range of views on it. It wasn’t just conservationists, there was a very wide range of views, and 
may ask very sensible questions” (Interviewee 14). 
Official documents such as Background Reports and Recommendations were based on scientific 
information and additional information provided by stakeholders during the inquiry. These 
documents generally provided the reasoning behind proposals and recommendations. One 
difficulty with the consultation process, however, was the absence of a clear way to deal with 
stakeholders’ values and opinions, as opposed to technical and scientific information: “The 
Commission prefers evidence-based submissions, not unsubstantiated opinions or emotive 
comments” (Interviewee 3). 
                                                     
8
 According to this theory (sliding or shifting baselines), people assume that recent conservation status is 
the baseline, and therefore conservation expectations tend to drop continuously through generations 
(Pauly 1995). 
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Some interviewees mentioned that while information was publicly available, some did not hear 
about the process and the possibility of participating until it had concluded. Official documents 
of the inquiry were considered long and technical. This meant that those unwilling or unable to 
read and interpret complex documents, and write well-supported letters to the panel, were not 
able to participate. 
As already mentioned, another issue referred to the lack of clarity of the proposed MPA system. 
The Tasmanian MPA strategy allowed for a diversity of management objectives and categories, 
ranging from no-take reserves to multiple-use areas. Some interviewees felt that this approach 
made the process more ad hoc and increased the confusion over terms such as marine protected 
area and reserve. This might partly explain the perceived threat behind the MPA language.  
During the inquiry, the purpose of each of the proposed areas was also apparently unclear. 
According to Interviewee 10, the proposed areas were representative, but information about 
values, threats and corresponding actions was not available for each of them. This interviewee 
believed that MCAs could have contributed to biodiversity conservation, if a risk analysis had 
been performed after their designation and restrictions had been established according to threats 
and values:  
Long before you apply any classification criteria, category I, II, III, IV, V, VI, you need 
to find out what the threats are, and find out what the classification will do to mitigate 
those threats. Only then are you in a position to really say to the public, and get the public 
to believe in it, that a classification is going to produce an outcome, and this is going to 
be a benefit. 
In contrast to the consultation process, several interviewees argued the final decision left many 
unanswered questions and lacked transparency. The Minister at the time did not accept the 
recommendations of the TPC, but he offered no explanation as to who advised him or what 
were the justifications of his decision. Some interviewees believe the decision served particular 
interests, and were a consequence of vigorous lobbying by these parties. 
Some interviewees stated that they did not have clear information as to why assessments of 
other Tasmanian marine bioregions have not proceeded, as intended under the state strategy.  
There’s been no public consultation, and there’s been no public announcement of what 
the State Government is going to do [about the rest of the bioregions], if in fact they’re 
going to do anything (Interviewee 21). 
This is further supported by Interviewee 15, who casted doubt upon the actual intention of the 
previous government: 
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With our last Government, we had lots of nice conversations with politicians and 
bureaucrats and everyone said they liked MPAs. The main barrier was the lack of money 
… I have to wonder whether it was just an excuse; Tasmania is not the richest place in the 
world, but money is probably not necessarily such a limiting factor with MPAs. 
After the Bruny Bioregion process, no further advances were made in relation to MPAs. Four 
bioregions are left with no MPA representation and other regions have limited representation. 
Furthermore, the Bruny Bioregion marine conservation areas do not offer significantly 
enhanced biodiversity protection when compared to non-protected areas. 
Responsible bodies. Some interviewees highlighted the fact that there were several pieces of 
legislation governing the designation and management of MPAs (NCA, NPRMA, LMRMA and 
related regulations). These Acts were administered by different agencies. Therefore, more than 
one agency and more than one Minister had to deal with marine conservation issues. This 
created problems of coordination, as described below. This was also accompanied by 
ambiguous responsibilities, where staff did not necessarily know the scope of their 
responsibility and that of another agency. For example, compliance was mainly the 
responsibility of the police, but according to one interviewee, some PWS staff are authorised 
under fisheries legislation to enforce regulations. As not all rangers have enforcement authority 
or skills, some felt it was not their responsibility to enforce regulations within MPAs. Another 
interviewee complained that ministers tended to use that lack of clarity about roles to mutually 
relinquish their responsibility to other ministers. In this way, some issues can remain 
unanswered by both ministers.  
We have ministerial responsibility divided, so you have a Minister for the Environment, 
and you have a Minister for Primary Industries, so you need to send the same letter to 
both of them, and each of them will say my colleague is [dealing with it] (Interviewee 
21). 
The roles of the TPC and the panel during the consultation process and the steps involved were 
deemed as clear, especially for those that participated. On the other hand, the final step of the 
process, where the Minister considered the recommendations of the TPC and the panel, was not 
clear. Only the Minister was in charge of evaluating the input of all stakeholders and the 
resulting TPC recommendations. It was not clear if the assessment of the documents was 
overseen by other members of Parliament or Cabinet, or who advised the Minister. The Minister 
did not explain to the public why he made a decision different from the final recommendations. 
Those who felt that the decision had undermined principles of transparency and participation, 
had no formal avenue to express these concerns. 
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5.1.3 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy of an entity or a process is in part related to legal authority. Other aspects that 
contribute to legitimacy, include evidence-based decision making, the integrity of decision 
makers and the extent to which a decision making body is acknowledged by stakeholders to be 
the appropriate authority (Sanderson 2002; Lockwood 2010). 
Authority by law. The Tasmanian MPA Strategy was developed by the Marine and Marine 
Industries Council in 2001. As mentioned by interviewees, the Strategy was not legally binding, 
and was only a conceptual guideline for the MPA system. Planning processes, on the other 
hand, are formalised in the Public Land (Administration and Forests) Act 1991, and the 
inquiries and proclamation processes for the Kent Group - Port Davey/Bathurst Harbour and the 
Bruny Bioregion followed that process. Interviewees indicated that the Minister did not have to 
follow the recommendations of the TPC and did not need to explain his decisions.  
The Fisheries Minister of the day has a great deal of power under the legislation, so 
there’s sort of a problem there with the decision making process (Interviewee 15). 
So, even if the decision in the Bruny Bioregion case was considered by some interviewees to be 
contrary to due process and good governance, it was legal. In the same vein, interviewees stated 
that ministers do not need to follow recommendations made by DPIPWE, PWS or FACs, nor 
explain why they make different decisions. Most interviewees stated that decisions were 
“political”, implying that while those decisions were not necessarily in the best interest of the 
community, they believed that the decision process could not be changed. According to 
interviewee 18, “if you could get politics out of resource management, it would be so much 
easier, because then all the right decisions would happen”. Politics was thus regarded by most 
interviewees as an unavoidable fault in decision-making. Some of the issues included no 
traceability; available evidence ignored or dismissed; no explanations to the public; vested 
interests not disclosed; and the override of formal process. However, the legal process for 
decision-making gave that power to the Minister. Therefore the outcomes of the Bruny case 
were formally legitimised, even if they were not accepted by most stakeholders.      
Evidence-based decisions. Some interviewees highlighted the uniqueness of Tasmanian marine 
biodiversity, due to its high levels of endemism and the presence of key habitats. One of the 
main threats recognised during the interviews was the uncontrolled nature of recreational 
fisheries. Licences are only required for a few species, and bag limits might be inappropriate 
when several fishers are in one area over a prolonged period. The growth of this activity and the 
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associated technological advances are perceived to have enabled fishers to reach remote places 
and be more efficient in catching fish. This increasing pressure over resources was believed to 
lack a corresponding control of effort. 
There are no hard numbers on the recreational catch in the state. There’s only what you 
would call guesstimates and in many cases that only applies to the target commercial 
species. So bycatch is just an unknown factor (Interviewee 14). 
The deterioration of the marine environment is most evident for those who have a long-term 
relationship with Tasmanian waters, especially underwater. As already mentioned, 
understanding these unique habitats and teasing out the effects of different activities is very 
difficult. This can result in high levels of uncertainty. Some interviewees suggested that MPAs 
could provide a baseline of what the ecosystems could look like without some of the most 
important pressures. This could guide future management strategies. A risk assessment of 
marine values, specific for each case, could provide clearer guidance as to the best management 
tools and if no-take MPAs could assist in reaching conservation and socio-economic goals.  
My view is that in the majority of cases, what we are not doing is going to an area and 
saying that the main threat in this area is X, and the best way to mitigate it is to do Y 
(Interviewee 10). 
Some interviewees stated that scientific evidence to guide decisions can vary substantially. This 
can depend on the scientist consulted. Politicians can take advantage of this, as they can choose 
which evidence is more convenient for the kind of decision they want to make. For example, 
according to Interviewee 21 in the Bruny case “… the Minister said here’s someone from the 
University saying there’s no scientific evidence, so therefore we don’t need to have no-take 
areas”. 
Some interviewees felt that in general, science and practical experience have been devalued, and 
politicians and high-level bureaucrats do not consult scientists or practitioners to support their 
decisions.  
My real puzzlement is when people are making decisions politically in an area that they 
don’t know anything about, why they don’t follow the advice? There’s plenty of 
information out there. CSIRO and IMAS just have so much; why that isn’t valued and 
considered? (Interviewee 11). 
Scientific evidence is often generalised, and some interviewees mentioned that conservation 
organisations regularly base their campaigns on information that might not be relevant for the 
specificities of each region. They can also select certain information to make a point, ignoring 
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conflicting evidence. One interviewee mentioned the case of shark finning.
9
 Conservation 
organisations mobilised people to send out large numbers of letters and emails to politicians all 
over Australia to raise national concern over this practice. The practice, however, was perceived 
by this interviewee as a problem in some regions, but not in Tasmania. This interviewee 
believed that conservationist campaigns forced unnecessary regulations for the State. 
As part of the process of consultation with stakeholders, many interviewees believed that 
management alternatives determined by scientific evidence can be restructured according to 
stakeholder input, in order to support social-economic objectives and to build support. However, 
one interviewee mentioned that in many planning processes, final proposals have been altered in 
unexpected ways, and political interference has been blamed for those changes. Modifications 
based on politics are usually difficult to track, and according to some organisations, they may 
seem illogical.  
The Bruny Bioregion was an example of how very good science and good conservation 
planning process, from my perspective, can get completely and utterly sidelined by 
politics (Interviewee 25). 
Influences and the political position of certain sectors and organisations could have been partly 
responsible for a seemingly unequal consideration of activities in the Bruny consultation 
process, which gave certain activities, such as fishing, more prevalence than others, such as 
diving. 
Some interviewees believed that extremist views, both for and against MPAs, were related to 
irrational arguments. People or organisations with extremist views were inclined to overlook 
any evidence that contradicted their arguments. While extremists might not have represented the 
general view of a sector, their advocates tended to be more vocal. Many interviewees believed 
that the final decision followed the views of extremist recreational fishers, rather than the 
evidence assembled by the TPC, or even the view of the majority of recreational fishers.  
Your average recreational fisher, mom and dad and their kids, they are logical, rational 
people, who, when you talk to them about marine protected areas, and what they are 
actually trying to protect, can understand the rationale (Interviewee 18). 
Integrity. Short-term economic interests are perceived to have a priority in politics, even if long-
term sustainability is in the interest of the community. Many interviewees stated that the final 
                                                     
9
 Cutting off the shark fins, which fetch a higher price than the meat, and throwing the rest of the animal 
back.  
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decision was determined by politics, and politics tended to be characterised by unstated 
influences and motives. 
A lot of politics in Tasmania goes behind closed doors, so we don’t actually know quite a 
lot of information shared between people who lobby politicians … as we saw in the last 
round of MPA proposals in the Bruny Bioregion, the politics sort of gazumps everything 
else … When you talk to politicians, 99% of the politicians, you don’t know quite what 
they are saying (Interviewee 15). 
According to Interviewee 14, politicians in Tasmania are perceived to follow their own 
interests: “It’s very rare to come across someone who is there genuinely for the benefit of the 
people. Most politicians are in it for themselves”. Many times their immediate interest is 
gaining enough votes to stay in power.  
In the Bruny Bioregion decision it was really clear that the Minister thought there was 
enough anger in the community to lead to several thousand votes being lost; and that 
would be sufficient in Tasmania to change, probably not the Government, but certainly 
change the make-up of who was actually in Parliament (Interviewee 25). 
Immediately after the Final Recommendations were delivered to the Minister, he sent a letter to 
licence holders, reassuring that the State Government would not create any MPA that banned 
recreational fishing (Neales, 2008). This letter suggests that the Minister believed that the 
majority of recreational fishers shared the strong opposition of the vocal fishers who dominated 
the public debate. His decision could have been thus motivated by an interest in keeping voters 
happy.  
The process of establishing a comprehensive, adequate and representative MPA system for 
Tasmania was supported by several scientists and conservation organisations. Some 
interviewees stated that the Tasmanian interest in MPAs was derived from the push of the 
Australian Government to fulfil an international commitment to protect 10% of marine and 
coastal areas by 2012.
10
 The focus of the State Government was perceived to be on the number 
of hectares protected, rather than an interest in biodiversity conservation. This focus on 
designation was backed by other interview statements, which suggested that MCAs were no 
more than “paper parks”. There was a feeling that the State Government did not provide a 
proper budget for the management of new protected areas when inquiries started.  
                                                     
10
 Decision VII/28 of the CBD meeting in 2004 stated: “[The Conference of the Parties] adopts the programme of 
work on protected areas … with the objective of the establishment and maintenance by 2010 for terrestrial and by 
2012 for marine areas of comprehensive, effectively managed, and ecologically representative national and regional 
systems of protected areas …” 
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If Liberal or Labor institute a marine park, it’s probably because the Australian 
Government gave them some money to do it a number of years ago, and they’re not doing 
it yet. The money was just to implement them ... I don’t think anybody thought they were 
going to manage them (Interviewee 13). 
The current Liberal Government has openly stated their opposition to MPAs, having imposed a 
moratorium on any new areas: “More than 135,000 hectares of Tasmania’s coastal waters are 
within Marine Protected Areas, equating to nearly eight per cent of coastal water. A majority 
Hodgman Liberal Government will impose a moratorium on any new Marine Protected Areas in 
the State’s waters” (Tasmanian Liberals 2014).  
The impression that Tasmania was following a national agenda driven by international 
commitments, rather than having any real political will to protect the marine environment, is 
reflected in the low priority of current MPAs. This lack of interest is also reflected in the 
absence of political leadership needed for forwarding unpopular decisions to ensure the 
sustainability of marine resources. This is supported by Interviewee 18: “If you don’t want to 
lose votes, you don’t make too many courageous decisions, because in Tasmania that means 
losing too many votes.” Specific examples mentioned by some interviewees included the lack of 
final decisions on establishing licences to fish endangered species, like Bluefin tuna, or the 
banning of graball nets. Such examples of failed commitments to act in good faith to progress 
marine conservation processes compromise legitimacy. 
Another issue raised that related to integrity was that sources of research funding are not always 
openly disclosed. Some interviewees believe that the results of research projects and related 
positions on MPAs might be influenced by expectations of funding bodies. Such bias was 
suggested to occur in research projects that provided arguments against MPAs, when part of the 
funding for these projects came from the fishing sector. Likewise, projects funded by 
conservation organisations were perceived to be more likely to support the establishment of 
MPAs. 
Stakeholder support. Some of the previous issues related to legitimacy contributed to reduce 
stakeholder support. This was particularly evident for the Bruny Bioregion case. The lack of 
clarity about roles and procedures, the purpose of MPAs, the lack of a system and the limited 
information about the marine environment and its threats made it harder to secure stakeholder 
support. In the Bruny Bioregion case the consultation as a process was well supported by most 
interviewees. However, as preliminary decisions were made before consulting stakeholders, 
some interviewees believed that this might have generated some direct opposition that could 
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have been avoided if participation had started from the beginning. In relation to the final 
decision taken by the Minister, many interviewees believed that it generated confusion, 
resentment, anger and frustration. It left the impression among participants of having been 
deceived, which reduced trust in government and diminished willingness to participate in future 
processes.  
I participated in the Bruny Bioregion marine parks fiasco … I’m personally very reluctant 
to get involved again because I can’t see, unless they change a lot of things, it being any 
improvement (Interviewee 14).  
Even some organisations that did not fully support MPAs were puzzled by the final decision.  
5.1.4 Performance 
The concept of performance is closely related to management, but some subcomponents are 
relevant to governance as well. The subcomponents contributing to performance include: 
direction, appropriate skills and resources, coordination, and efficiency and effectiveness. 
Direction refers to appropriate guiding policy instruments that set a clear path and envision a 
feasible future. Organisations involved in MPA governance and management need appropriate 
skills and resources to perform their tasks, including community involvement practices. 
Coordination across sectors is closely related to efficiency and effectiveness. Particularly in 
Tasmania, where legislation governing marine conservation issues is divided (Kriwoken 2016), 
coordination becomes a major challenge. 
Direction. In Tasmania, the only guiding tool is the Tasmanian MPA Strategy, which is not 
enforceable. Because the Strategy was completed in 2001, some interviewees believed an 
update would be appropriate. Although the Strategy was perceived to be a good guiding tool, 
many interviewees highlighted the lack of a real commitment by the Tasmanian Government. 
This was evident in a fragmented legal framework, an inadequate budget, and limited actions to 
effectively manage existing MPAs. Some interviewees pointed to the salience of other ongoing 
environmental controversies, such as forestry, which have reduced the capacity and willingness 
of several organisations and politicians to engage in yet another environmental conflict. 
I don’t think he [the Minister] was against it [MPAs], but also the forest process was 
happening at the same time, so it’s a lot of other intense noise going on in the 
conservation-resource management space. I guess they could only deal with so many 
issues at once (Interviewee 16).  
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Many mentioned that the region by region approach to designating MPAs was inefficient and it 
failed to address the big picture. One interviewee suggested a state-wide process could have 
presented each proposed area as part of a larger process, in which people in other regions were 
making compromises as well. Another interviewee stressed that starting with the most complex 
bioregion was a mistake, and that it should have been left last, when the process had been tested 
and refined in less controversial areas.  
Politicians in Tasmania are perceived to have short-term economic priorities, while long-term 
sustainability is secondary. There is no political leadership to drive MPAs or other marine 
conservation tools onto the policy agenda.  
The process has come to a grinding halt because the government is not prepared to put 
any money into doing the work of risk assessment, talk about what the threats are, work 
out how best to classify the areas; there’s no will to do anything (Interviewee 10). 
Engagement methods used during the Kent Group/Port Davey and Bruny Bioregion inquiries 
followed prescribed steps in the Public Land (Administration and Forests) Act 1991. As 
mentioned above, many key stakeholders did not participate, either because they did not hear 
about the process, or because participation required commitment and particular skills. Guiding 
tools and the legal framework did not provide for tailored engagement methods that could 
facilitate more meaningful participation. The MPA Strategy highlighted the importance of 
education and consultation, suggesting the development of “an education and community 
awareness program” (Marine and Marine Industries Council 2001 pg 20). Such a program 
before and during the inquiry could have built more public understanding and assisted a more 
informed public debate, but it was not implemented.  
Appropriate skills and resources. The lack of political will to advance marine conservation is 
perceived to be reflected in the inadequate MPA budget and limited operational planning. Most 
interviewees showed concern that only one person was dedicated to the management of all 
MPAs in Tasmania.
11
 Only Maria Island Marine Reserve and Macquarie Island Nature Reserve 
have management plans. The Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area Management Plan, 
which includes Port Davey Marine Reserve, was pending approval in late 2015. As discussed by 
the interviewees, PWS did not have a surveillance strategy for the marine areas they manage, 
and relied on the marine police to enforce regulations. There were no research or monitoring 
plans. Monitoring of some of the MPAs was delegated to IMAS, so it was perceived to be 
guided more by research interests than by management needs.  
                                                     
11
 Soon after the interviews, the Marine Reserves Officer position was discontinued. 
Chapter 5 – Analysis of governance quality for MPAs in Tasmania  
115 
 
Coordination. Poor coordination was perceived to start at the national level, with no alignment 
between aims and strategies across sectors, nor across levels, between the Federal and the 
Tasmanian Governments.  
One of the problems that we see is that the left hand doesn’t know what the right hand is 
doing. The State Government will be doing one thing and the Australian Government will 
be doing something completely different (Interviewee 18). 
While the Australian Government is responsible for international commitments such as the 
designation of protected areas in 10% of its waters, each state does not necessarily have the 
same priorities. According to a few interviewees, the Australian Government funded the 
development of a Tasmanian MPA system, but this ended with the Bruny Bioregion inquiry. 
Some bioregions were left with inadequate or no representation in an MPA system. As 
mentioned by Interviewee 1, the topic has not had much political coverage, possibly because 
other issues such as forestry have dominated the environmental debate: “I actually think MPAs 
in Tasmania have paid a price for the forests conflict and debate and politics”. 
Many interviewees believed poor coordination between PWS and the Marine Resources Group 
was a consequence of the agencies working under two different Acts. The priorities and 
objectives of the agencies were perceived to be fundamentally different.
12
 According to one 
interviewee, PWS did not have the authority to develop MPA management plans independently. 
To develop management plans, PWS would need to align priorities with the Marine Resources 
Group and have the endorsement of relevant Ministers. Additionally, regulatory compliance 
within MPAs required coordination with the police. The perception was that that coordination 
could be much stronger and strategic. Some interviewees believed that these agencies should 
have a joint plan to address enforcement actions, monitoring of compliance and to clarify the 
role of each agency’s officers. 
Biological monitoring is one activity that might have increased coordination between different 
government agencies, and between government and non-government organisations. For 
example, PWS and Birdlife Tasmania have worked together to monitor seabirds in coastal areas, 
and IMAS has monitored reefs in marine reserves. Woodbridge Marine Centre has worked with 
PWS to use marine reserves to teach children the importance of marine science. Probably the 
                                                     
12
 The Marine Resources Group “supports the orderly and sustainable development of Tasmania’s marine 
farming industry”, helping to “grow Tasmania’s primary industries”. PWS on the other hand, “aims to 
protect, promote and manage Tasmania's world-renowned parks and reserve system, … [which] provide 
significant environmental, social, cultural and economic benefits” (Department of Primary Industries 
Parks Water and Environment 2014). 
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best regarded example of constructive collaboration between government, industry, community 
and science was the DEP. This program has coordinated monitoring efforts, and engaged the 
industry and the community in the conservation of the Derwent estuary. Some interviewees 
suggested that some of these existing links had the potential to bring together organisations with 
different interests and various skills, to find commonalities and work towards shared goals. To 
realise this potential, however, a specific coordination strategy would need to be developed. 
Efficiency and effectiveness. As pointed out by one interviewee, the government can be very 
efficient when making decisions that concern human health, but environmental issues were 
perceived to be of low priority. One interviewee feared that the current interest of governments 
in increased efficiency in licencing could reduce control over environmental impacts.  
The planning process in Tasmania was regarded by some interviewees as generally effective 
and relatively efficient. Many times planning processes have resulted in satisfying outcomes 
reflecting a balance of interests, as in the case of the Kent Group/Port Davey inquiry. The Bruny 
Bioregion inquiry, however, showed that there are faults in the process, which prevented 
reaching the expected outcomes. The proclaimed MCAs did not have significant restrictions to 
differentiate them from the rest of TSW, and with no zoning scheme or management plans, they 
were seen as “paper parks”. No further steps were taken after the Bruny Bioregion decision, 
either to manage the new areas, nor to the declare areas for other bioregions. Some interviewees 
thus considered that the current system of MPAs in Tasmania was too small to achieve the 
expected outcome of contributing to the conservation of biological diversity.  
Another point raised by several interviewees was the inefficiency of approaching the MPA 
designation process in a piecemeal fashion. 
Instead of doing them all at once and be done with it, it’s got to be one by one, and you 
got to go through the process over and over. Otherwise it would have been done 20 years 
ago and we wouldn’t be talking about it today (Interviewee 13). 
The consultation processes were long and costly, but a few interviewees suggested that being 
long is not necessarily a problem. Including stakeholder input from the start and having an on-
going dialogue take a long time. Each process is different, but taking enough time to make a 
decision might result in more widely accepted outcomes. In the long run, this acceptance is key 
to fulfilling the ultimate conservation goal. In the case of the Bruny Bioregion, however, the 
Minister disregarded the recommendations that resulted from the process, wasting state money 
and the time of government staff, appointed panel and participants. It not only left the 
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impression among participants of having been deceived, but it was seen as a waste of 
everybody’s efforts and a misuse of public resources.  
A waste of months of work, waste of a lot of time and effort by everybody concerned. I 
know the people who were on the panel were pretty disgusted that the fact of all of their 
work, all their effort, was basically thrown out of the window (Interviewee 14). 
On a different note, some organisations have played a role in supporting government agencies 
communications and public engagement in the management of marine resources. This has been 
greatly enhanced by the large number of volunteers willing to support some of those activities. 
Government agencies, however, have not harnessed that potential in a coordinated fashion, and 
some interviewees believe private-public partnerships could do better, thereby increasing both 
efficiency of effort and achievement of outcomes. 
 
5.2 Discussion 
In this section, I will focus on the governance issues highlighted by interviewees for the Bruny 
Bioregion case. As there was a general perception that this was a failed process, it is instructive 
to consider the extent to which such problems are systematic in Tasmanian marine planning 
processes. A comparison with examples in the literature provides an overview of the extent to 
which these problems are found elsewhere. Starting with the TMPAS, and then the steps 
outlined by the Public Land (Administration and Forests) Act 1991 (Figure 4.2), I will consider 
the main points raised by interviewees. I will analyse the interactions between the issues and the 
implications for good-practice. Associated recommendations will be outlined in Chapter 8.  
The history of the Inquiry into the establishment of marine protected areas within the Bruny 
Bioregion (hereafter referred to as the Bruny Inquiry) and the steps undertaken in the process 
are described in Chapter 4. For the purpose of this discussion, I will collapse the steps into 
three: a) drivers of the process and guiding tools, b) consultation process and c) final decision. 
The consultation step includes the referral to the TPC; development of the Background Report; 
an Interim Report; Draft Recommendations; Final Recommendations; and corresponding 
reception of submissions from the public and hearings (details outlined in Chapter 4). While this 
step was probably the most complex, interviewees mostly made reference to the consultation 
process in general, or specific tools, but not explicitly to each sub-step. Thus, for analysis 
purposes, I will hereafter refer to the overall consultation process. In concluding remarks, I 
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summarise the well-regarded elements of the governance regime, the flaws and the aspects that 
could be improved. I compare the Tasmanian case with examples of good practice from 
different regions around the world.  
5.2.1 Drivers of the process and guiding tools 
From the late 19
th
 Century, the main stimulus behind the designation of protected areas around 
the world was to preserve iconic landscapes and species. After the mid-1900s, tourism started to 
become a key activity in many of them, but it was only from 1970s onwards that protected areas 
were seen as a valuable management tool to protect the dwindling habitats and species (Watson 
et al. 2014). It is with this purpose that the TMPAS intended to guide the establishment of a 
system of effective MPAs in Tasmania: “to contribute to the long-term ecological viability of 
marine and estuarine systems, to maintain ecological processes and systems, and to protect 
Tasmania’s biological diversity” (Marine and Marine Industries Council 2001 pg. 6). IUCN’s 
conceptual developments and definitions (Dudley 2008; Day et al. 2012) provided direction, 
increasing coherence across the international, national and the Tasmanian State levels.   
The designation of representative MPAs, however, is only the initial step in the establishment of 
an effective MPA system. Long-term management, monitoring and periodic assessment of 
effectiveness are key components (Worboys et al. 2015) to achieve primary and secondary 
goals outlined in the Strategy. As mentioned by some interviewees, at the start of the formal 
designation process, the government at the time did not envision actions beyond MPA 
proclamations. For example, MPA managers have lacked adequate funding to perform basic 
management actions such as effectiveness monitoring, surveillance and community 
engagement. Most MPAs do not even have management plans; management plans are basic 
tools that guide management actions, and may include an analysis of values, threats, regulations 
and financial mechanisms (Worboys et al. 2015). Management actions beyond designation were 
not planned for when the government decided to initiate the establishment of new MPAs, but at 
the time of designation, the TPC recommended their development (Marine and Marine 
Industries Council 2001). As suggested by some interviewees, this insufficient emphasis on 
management might be a result of national and international commitments to achieve a 
percentage of protected waters, rather than a genuine commitment to the conservation of marine 
biodiversity (Barnes 2015). One interviewee pointed out that in some cases the establishment of 
a global numerical target has shifted politics away from real conservation.  
Chapter 5 – Analysis of governance quality for MPAs in Tasmania  
119 
 
Furthermore, Agardy et al. (2003) emphasize that vulnerable ecosystems need much higher 
levels of protection than a universal target set at 10%, 20% or 30%. These authors also stress 
that policies that focus solely on protecting a numerical target, may divert resources from 
surrounding waters, where complementary actions might be needed to reach conservation goals.   
De Santo (2013) argues that a numerical target has driven countries to create MPAs without a 
corresponding management capacity, undermining both sustainability and social justice. Until 
2009, Tasmania focused mainly on proclamation, without clear direction on the next steps to 
ensure that those new areas were effectively managed. After the Bruny Inquiry, there have been 
no new designations and very little has been achieved regarding management of existing MPAs. 
Until 2007, the Australian Government actively coordinated the establishment of a NRSMPA, 
with the participation of all states and territories. Most efforts afterwards focused on the 
Commonwealth MPA system, as reflected by limited references to other MPAs in their 
webpage (Department of the Environment n.d.-a). The latest country report to the CBD 
highlights that Australia has the largest representative MPA network in the world, but fails to 
recognise that several marine regions still lack any kind of representation, or that many MPAs 
have no management plans and their status of conservation is unknown (Department of the 
Environment 2014a). The lack of government support for MPAs in Tasmania is driven by a 
combination of factors: 
1) The strong divide between pro-development and environmental ideologies in Tasmania 
As mentioned by some interviewees, the pro-development – conservation divide seems to be 
more perceived than real, as it has been exaggerated by the media and by political 
manipulation. For instance, (Gale 2008) mentioned that branding development opposition as 
“greeny” has been used to generate political support from businesses in Tasmania. This 
difference between perceived and actual disagreements has been reported in other places. For 
example, in a case study from Lake Ontario, Schusler et al. (2003) mention that after a 
collaborative management process, people were surprised to learn that there was much more 
common ground between different stakeholders than they originally thought. In Tasmania, the 
dichotomy between development and conservation has probably been fuelled by previous 
environmental controversies, such as the Gordon-Franklin Dam, the Gunns pulp mill, and the 
forestry debate (Baidya 1984; Jacobs 2007; Gale 2008; Krien 2010). 
2) Uncertain, insufficient and conflicting evidence surrounding the costs and benefits of 
MPAs 
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The academic literature demonstrates that MPA benefits depend on a number of factors, such 
as clear and viable objectives (Weible 2008) and appropriate monitoring; effectiveness of 
fisheries management and coordination between conservation and fisheries management 
(Hilborn et al. 2004); ecological design (Kirkman 2013); and effective compliance of rules 
(Edgar et al. 2014). As some interviewees mentioned, MPA benefits have been exaggerated, 
particularly under the steady growth of ecological and socio-economic expectations of what 
MPAs are supposed to deliver (Watson et al. 2014). Failure to meet such complex set of 
expectations results in loss of faith and bad publicity for MPAs (Pressey 2013). Some have also 
raised doubts as to the adequacy of MPAs to regulate external threats to biodiversity, like 
climate change, pollution and invasive species (Kearney et al. 2012). 
3) Cultural perception of recreational fishing as a right, rather than a privilege with 
corresponding responsibilities 
The perception of recreational fishing as a given right was further commented by another 
interviewee, who stated that no subsistence fisheries exist in Tasmania, and that recreational 
fishing should be subject to regulations as strict as those for commercial fishing. Recreational 
fishers comprise a significant proportion of the Tasmanian population (Lyle et al. 2014b). As in 
other places around Australia, decisions that may affect recreational fishers are delayed or 
entirely avoided (McPhee et al. 2002). Unfortunately, it is unclear if the recreational fishers 
that oppose MPAs in Tasmania are the majority or just a vocal minority. In other places in 
Australia, recreational fishers have come to support MPAs after initial opposition (Hoisington 
2013).    
Regarding the legal tools that support the establishment of an MPA system, interviewees 
referred to the TMPAS, and to the legal framework under which MPAs are designated and 
managed. The TMPAS was in general regarded as an appropriate guiding tool, although they 
mentioned that it probably required updating. Some interviewees also mentioned that the legal 
framework for designating and managing MPAs is confusing. A set of laws, under the 
responsibility of different agencies and ministers requires a high level of coordination, which 
was deemed as insufficient. These difficulties were raised by the TPC during MPA inquiries 
(Resources Planning and Development Commission 2003a; 2008), and have been discussed in 
more detail by Kriwoken and Haward (1991) and Kriwoken (2016). Interviewees, however, did 
not elaborate on the fact that a strategy is usually no more than a guiding tool, and has no 
statutory weight. Interviewees did not have specific recommendations to improve the legal 
framework, but in 2008 the TPC made a specific recommendation to amend relevant Acts 
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(NCA, LMRMA and NPRM) to provide for more effective management by a single authority – 
PWS (Resources Planning and Development Commission 2008). Other states in Australia have 
shown a stronger commitment by creating a state-wide MPA system (Wescott 2006; Thomas 
and Hughes 2016; Wescott 2016). In the case of South Australia, a law specific for MPAs 
reduced ambiguities in objectives and responsibilities of government agencies (Department of 
Environment Water and Natural Resources 2014). New South Wales also developed specific 
legislation to establish and manage MPAs in 1997, although recent governments have 
introduced changes and weaken levels of protection (Clarke 2016).  
The issues considered in this section point to failures in governance performance. On the one 
hand, direction to establish a MPA system seems to come mainly from international 
commitments, rather than a genuine interest in protecting marine biodiversity. Remarks from 
interviewees from different sectors in relation to a lack of political will and weak leadership 
further cast doubts on appropriate MPA direction. The TMPAS gives reasonable direction to 
establish an effective MPA system. Nevertheless, without genuine government commitment to 
implement the strategy, such a guiding tool is insufficient for achieving substantive outcomes. A 
lack of political commitment is also closely related to insufficient funding to effectively manage 
MPAs.   
5.2.2 Consultation 
As detailed in the Section 5.1, most interviewees were satisfied that the consultation process 
followed many of the components and subcomponents of good governance. The TPC was 
perceived as an objective arbitrator of stakeholder inputs. The Panel and reference body 
appointed by the TPC played a key role in considering the available evidence and the views of 
different stakeholders, managing to adjust the initial proposal to accommodate various interests. 
There were three documents released for public comment (June 2006: Background Report; 
March 2007: Interim Report; August 2007: Draft Final Recommendations); participants were 
invited to hearings in September 2006, November 2006 and November 2007. Throughout the 
process, the Commission also consulted specific agencies and individuals to further inform itself 
(Resources Planning and Development Commission 2008). Most participants thought that this 
procedure was open to those with an interest, making it both participatory and fair. Consultation 
was also deemed as transparent by most participants, because information about the process, its 
justification and the role of different agencies was in general available. The information that 
supported the proposed marine protected areas was mainly considered scientifically sound and 
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capable of supporting an evidence-based decision, which would give more legitimacy to final 
decisions. 
Nevertheless, in cases with high levels of controversy and several antagonistic stakeholders, 
such as the Bruny Bioregion, the formal consultation process outlined in Chapter 4 and Figure 
4.2 are likely to be insufficient to meet all principles of good governance. Some interviewees 
raised a number of concerns regarding good governance criteria that deemed the process 
inadequate for the complexity of the Bruny case. This is further emphasised by submissions 
received during the inquiry, which suggested that a “flawed process was followed, including a 
failure by the Commission to adequately consult on the establishment of MPAs” (Resources 
Planning and Development Commission 2008, pg 20). The response to that concern simply 
enumerated the steps taken, stressing that it was the process dictated by law (Public Land 
(Administration and Forests) Act 1991). This answer suggests that the Commission was locked 
into a fixed consultation path. In the literature, the need to adapt methods and tools to specific 
circumstances is a requirement for proper public engagement (Reed 2008). The rigidity of the 
TPC processes is consistent with findings of insufficient adaptive capacity in the governance 
and management of marine biodiversity reported by Lockwood et al. (2013).   
In the Bruny consultation process, the TPC gathered data from a wide range of stakeholders, 
writing documents supported with good basic information. Nevertheless, according to some 
interviewees, some stakeholders never realised that a consultation was in progress, did not have 
the time or the capacity to read long and complex documents, or did not know that they could be 
affected by the outcomes. One interviewee suggested that official meetings were not necessarily 
the best approach to engage large numbers of people, and that non-government organisations 
could have enhanced communication and participation.  
An important point about the Bruny consultation was the limited options given to different 
stakeholders to engage in a constructive dialogue. The Commission considered different points 
of view, expressed in hearings and submissions. The process was best characterised as a 
gathering of information (IAP2 2007), which was then internally discussed to develop the next 
document in the process. Stakeholders therefore, had limited opportunity to deliberate and 
engage in a social learning process.
13
 As indicated by many of the supposedly anti-MPA 
interviewees, there would have been room for negotiations, if they had perceived that there was 
room for negotiating MPAs proposals.  
                                                     
13
 Social learning is described as a collective reflection that take place when people with different 
interests work together to improve human interactions towards a common goal (Keen et al. 2005).  
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Some organisations even claimed to have had a proactive role in the past, proposing MPAs that 
could minimise socio-economic impacts. Such proposals unfortunately were not considered 
seriously, and were never used as the base for a rational discussion about the ideal location, size 
and regulations of MPAs in Tasmania. A deliberative process might be time consuming and 
costly, but if this reduces strong opposition and conflict, in the long run it might be more cost-
effective. For example, (Hartz-Karp 2007) found that a Citizens Jury arrived at the same 
solution originally proposed by the Council for a highway exit in West Australia; the Jury, 
however, managed to solve an unsettled conflict of years between two communities and the 
Council. Despite the extra cost and time that a participatory approach takes, outcomes can be 
more sustainable. A prolonged period of deliberation and associated costs need to be planned 
for, as an unfinished process might result in frustration, mistrust, reinforced conflict and 
“mistaken learning”14 (Schusler et al. 2003; Muro and Jeffrey 2008; García et al. 2014).  
Another key issue raised during the interviews was that consultation did not start from the 
beginning, but only after an initial background report was released. Some interviewees felt that 
such approach triggers instant opposition and reduces ownership of the process. The need to 
involve stakeholders at an early stage has been recommended by several authors in a variety of 
situations (e.g., Reed 2008; Weible 2008; Conrad et al. 2011). As an example, in a small 
community on the Colombian Pacific coast, stakeholders were involved from the beginning, 
when they were consulted over their willingness to develop management plans for their 
mangrove areas. Afro-descendant communities in Colombia have struggled to have their rights 
recognised. Therefore, they are usually sceptic of external aid. An early involvement in the 
process allowed them to build ownership of the process. It also generated the necessary trust to 
use the scientific knowledge base to complement their local knowledge (García et al. 2014). 
To summarise, the main shortcomings were engagement methods that were not tailored to reach 
some of the key stakeholders, and limited dialogue opportunities between stakeholders. 
Engagement methods are closely related to information available, because even if the 
information is appropriate, it might not reach all key stakeholders. This issue is further related to 
participation and fairness, because if some stakeholders do not have access to information, they 
might not be in an equal position to have their views considered.   
                                                     
14
 When a group develops a shared understanding that is based on wrong or biased information. 
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5.2.3 Final decision 
In 2009, the Minister for Primary Industries and Water signed the proclamation of 14 MCAs 
and the extension of two existing marine reserves in the Bruny Bioregion. The decision, 
however, took most people by surprise, as it did not follow the recommendations of the TPC. 
MCAs did not have any regulation significantly different from the surrounding waters, and 
since then the government has not developed management plans for any of them. These areas 
are therefore still seen as “paper parks” – reserves that exist in name only.  
Before making the final decision, several interviewees believed that the Minister was 
approached by a very vocal group of recreational fishers, and his decision possibly reflected 
what was discussed in that meeting. The Tasmanian polity is relatively small, which facilitates 
the informal network of influences, and as one interviewee expressed:  
You use everything at your disposal to use; and getting someone else to manipulate 
someone, that’s fine, you use that. And you’ve got to lobby, very hard, to get influence 
(Interviewee 13).    
While lobbying is a legal and efficient way of influencing decisions, one of the problems is that 
it usually lacks official records, and decisions lose transparency. Many times, it is also unfair, as 
different stakeholders have different lobby capacities. Actors that are more powerful tend to 
have better means to lobby, while the opinion of marginalised groups is neglected (Lowery 
2007). Lobbying also hampers any deliberative process, because the views of lobby groups are 
more prominent; particularly if participation opportunities are as limited as in the Bruny case.     
The Minister sent a letter to all recreational fishing licence holders in Tasmania, assuring that 
his decision would not affect recreational fishers in any way (Neales 2008). This letter suggests 
that he believed that most recreational fishers were against MPAs, and that he valued their 
opinion above recommendations from the TPC and all consultation participants. Some 
interviewees questioned the integrity of the Minister for making a decision that seemed to be 
guided by his interest to get enough support for the coming elections, rather than based on the 
general interest. Some interviewees therefore believed that the decision process was flawed in 
the final decision step: 
Now the way it should work is the Minister should accept those recommendations unless 
he's got very strong reasons for not doing that, and he should explain. He’s got to come 
up with bloody good reasons as to why he shouldn’t accept recommendations that have 
been made over such a long and involved process. That situation makes a farce of the 
entire democratic process (Interviewee 14). 
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The process to develop the final recommendations that the TPC sent to the Minister took over 
two years and involved the establishment of a panel and an advisory body with 12 experts, the 
analysis of 257 submissions, three hearings and the writing of 4 official documents. The fact 
that the results of the consultation process were mostly ignored, means that time, funds and 
effort were wasted along the way. People who participated in the process felt that the 
participatory process was token. 
One of the consequences of following a token participatory process is that stakeholders lose 
trust in government, because they feel they have been misled (Arnstein 1969). Most engagement 
processes are long and tedious for facilitators and for participants. Considering that the public 
might make contributions that substantially improve proposals, disrespecting participants in one 
process, might reduce the potential community support and commitment in the future. Schusler 
et al. (2003) points out that raising participants expectations can disempower communities if 
those expectations are not met. Non-participatory decisions have the advantage of being faster 
and less costly (Muro and Jeffrey 2008), so a token participatory process can have as many or 
more negative impacts on democratic processes.  
Considering the different points discussed in this section, the final decision in the Bruny case 
breached several principles of good governance. It lacked inclusiveness and fairness, as it 
ignored the input of the different stakeholders and echoed a biased view of the issue. It did not 
provide for dialogue amongst stakeholders. It was not transparent, as the reasons and influences 
behind decisions and the process were not disclosed. The decision did not have the support of 
the majority of stakeholders. The consultation process was time-consuming and expensive, yet 
its outcomes were set aside in the final decision. Finally, the outcome was inconsistent with the 
policy of the government at that time.
15
 
 
5.3 Chapter summary 
The previous sections in this chapter highlighted and discussed the main problems found in 
relation to MPA designation processes meeting good governance principles. Table 5.2 provides 
a general summary of these findings and examples of good practice elsewhere. 
                                                     
15
 “Labor will support the development of a balanced strategy that includes the Tasmanian Marine 
Protected Areas Strategy whilst providing fair and equitable access to all those with interests in fish and 
fishing” (Labor 2014). 
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Table 5.2 Good governance criteria compared between the Bruny Bioregion, other processes in 
Tasmania and examples of good practice 
Good 
governance 
criteria 
Bruny bioregion 
Davey and Twofold Shelf 
bioregions 
Good practice examples 
Inclusiveness 
and fairness 
Good: Consultation 
process open. TPC and 
appointed panel 
impartial. 
Could be better: 
Engagement methods, 
dialogue opportunities 
and early engagement 
of stakeholders. 
Bad: Final decision 
disregarded input from 
participants and 
compromises that 
resulted from (limited) 
dialogue.  
Good: Consultation process 
open.  
Apparently engagement 
methods were satisfactory.  
Concerns from stakeholders 
considered - final decision was 
a compromise.  
Could be better: Ongoing 
dialogue and engaging 
stakeholders from the 
beginning. 
Consideration of pro-active 
participation of key 
stakeholders.  
A more salient role of non-
government actors in decision-
making.  
Some sectors could have better 
formal representation. 
Communication strategies. 
Bad: Practitioners do not have a 
key role in planning processes. 
Easy lobby opportunities 
provide the chance to small 
vocal groups to override a 
sector’s position. 
In Lake Ontario, a “search 
conference” provided an 
adequate forum for different 
stakeholders to discuss their 
concerns and management 
options. This engagement 
method allowed the 
participation of all key 
stakeholders. An open 
dialogue resulted in “social 
learning”. The authors 
explain why such methods 
need to be ongoing, rather 
than specific in time 
(Schusler et al. 2003). 
In an innovative process 
involving a variety of 
participatory tools, “Dialogue 
with the City” sought citizen 
input from the beginning: 
understanding values and 
concerns, evaluating planning 
scenarios and creating a 
“Community Plan”. As a 
result, there was a high level 
of ownership and support 
(Hartz-Karp 2007).   
 
Accountability 
and 
transparency 
Good: Consultation 
process transparent.  
Information available to 
the public. 
Could be better: 
Clearer legal framework 
and roles. 
Easier access to 
information. 
Bad: Reasons behind 
final decision and parts 
involved were not 
public. Nobody was 
accountable for 
unsatisfactory outcomes 
and these could not be 
challenged. 
Good: Consultation process 
transparent.  
Information available to the 
public. 
Could be better: Clearer legal 
framework and roles. 
Easier access to information. 
Bad: Nobody is accountable for 
lack of action or unsatisfactory 
outcomes (e.g. few management 
plans; zoning of Maria Island 
MP). No clear legal challenge. 
Galera-San Francisco Marine 
Reserve in Ecuador 
established an unprecedented 
governance system in this 
country. For the first time, 
local fishers were part of a 
management committee that 
has decision power, rather 
than an advisory role. The 
result is that decisions come 
as no surprise. This process is 
supported by a conservation 
agreement, in which local 
actors are accountable to 
donors and government 
authorities for conservation 
outcomes, while donors and 
authorities are accountable 
for financial and technical 
support. This arrangement is 
particularly suitable in a 
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country with low top-down 
enforcement capacity (López 
et al. 2012; Zurita and Luna 
n.d.) .  
In June 2015, a Dutch court 
set a landmark for citizen 
legal action against 
government inaction in 
relation to climate change. 
While the implications of 
such ruling are still to be 
analysed, this is an example 
of how citizens have 
demanded conservation 
actions from governments 
(Enserink 2015).  
Legitimacy 
Good: Government role 
as single decision-
maker generally 
unchallenged. Good 
quality of bio-physical 
information used in the 
process.  
Could be better: Socio-
economic information. 
More salience of 
stakeholder 
contributions. 
Bad: Evidence behind 
final decision unstated. 
Low community 
support for final 
decision.  
Good: Government role as 
single decision-maker generally 
unchallenged. Good quality of 
bio-physical information used 
in the process.  
Could be better: Socio-
economic information. Support 
from some sectors and 
stakeholders. 
 
Hartz-Karp (2007) explains 
how a “Citizen’s Jury” 
solved what seemed an 
intractable problem. The final 
solution was very similar to 
the original proposal that had 
raised strong opposition. 
Citizen participation, 
however, increased 
acceptance by the affected 
communities.    
Performance 
Good: TMPAS 
generally accepted.   
Could be better: MPA 
strategic planning 
should go beyond 
designation.  
Bad: Low commitment 
of government to 
implement MPAs 
beyond rhetoric. 
MCAs have no 
management plans and 
are not implemented.  
Waste of time and 
resources running a 
participatory process if 
not considered in final 
decision. 
Good: TMPAS generally 
accepted.   
Could be better: MPA 
strategic planning beyond 
designation (budget and staff 
for implementation). 
Development and 
implementation of management 
plans.  
Bad: Decisions are highly 
influenced by political interests; 
short-term thinking of political 
leaders.  
The National Marine 
Sanctuaries Act (US) 
provides a robust legal 
framework for the 
designation and management 
of MPAs. Strategic direction 
goes beyond designation, 
establishing an agency with 
appropriate skills and 
resources, establishing 
ongoing forums for 
stakeholder participation and 
an adaptive management 
framework (Morin 2001; 
Etheridge et al. 2010).  
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Although the Tasmanian planning system seems to follow most good governance criteria, there 
are some deficiencies that can result in unexpected and unsound decisions. These deficiencies 
will not necessarily result in pro-development, anti-conservation decisions, but affect the overall 
credibility of the planning system. However, because contemporary political decisions tend to 
be driven by short-term economic interests (Armitage et al. 2007), it is more probable that 
outcomes will support development agendas at the expense of conservation outcomes. In the 
following Chapter, I analyse power structures in the MPA governance regime. I explore both 
the negative aspects of power and the potential role of social structures for collaborative 
approaches to marine conservation. 
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Chapter 6 Power structures in the Tasmanian MPA governance 
regime 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will analyse the power structures and their implications in the Tasmanian MPA 
governance system. Understanding the underlying power structures will: (i) shed light on how 
the positive and negative aspects of these structures affect governance quality, and (ii) assist in 
the identification of opportunities for improvement. Although some authors differentiate 
between power and influence (Lukes 2005), throughout this Chapter I will use the terms 
interchangeably to mean the capacity of an actor to affect the actions of others in an intentional 
way (Wrong 1979).  
Exercise of power is often seen as a destabilising phenomenon, which increases inequality and 
unfairness in decision processes (see Chapter 4). Here I posit that while the distribution of 
power can have a negative effect on governance quality, many key aspects of good governance 
depend on some actors having relatively more power than others. For example, positive 
leadership, coordination and brokerage have been highlighted as key elements to foster good 
governance of common-pool resources (see Chapter 4 for a discussion). Such elements, 
however, can be positive only if influential actors choose to exercise their power in ways that 
foster common goals, consensus building and collaboration. Power can therefore have positive 
and negative effects, and the outcomes of exerting influence depend on the goals and means 
chosen by the powerful.   
In this study, I used a mixed-method approach, including quantitative SNA, a questionnaire 
answered by key informants and qualitative information from semi-structured interviews, to 
investigate power relationships in Tasmanian MPA planning. This approach provided multiple 
perspectives on the topic, thereby allowing a better understanding of complex power dynamics 
than would be afforded by the application of a single method. First, I present an analysis of the 
existing hierarchy in power relationships among key organisations. I then present results on 
stakeholder perceptions of how the actors formed coalitions for or against MPAs or other 
marine conservation initiatives, and relate it to the perceived polarisation of opinion regarding 
MPAs. Finally, I analyse the self-reported network of information exchange, exploring 
opportunities and hindrances to potential collaboration regarding marine conservation. In the 
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following section, I briefly discuss some points in relation to the literature, but major findings 
are discussed along with results of other chapters in Chapter 7.  
 
6.2 Hierarchy in power relationships 
Both qualitative and quantitative results indicated that different stakeholders in the MPA 
governance regime had varying levels of influence over decisions and outcomes. While some of 
these differences were related to powers established in legal instruments, others were not 
explained by these formal structures. As detailed in Chapter 3, three quantitative methods were 
used to identify the influence level of different organisations. 1) answers to interview questions 
5 and 6 (see Appendix 4) were analysed using the ‘Hubs and Authorities’ method described in 
Section 3.3.6, and quantifying power sources. 2) Question 15 of the online questionnaire (see 
Appendix 2) was analysed using a Kruskal-Wallis and post-hoc test to measure the level of 
influence of different actors; and 3) a media prominence analysis also gave an indication of 
highly influential actors within the system. These analyses were complemented by qualitative 
data from the in-depth interviews.  
The results of the ranking of organisations with the Hubs and Authorities procedure indicated 
that there was a clear hierarchy among relevant actors. The first column in Table 6.1 shows the 
squared Authority Scores.
16
 The first five stakeholders accounted for 61% of the perceived 
influence in the network, while the majority of actors were perceived to have little influence on 
decisions. A histogram of the Authority Scores (Figure 6.1) shows that from the 38 evaluated 
actors, influence was concentrated on approximately nine stakeholders (> 0.2), while 29 had 
little or no influence (≤ 0.2).  
The second column in Table 6.1, and Figure 6.2, show the average of the influence level 
attributed to each actor in the online questionnaire. I found significant differences in influence 
levels between 19 actors (chi square=86.302, p<0.05) and a pairwise comparison indicated that 
organisations could be grouped in two classes: high-influence group (TSIC, TARFish and to a 
lesser extent FACs) and medium/low influence group. The organisations in the average-
influence group did not have significant differences with either the high or the low influence 
groups.  
                                                     
16
 Because the sum of squares is one, these values give a clearer indication of the contribution of each 
value to the overall influence in the network. 
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The final four columns in Table 6.1 show the proportion of interviewees who identify a specific 
source of power for each actor. As detailed in Chapter 3, a political source of power included 
statutory powers, connections to decision makers and electoral pressure. An economic source of 
power referred mainly to an economic standing, the possibility of funding different projects or 
being able to finance lobby activities. An information source of power includes the capacity to 
create a convincing argument and the presentation (and potentially manipulation) of 
information. An expert source of power relates to the trust and prestige of specific people or 
organisations based on their specific expertise.  
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Table 6.1 Influence and sources of power of different stakeholders in the Tasmanian MPA 
governance system.  
Squared Authority Scores (Hubs and Authorities results), average influence level (0 = no influence, 1 = low 
influence, 2 = average influence and 3 = high influence) and sources of power of MPA stakeholders 
 
Stakeholder Squared 
Authority 
Score  
Average 
influence 
level (SE) 
Sources of power. Percentage of respondents who 
mentioned that source (N=20) 
Political Economic Information Expert 
Minister 0.13 - 90    
TarFISH* 0.12 2.5 (0.1) 55 40 40  
TSIC 0.12 2.7 (0.1) 55 85 35 25 
Fish sectors 0.11 - 55 85 30 25 
Labor** 0.07 - 60    
Liberal** 0.06 - 50    
DPIPWE 0.05 2.2 (0.1) 45  25 40 
Parliament 0.04 - 45    
TPC 0.04 2.1 (0.2) 25  15 20 
Fish clubs 0.04 - 40 25 25  
Other ministers 0.04 - 55    
FAC 0.04 2.2 (0.2) 35  30 35 
IMAS 0.03 2.0 (0.2)   50 75 
TCT 0.02 1.7 (0.1) 35 15 45 25 
PWS 0.02 2.1 (0.1) 40  20 30 
CSIRO 0.01 1.7 (0.1)   50 60 
SCBOOT 0.01 2.1 (0.1) 20 15   
Greens 0.01 - 30    
Tourism Tas 0.01 - 15    
NPWAC 0.01 1.7 (0.2) 20   20 
MAST 0.01 - 25   15 
Marine Police 0 - 15   15 
Diving operators 0 1.7 (0.1)  25   
Ocean Planet 0 - 15  25 15 
Media 0 2.0 (0.2) 15  10  
Pennicott Cruises 0 1.9 (0.1) 5 20   
ET 0 1.6 (0.1) 20 15 35 20 
EDO 0 - 20  20  
DEP 0 1.2 (0.2)   30 25 
UTAS 0 1.4 (0.2)   20 30 
Community 
groups 
0 -   15  
Birdlife Tas 0 -  5 5  
NRM South 0 1.4 (0.2)  5 5  
Woodbridge 0 -     
High Schools 0 -     
Diving clubs 0 1.3 (0.2)     
SCAT 0 -     
*During interviews, many people ticked TARFish, but explained that they referred more to the recreational fishing 
sector in general, rather than a specific organisation. 
**Most people referred to the party in power, rather than a specific party. Labor was mentioned because it was in 
power at the time of the Bruny case, and the Liberals were in power at the time of conducting interviews. 
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Figure 6.1 Distribution of influence in the Tasmanian network of actors with a stake in MPAs, as 
indicated by the squared authority score 
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Figure 6.2 Average of perceived level of influence in the Tasmanian MPA governance system 
(0 = no influence, 1 = low influence, 2 = average influence and 3 = high influence). N=26. Black columns indicate a  
high-influence group, as determined with a Kruskal-Wallis post hoc test. 
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A media search in two of the most important sources available online (details in Chapter 3) 
included 15 articles in ABC rural news and 21 articles in The Mercury newspaper. As 
(Grossmann 2013) showed in his studies of politics in the United States, media prominence 
tends to be highly skewed, with a few organisations mentioned several times, while the majority 
are rarely referred to, if at all. Not all influential actors might have high media prominence, but 
according to Grossmann (2013), those who do have a high chance of having the means to 
influence political decisions. Table 6.2 shows the prominence of different sectors and 
organisations in the media in relation to MPAs.  
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Table 6.2 Prominence of sectors and organisations in the Tasmanian MPA governance system, as 
indicated by number of times mentioned in key media communications N=36 
Sector Total Subsector 
 
Organisation/position/subsector 
Number of 
times 
mentioned 
State 
Government 
64 
(elected) State 
Government 
36 
General references 10 
Minister 19 
Labor 2 
Planning Minister 2 
Premier 2 
Cabinet 1 
State 
bureaucracy 
28 
TPC 24 
DPIPWE 1 
MAST  1 
PWS 1 
Police 1 
Fishers 61 
 
General references 12 
commercial 
fishers 
31 
General references 15 
TSIC 11 
Abalone industry 2 
Lobster industry 2 
TRLFA 1 
recreational 
fishers 
18 
General references 13 
Australian Recreational and Sport 
Fishing Industry Confederation 
(Recfish) 
2 
Charter boat operators 2 
Recreational FAC 1 
Conservationists 25 
General references 7 
TCT 6 
ET 4 
Marine and Coastal Community 
Network 
2 
Australian Bush Heritage Trust 1 
Ocean Planet 1 
Save Ralphs Bay 1 
Erith Mob 1 
Tasmanian National Parks 
Association 
1 
The Wilderness Society 1 
Politicians 6 
General references 1 
Greens 3 
Liberals 2 
Scientists 6 
General references 1 
IMAS 3 
CSIRO 1 
UTAS 1 
Community 4 General references 4 
Tourists 3 General references 3 
Divers 2 General references 2 
Federal government 2 
General references 1 
National Parks and Wildlife Service 1 
local government 2 
Tasman Mayor 1 
West Coast Council Mayor 1 
tourist operators 1 General references 1 
Other 3 
future generations 1 
hospitality sector 1 
marine retailers 1 
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6.2.1 High-influence actors 
The results from all the previous methods pointed first to the State Government as the most 
powerful actor. No political party was considered particularly influential, other than that in 
power (Labor at the time of the establishment of new MPAs in the Bruny, Davey and Twofold 
Shelf Bioregions, and Liberal at the time of writing this thesis). The Greens were deemed to 
have low influence (Authority Score = 0.1), even when part of a coalition with Labor from 2010 
to 2014.   
According to interview results, the sole source of power for decision-makers was political, 
which in the classification of power sources included statutory powers (see Chapter 3 for the 
classification of sources of power). The Minister responsible for the decision in each case was 
identified as the most influential actor. This was particularly true in the case of the Bruny 
Bioregion, as the Minister’s decision to declare Marine Conservation Areas, rather than Nature 
Reserves or National Parks, did not require the decision to be approved by both Houses of 
Parliament according to the Nature Conservation Act 2002. As mentioned in Chapter 5, this 
concentration of power was perceived as excessive by some interviewees. Interviewee 17 
suggested that if the Minister does not accept the TPC’s recommendations, the decision should 
be approved by Parliament, “so at least there’s a little bit more oversight”. This interviewee 
argues that this additional control over the Minister’s decisions would also take “some of the 
power away from lobby groups that could just convince the Minister”, rather than several 
members of Parliament. As discussed in Chapter 5, this concentration of power had negative 
consequences on the quality of MPA governance; for instance, some interviewees believed it 
reduced fairness, inclusiveness, accountability and trust.   
The non-government stakeholders with the highest influence level were fishers. Commercial 
fishers had a much higher media prominence than recreational fishers at the time of the TMPAS 
development and in the Port Davey and Kent Group designation process. In contrast, 
recreational fishers had as much media prominence as commercial fishers during the Bruny 
Bioregion designation process (Table 6.3). This is not surprising, considering that the 
designation of no-take MPAs in the Bruny Bioregion would have overlapped with important 
recreational fishing locations, which are also relatively close to important population centres 
(Greater Hobart and other regional centres in southeast Tasmania). Port Davey and the Kent 
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Group, on the other hand, are more remote and are not as important for recreational fishers as 
areas closer to more populated regions (Lyle et al. 2014a).   
 
Table 6.3 Comparison of media prominence for commercial and recreational fishers during 
different processes in the development of the Tasmanian MPA system. 
 
Process Sector References 
TMPAS formulation (4 articles) Fishers general references 0 
Commercial fishers 7 
Recreational fishers 1 
Port Davey and Kent Group 
designation (9 articles) 
Fishers general references 4 
Commercial fishers 8 
Recreational fishers 1 
Bruny Bioregion designation (22 
articles) 
Fishers general references 8 
Commercial fishers 16 
Recreational fishers 16 
Values are the sum of references to the sector in general or to specific organisations. N=36. 
  
Interviewees believed that the most important source of power for commercial fishers was 
economic. Their importance for the State’s economy has made them an important player, and 
according to interview results, both politicians and the TPC consulted them before the Bruny 
Bioregion public inquiry commenced. Economic standing, however, was not the only reason for 
relative importance in relation to other stakeholders. For example, the tourism sector had a 
larger contribution to the State’s Gross Product (Tourism Industry Council Tasmania 2013), but 
they did not receive the same “special treatment”, and were just another stakeholder during the 
inquiry. It could be a combination of economic importance, and other factors, such as the 
existence of a representative body, which represents other organisations with an interest in 
commercial fishing. Good organisational and lobby capacity could partly explain efficacy in 
influencing decisions. For example, one interviewee pointed out how good organisational 
capacity allows the TRLFA to interact directly with government, while less organised sectors in 
the fishing industry need to interact through the representative body. In comparison, tourist 
operators with an interest in marine conservation were not represented by a representative body 
advocating for their interests; this was probably related to a majority of tourism operators being 
land-based. Divers, which were a stakeholder with a direct interest in MPAs, had no official 
representative body to represent them. Advocating for or against a proposal was therefore more 
an individual effort for tourism operators, rather than a sectoral position. This might have 
diminished their influence, especially when different diver groups maybe had different 
Chapter 6 – Power structures in the governance regime for MPAs in Tasmania  
139 
 
objectives and priorities. This low influence was reflected in all power indicators in Tables 6.1 
and 6.2.  
Recreational fishers were perceived to be highly influential, particularly in the Bruny Bioregion 
case. The main source of power for recreational fishers was deemed to be political, and was 
mainly related to a large number of voters. Interviewees explained that the large proportion of 
recreational fishers in the State gave them advantage in the political debate, as politicians were 
worried about electoral consequences of not considering their points of view. Lobby groups that 
mobilised a strong opposition to MPAs eventually managed to dissuade the Minister from 
establishing new no-take areas. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 5, this group did not 
necessarily represent the views of the majority of the sector. In an analysis of political views in 
the United States, Fiorina et al. (2006) discuss a similar case where strongly committed leaders 
of interest groups tend to have an atypical set of values and levels of commitment. These 
authors further suggest that such leaders are not only unrepresentative of the population, but that 
they increase the sense of polarisation.  
Interviewees who mentioned an economic source of power for recreational fishers referred 
mainly to the importance of recreational fishing expenditures to the local and State economy. As 
opposed to the commercial fishing sector, at the time of the Bruny Bioregion process, 
recreational fishers did not have an organised lobby capacity. Recreational fishers had a 
contested representation, as more than one body claimed to be the representative body. Some 
interviewees further mentioned that a large number of fishers were not part of any organisation. 
This explains why some interviewees identified TARFish as one of the most powerful 
stakeholders, but commented that they referred to the sector in general, rather than the specific 
organisation. Currently, TarFISH is recognised by the State Government as the representative 
body, and it has a large membership, mainly through member organisations, which in turn 
represent individual fishers. As Interviewee 19 indicated: “They are doing fairly well over the 
last five or six years, since Mark Nikolai has been involved with it. Prior to that, it was a bit of a 
no-tooth organisation”. 
Although many individuals are still not associated to any organised group, today TarFISH might 
be in a better position to represent the views of the sector. As stated in their webpage, they can 
provide “the strength of a single unified voice speaking to government, industry and the 
community” (TARFish n.d.).  
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One interesting point is that many participants, regardless of their position on MPAs, seemed to 
give more importance to certain stakeholders, without a clear reason for doing so. This ranking 
broadly resembles the qualitative results, and was evident in the expressed necessity to work 
closely with some stakeholder (e.g. fishers), while others were not mentioned (e.g. Aboriginal 
groups). For example, Interviewee 22 stated that even though tourism is economically more 
important, “I probably would hold more respect of the opinion of commercial fishers than 
tourism operators in a weight type thing, even though I think [tourism] is important”. Key 
stakeholders, such as divers, were not considered as important as other users, regardless of their 
possibly high stakes in the marine environment. This unconscious ranking of actors can explain 
why the opinion of certain actors is disregarded by politicians without a critical assessment, 
while other actors are not only welcomed to voice their opinion, but invited to do so. For 
instance, Interviewee 1 stated that “a Green or scientists saying something needs to be done, 
isn’t going to have nearly as much weight as the fishing industry saying it”. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Lukes (2005) posits that certain forms of control are better explained by social 
constructs than by individual power. Therefore, this ingrained classification of actors in 
Tasmania could be partly explained by socio-cultural factors. For example, recreational fishing 
is an important element of the Australian culture, particularly in Tasmania with an overall 
participation of 26% of the population (Lyle et al. 2014a). The importance of this practice has 
historical roots, having both leisure and subsistence significance for early British settlers. This 
relationship with Australian natural environment was part of the process of establishing a 
national identity and therefore strongly embedded in culture (Franklin 1996). Frawley (2015) 
also considers that this activity has an important contribution to the well-being of fishers. These 
factors can explain the overall recognition of this sector by both fishers and non-fishers.  
On the other hand, the dependence on the extraction of natural resources in Tasmania since 
colonisation (Bureau of Infrastructure Transport and Regional Economics 2008), partly explains 
the status given to the commercial fishing sector. This status is reflected in the quantitative and 
qualitative results in this study and the importance given in the legal framework and governance 
structures. For instance, the most important legislation for the sustainable management of the 
marine environment (LMRMA) regulates fisheries more than conservation; it is therefore the 
responsibility of the Wild Fisheries Management Branch of DPIPWE and the current Minister 
for Primary Industries and Water (DPAC 2015). The shaping of perceptions and preferences can 
be the most effective way of control, but, as in the case of fishers’ status in Tasmania, it might 
not occur consciously, or be effected by a single actor (Lukes 2005).      
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While still in the high-influence or mid-influence groups, certain government organisations 
were perceived to have a minor role in the decision making process for the designation of new 
MPAs. For example, the participation of key organisations in the future management of MPAs, 
like PWS and the Police, was not different from most other stakeholders. Some government 
staff felt that it was difficult to have a position, even though their activities could be greatly 
affected by the presence or absence of MPAs. Public service ethics in Tasmania establishes that 
State Service should be apolitical (State Service Act 2000). Therefore, when debates become 
public, the participation of State employees can be constrained. This is in line with new public 
management
17
, where public servants become accountable to a range of stakeholders, many 
times with contradicting views (Parker and Gould 1999). A tendency to silence government 
employees also reflects a general government aversion to criticism (Sawer et al. 2009). These 
authors believe that by trying to silence certain sectors through diminishing or conditioning 
funding, governments are wasting an opportunity to tailor policies to actual needs and 
circumstances. This could also be the case if governments fail to consult with staff in charge of 
implementing government policies.  
The role of the TPC in the designation of new MPAs was crucial, as it led the compilation of 
relevant information, conducted public inquiries and incorporated different points of view. This 
formal role probably determined its high media prominence (Table 6.2). The extent of their 
influence over decisions, however, was considered medium to low by 61% of questionnaire 
respondents. According to one interviewee, in other circumstances their recommendations have 
been usually accepted by decision-makers. However, whenever the recommendations have been 
contrary to the view of politicians or certain sectors, TPC recommendations have had little 
weight (Gale 2008). This was probably the case in the Bruny Bioregion MPA process.     
6.2.2 Low-influence actors 
Actors with low influence have used several strategies to counterbalance this skewed 
distribution of power. For example, smaller parties like the Greens or independent politicians 
often have little influence over final decisions, either to push forward or veto specific policies. 
These politicians, however, have the means to initiate debate, sometimes effectively including 
certain issues in the agenda. Participation in advisory committees can also provide an 
                                                     
17
 New public management refers to reforms in public administration structure and procedures following 
a neo-liberal political ideology. These reforms aimed to transform the provision of public services to 
resemble private sector management, focusing more on improving economic performance (Parker and 
Gould 1999).    
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opportunity to include issues in the agenda and influence to a certain point final decisions. For 
instance, TCT has been a member of fisheries advisory committees for a long time; through 
regular presence and dialogue, TCT may have created a higher profile among other members 
and improved trust relationships. This can explain a higher authority score than other 
conservation organisations.   
Other tools used by low influence actors include acquiring and using formal and informal 
knowledge of the governance system. For example, EDO has a clear understanding of the legal 
framework and participation mechanisms, as it is their area of expertise (Environmental 
Defenders Office 2016). With knowledge about key actors, most effective actions and best 
timing for different actions, they have been in a position to advise advocacy groups about the 
best strategy to have their opinions considered. One organisation also highlighted the value of 
having an informal social network of information; by obtaining key inside information, this 
organisation has been able to adjust its strategy to influence government decisions.  
Conservation organisations used information as their main source of power, through gathering 
relevant information to support their position, building arguments to further their objectives and 
disseminating selected information to the public. Some conservation organisations have relied 
more on building an argument and lobbying relevant politicians to support their objectives. 
Tasmania is a small polity, which makes politicians more accessible to the general public and 
community groups than larger states or countries. Other organisations have used a strategy more 
reliant on public engagement and mobilisation. Local outreach and environmental education 
events, media communications and social media have been some of the preferred tools. Several 
interviewees, however, pointed out that most media sources are interested in controversies, 
rather than balanced discussions of an issue: 
They are biased in promoting what is most interesting and appealing. If it is controversial, 
because it creates intrigue; the boring stuff just gets pushed to the side or is not 
necessarily reported. They might not be deliberately biased in terms of wanting to change 
an argument; they are biased in that they want to be more popular in their commercial 
operation (Interviewee 20). 
Interviewee 18, further commented that the media are interested in “a fight, and from our 
perspective that is not a good strategy to try and progress something like MPAs, because it 
won’t be a rational balanced discussion”. 
Fiorina et al. (2006), Gilbert et al. (2009) and Dandekar et al. (2013) discuss how mass media 
and internet information sources have promoted polarisation elsewhere. The media, however, 
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can be a valuable tool to advance collaborative planning strategies, as illustrated by Hartz-Karp 
(2007). This author explains how several initiatives in Western Australia have used the media to 
provide balanced information to stakeholders and to invite the involvement of civil society.  
The case of the research sector is interesting; on the one hand, survey results show that most 
sources of information are considered with caution. Scientific publications were the most 
trusted, compared to the media and to other sources (Table 6.4).  
 
Table 6.4. Levels of trust of different information sources 
1: I distrust all their information; 2: I distrust most information; 3: I trust some information and distrust other; 4. I 
trust most information; 5. I trust all their information. 
 
Sources of information Mean SD 
Mass media (TV, radio, newspapers) 2.42 0.64 
Peer-reviewed publications (academic journals, books) 3.88 0.65 
Bulletins/newsletters/web pages of specific organisations 3.08 0.69 
Close friends and family, work colleagues or co-members of a 
group/organisation 
3.12 0.52 
 
Several interviewees, however, believe that politicians undervalue science, and that evidence-
based decisions are more part of the rhetoric than of the actual decision-process: 
Governments love the phrase “evidence-based management” up until the point when it 
shows they need to do something that they don’t want to do, and then political decisions 
get in the way of evidence-based management (Interviewee 21). 
This ambiguity probably in part determines the medium level of influence of research 
organisations. While their view is highly regarded when an assessment is needed, it is not as 
welcome if it supports an unpopular decision. For example, the benefits of licencing all marine 
recreational fishing have been assessed (Frijlink 2012) and discussed in public (Parliament of 
Tasmania n.d.). However, as there is strong opposition from some in this sector, a decision on 
licencing has been deferred indefinitely.  
The design of the Tasmanian political system and MPA governance system determines that the 
designation of new MPAs is a highly politicised process. Depending on the type of reservation, 
the decision needs to be approved by both Houses of Parliament, or just by the Minister. In the 
Bruny Bioregion case, the new areas were Conservation Areas, and therefore did not need 
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parliamentary approval according to the NCA. The Minister in turn is a politician popularly 
elected and a member of the majority party or coalition. Because re-election of politicians 
depends on popular perception of their performance, or at least that of the party to which they 
belong, they are prone to prioritise actions that improve their public standing. Politicians 
therefore tend to give priority to short-term results, rather than long-term benefits; they also 
respond to the perceived preferences of powerful interests, particularly those in their electorate, 
even if this compromises the interests of the community as a whole or of future generations 
(Armitage et al. 2007). As Interviewee 25 mentioned, “where you have very finely balanced 
politics, they are not being courageous”. A highly politicised decision system determines that 
politicians will avoid a decision if they believe it goes against the preferences of an important 
section of the voting population. Political leadership supporting long-term benefits is therefore 
unlikely. 
In this and the previous subsection, I have analysed the formal and informal hierarchy of the 
main actors in the Tasmanian MPA governance system. In the following section, I explore the 
degree of divergence of opinion among key actors, and argue that the actual level of polarisation 
is less than that perceived by participants in this study, and as that depicted in the public 
domain.    
6.2.3 Polarisation of opinion 
When asked to identify coalitions, either for or against MPAs, six interviewees said that they 
were not aware of any, or that they thought only loose coalitions existed. The results of the rest 
of the interviewees (17) were analysed using Social Cognitive Mapping (see Chapter 3), to 
identify coalitions or “interaction groups” (Neal and Neal 2013). If less than three people 
reported an interaction, this link was ignored. Weak links referred to links reported by three to 
nine people, and strong links to those reported by more than nine people. Figure 6.3 suggests a 
significantly compartmentalised network, with strong links within the conservation, commercial 
and recreational fishing sectors, and weak or no links across sectors. Like-minded people tend 
to create social links with each other, more than with people with different characteristics, a 
phenomenon known as homophily in Social Network Analysis (see Chapter 2). Like-minded 
groups in turn act as echo chambers
18
, which can result in more polarised opinions (Baron et al. 
1996; Gilbert et al. 2009). The perceived coalition network structure therefore suggests a high 
                                                     
18
 “Echo chamber” is a media concept that refers to the sharing of comparable opinions and the avoidance 
or misrepresentation of dissimilar ideas. 
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level of polarisation. An E-I index
19
 allowed me to examine if this perceived network was 
characterised by high levels of homophily. To run the analysis, actors were divided in three 
possible groups: those with a primary interest in extractive activities, in conservation, and others 
(ambiguous interests). The overall network index was -0.6, which is significantly different 
(p<0.05) from the expected value of 0.283. This means that perceived internal links were much 
more prevalent than expected by chance. A statement by Interviewee 22 further emphasises this 
idea: “I would tend to say they [organisations in the list provided] mainly sit on one side of the 
fence or the other … Very few would come out balanced with the ‘fors’ and ‘againsts’”. 
 
Figure 6.3 Perceived coalition co-membership in the Tasmanian MPA governance system N=17 
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Commercial fishers 1
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Conservation NGO 2
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Government agency 1
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Government agency 4
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media
Government agency 6
 
 
Key: Shape indicate sectors (up triangle: conservation; square: commercial fishing; cross-in-box: recreational fishing; 
down triangle: research; circle-in-box: divers; circle: other). Line colour indicate strength of tie (grey lines: weak 
relations, reported by 3-9 people; black: strong links, reported by more than nine people). The weak links across the 
recreational fishing sector and the conservation groups referred to the opportunist coalition against the super trawler 
(Environment Tasmania 2014). 
 
In contrast, other interviewees believed that this polarisation has been overplayed by the media 
and in political debates. Questionnaire results support the notion than polarisation has been 
exaggerated. In the questionnaire, organisation representatives were asked, out of 14 sectors, 
with which they “strongly agree”, “mostly agree”, “disagree on some points and agree on 
                                                     
19
 The E-I (external-internal) index measures the difference between links across groups and links within 
a group (Chapter 3). The lower the number up to -1, the more internal links (homophilic).  
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others”, “mostly disagree” or “strongly disagreed” (See appendix 2 for the list of 
sectors/organisations included). Answers were converted to numerical values, from -2 (strongly 
disagree) to 2 (strongly agree). From 364 answers, most were neutral as they “disagree on some 
points and agree on others” (49.7%). Some respondents expressed that they “mostly agree” 
(23.6%) or “mostly disagree” (14.3%). Fewer respondents had stronger positions, answering 
“strongly disagree” (7.4%) or “strongly agree” (4.9%). Table 6.5 shows the average level of 
agreement of each respondent across 14 sectors. An average close to zero or positive suggests 
that respondents have more balanced views or tend to agree with most actors, and possibly that 
they are more open to dialogue; likewise, larger negative means and higher standard deviations 
can be interpreted as more disagreement and more extreme views respectively. Data in Table 
6.5 are ordered from low to high standard deviations, rather than by their means, to show 
respondents from less to more extreme.  
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Table 6.5 Level of agreement/disagreement of respondents within different sectors and 
organisations 
Answer scale: -2 (strongly disagree), -1 (mostly disagree), 0 (disagree on some points and agree on others), 1 (mostly 
agree), 2 (strongly agree). N=14. Responses are sorted from low to high standard deviations, as it gives a better idea 
of how “extreme” the views of a respondent are. 
 
Respondent Mean SD 
Recreational fisher 1 0.93 0.27 
Tourism operator 1 0.07 0.27 
Diver 1 0.14 0.36 
Commercial fisher 1 -0.21 0.43 
Recreational fisher 2 0.43 0.51 
Scientist 1 0.14 0.53 
Scientist 3 0.00 0.55 
Scientist 8 -0.21 0.58 
Conservation NGO 1 0.29 0.61 
Diver 2 0.07 0.62 
Scientist 2 -0.43 0.65 
Government agency 2 -0.43 0.76 
Government agency 3 0.00 0.78 
Conservation NGO 4 0.00 0.78 
Government agency 1 0.21 0.80 
Political party 1 0.43 0.85 
Partnership 1 0.79 0.89 
Scientist 6 0.36 0.93 
Partnership 2 -0.43 1.09 
Recreational fisher 3 0 1.11 
Scientist 4 0.21 1.12 
Scientist 5 -0.29 1.14 
Scientist 9 -0.71 1.27 
Scientist 7 0.29 1.59 
Conservation NGO 2 -0.64 1.74 
  
Table 6.5 also shows that each sector comprises individuals with more or less extreme views. 
Some of the interviewees are involved in their organisation because they have a strong 
commitment to their views. As suggested previously, advocates of particular interests are 
usually unrepresentative of the majority of the population (Fiorina et al. 2006); therefore the 
low level of polarisation suggested by this study can be even lower in the general population. 
Questionnaire results also highlighted the existence of common ground between organisations 
that believe in the value of MPAs and those that are sceptical of MPA benefits. All respondents 
had a high level of attachment to marine environments in Tasmania (see Chapter 4), suggesting 
that there may be a common interest in maintaining the natural base into the future. As detailed 
in Chapter 4, a key source of disagreement lies in the value attributed to MPAs as an 
appropriate tool to control pressures and to reach conservation goals.  
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Interviewees were asked with which organisations they had had information exchanges related 
to MPAs or marine conservation. The self-reported information exchange network that resulted 
from this question (Figure 6.4) also suggests that if there was a strong ideological division, it 
was not preventing connections across sectors. Only reciprocated ties were included in the 
analysis as a link, focusing therefore on stronger relationships (Scott and Carrington 2011).  
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Figure 6.4 Information exchange network for Tasmanian MPAs 
Node shape indicate sector (up triangle: conservation; square: commercial fishing; cross-in-box: recreational fishing; 
down triangle: research; circle-in-box: divers; circle: other). Size of the nodes indicate in-betweeness scores. Position 
of sectors is similar to that in figure 6.3, to allow a comparison between perceived alliances, and actual information 
exchange links. 
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The relationships between different sectors were analysed based on the following three groups: 
1) extractive organisations were those with activities or objectives related to the extraction of 
marine resources; 2) conservation organisations were those with activities or objectives related 
to the conservation of marine resources; and 3) other organisations were those with activities or 
objectives related to both the extraction and the conservation, or not directly related to either. To 
understand the extent to which organisations preferred exchanging information with like-
minded actors (homophily), an E-I index was calculated. The overall network index was 0.36, 
which is not significantly different (p=0.46) from the expected value of 0.34. This means that 
the observed ratio of external and internal links was not different from that expected by chance. 
Several studies indicate that homophily contributes to opinion polarisation (Baron et al. 1996; 
Sunstein 2009), even if other factors such as biased assimilation
20
 also play an important role. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, interview results also pointed to the manipulation of debate by 
politicians and the media, exaggerating levels of polarisation. Baron et al. (1996) and Sunstein 
                                                     
20
 Biased assimilation refers to people being critical of new information that opposes their views, while 
readily accepting new information that confirms their views.  
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(2009) also discuss the role of selective internet content and social corroboration in augmenting 
opinion differences.   
Robins et al. (2011) argue that actors in a network need to establish common goals and actions, 
as one of the requirements for collaboration. A second condition highlighted by these authors is 
the existence of social structures that can enable collaboration. In certain circumstances, actors 
in a network might prefer to interact through coordination mechanisms, which are more 
effective for seeking valuable resources like information. If the situation involves higher risks, 
however, actors might prefer cooperative relationships, which provides more scrutiny over 
commitments (Berardo and Scholz 2010). As previously mentioned, results suggested that all 
organisations had an interest in the sustainability of marine resources, albeit with different 
views on the role of MPAs. I therefore posit that the current network of stakeholders in 
Tasmania has the means to establish a common goal and start a conversation about information 
requirements and the most appropriate tools to achieve that goal. In the following section, I 
explore the existing network structures, and how these structures could enable or impede 
coordination and collaboration among different sectors.   
6.2.4 Cross-sector coordination, brokerage and collaboration 
opportunities 
The underlying structures of the self-reported information exchange network were analysed 
using PNet (Wang et al. 2009). For my purposes, I developed a model that included triangles 
and two-stars, structures that can respectively indicate the opportunities for collaboration and 
coordination (Lewis 2006; Robins et al. 2012). Using the same grouping as for the E-I index, I 
included in the fixed-density model the following cross-sector structures: activity (cross-sector 
links), o2a (related to cross sector bridging) and t2u (related to cross sector collaboration). 
Activity refers to cross-sector relations, while the latter two structures respectively give an 
indication of opportunities to establish cross-sector bridging and collaboration. Only extractive 
and conservation structures were included in the model, because for other, few were found in 
the original count, resulting in low convergence of models. Fitted model results are presented in 
Table 6.6.  
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Table 6.6 Exponential Random Graph Model of Tasmanian MPA information exchange network 
Estimated parameters based on a model with fixed density of 0.36797. 
 
Effects Structure Estimates  
(standard error) 
t value 
2-star    
 
-0.02322 (0.10) -0.24 
Triangle  
 
0.572919 (0.24) ** 2.35 
Cross sector collaboration 
(extractive) 
 
-0.45755 (0.26) * -1.75 
Cross sector collaboration 
(conservation) 
-0.18604 (0.16) -1.15 
Cross sector bridging 
(extractive) 
 0.365777 (0.14) ** 2.53 
Cross sector bridging 
(conservation) 
0.120121 (0.07) 1.62 
Cross sector links 
(extractive) 
 
-0.84777 (0.41) ** -2.06 
Cross sector links 
(conservation) 
-0.42437 (0.45) -0.95 
Key: ** = significant at 0.05; * = significant at 0.1 
In “structure”, black circles indicate nodes with specific attributes. 
 
During the process of fitting a model, triangles were significantly more common than expected 
by chance in most models. In the model depicted in Table 6.6, triangles in general were more 
common than expected by chance, but triangles across sectors were either lower than expected, 
or not significant. This suggests that there are currently few social structures in the network, 
which would allow collaboration across sectors. Relations between the extractive sector with 
other sectors are less prevalent than expected, but 2-star structures across the extractive sector 
and other sectors are more common than expected. This apparent contradiction can be explained 
by a majority of actors within the extractive sector having scarce connections outside the sector, 
but one actor having a key role as a bridging organisation between the extractive sector and 
other sectors. An analysis of the normalised betweenness centrality for reciprocal links 
(Freeman 1979) suggests that the most important bridging organisations in the network are 
TARFish (0.18), followed by TCT (0.1), PWS (0.1) and ET (0.09). Bridging links between 
subgroups in a network are regarded as one of the key elements for collaborative resource 
management (Armitage et al. 2007; McLeod and Leslie 2009; Bodin and Prell 2011). The 
existence of such ties in the Tasmanian MPA network suggests that some organisations could 
potentially lead a collaborative approach to marine resource management.  
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6.3 Chapter summary 
This chapter focused on existent and potential power structures that affect the governance of 
MPAs and marine resources. Main findings were: 
Ambivalence of power structures: Power can have both negative and positive impacts on 
natural resource management. In many cases, power has been related to unfair decision 
processes, but power is a necessary feature of positive leadership, coordination and brokerage 
processes. 
Distribution of influence: Influence was concentrated in relatively few actors, mostly 
members of the commercial and recreational fishing sectors, some government agencies, and 
the relevant Minister.  
Polarisation: Perceived differences in opinion and existence of coalitions hint to higher levels 
of polarisation than what specific results from interviews and the information exchange network 
suggest.  
Social structures for collaborative approaches: An analysis of social structures in the 
information exchange network shows that there are opportunities for collaborative governance 
approaches, although across sectors relationships currently depend on a few bridging 
organisations. 
The next chapter provides a general discussion of the most important findings of this study. I 
explore the underlying causes and consequences of main issues of governance quality and 
power. I use empirical examples from the literature to compare and contrast my results. I 
analyse relevant normative views that are applicable in the Tasmanian case to improve the 
governance regime. I conclude by bringing forth the intertwined relations between the different 
issues of governance quality and power. That general discussion provides the basis for 
articulating the recommendations from this study in Chapter 8. 
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Governance is recognised as a key element of protected area effectiveness (CBD Secretariat 
2004; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2012). There is a variety of governance types, and particular 
arrangements should fit the specific circumstances of each case (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
2013). While governance regimes are expected to vary accordingly, a series of principles for 
any governance arrangement have been proposed (UNDP 1997; European Commission 2001; 
Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013). This study used these 
principles (Chapter 2) as criteria to evaluate the quality of governance for Tasmanian MPAs 
(Chapter 5). Considering the impacts of power structures in governance regimes (Forester 1989; 
Healey 2003; Schneider et al. 2003; McCullum et al. 2004; Ansell and Gash 2008; Kende-Robb 
and Van Wicklin III 2008), in Chapter 6 I analysed the negative impacts of an unequal 
distribution of influence. Power, however, is also a necessary feature of adaptive governance 
requirements, such as leadership or multi-level coordination (Lockwood et al. 2012). I therefore 
conducted an analysis of network structures that can potentially enable certain actors to act as 
facilitators in a collaborative approach (Chapter 6).  
In this chapter, I consider findings from Chapters 4, 5 and 6, and explore the underlying causes 
for the issues identified in these findings and the consequences for governance performance. I 
also discuss the possible interrelations between different issues, using similar and contrasting 
examples from other places. Normative views proposed in the literature are the basis for 
recommendations in Chapter 8. This synthesis is organised according to six key themes: 
governance quality; power structures that advance particular interests; polarisation; reduced 
trust; common ground; and power structures that advance common interests. So far in this 
thesis, while some interrelations have been noted, the primary focus has been on identifying and 
analysing each theme independently. However, complex interrelations between network 
configurations, power structures and quality of governance are also evident in the data. At the 
end of this Chapter, I therefore highlight the most important connections between these themes.  
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7.1 Governance quality  
The quality of governance in MPA designation processes in Tasmania was analysed according 
to principles of good governance found in the literature (Chapter 5). In this section, I discuss the 
most important findings according to examples and normative precepts found in the literature in 
the following order: 1) inclusiveness and fairness, 2) accountability and transparency, 3) 
legitimacy, 4) performance. I finish this section by discussing some of the solutions proposed in 
the literature. 
7.1.1 Inclusiveness and fairness  
Including all relevant actors in a decision-making process ensures the basic right of individuals 
and groups affected by that decision to express their concerns and points of view (Lockwood 
2010; Ban et al. 2013). Inclusiveness also has the advantage of bringing to the table different 
kinds of information, which might be a key component in the solution of so-called wicked 
problems
21
 (Rittel and Webber 1973; Weber and Khademian 2008; Ban et al. 2013; Head and 
Alford 2015), and to face rapidly changing conditions (Berkes et al. 2003; Charles 2007; 
Lockwood et al. 2012). Inclusiveness has also been linked to stakeholder support, which in turn 
facilitates implementation (Living Oceans Society and World Wildlife Fund Canada 2005; 
Lockwood 2010). The process of zoning and governing the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park has 
aimed to include the views of different stakeholders, including special legislation to provide for 
Indigenous involvement (Day 2016). The process of selecting and involving stakeholders, 
however, is complicated. As the issues of stakeholder selection are closely related to power 
structures, this issue will be analysed in section 8.2.  
In order to realise the benefits of an inclusive processes, leading agencies and participants must 
genuinely value the potential and actual contribution of different stakeholders. Tasmanian MPA 
planning processes were open to all interested parties. TPC analysed public submissions, and 
their reports included how this input was considered or if comments were beyond the scope of 
the terms of reference. However, there are no clear criteria for processing information that lack 
the proper support of data or publications, as is the case of emotional or anecdotal inputs. On the 
other hand, the process followed by the Minister after receiving TPCs recommendations is not 
clear. Some interviewees mentioned that only the advice of selected stakeholders was 
                                                     
21 Environmental problems have been described as “wicked”, because they involve the interplay of biophysical, 
economic, social, cultural and institutional dimensions. As many of these dimensions involve opinions and social 
constructs, problems lack a definitive formulation and therefore science alone is unable to provide solutions.   
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considered, effectively excluding the input of many of the consultation participants and 
apparently resulting in a biased decision.   
Another related issue concerns the input that low-level but experienced employees can provide 
in a planning process. Different governance ideas have permeated government structures and 
functions in Australia at all levels, including New Public Management, network governance, 
meta-governance and devolution of power to less centralised levels (Parker and Gould 1999; 
Lockwood and Davidson 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; Robins et al. 2011). Despite these 
reforms and innovations, the role of government remains central and hierarchical in decision-
making (Halligan 2015). Several comments in this study indicate that the contributions of 
lower-level Government staff are usually disregarded. Strongly hierarchical institutions are less 
likely to include the input of operational staff, even though that input would be pivotal in the 
implementation of an adaptive management system; this is particularly important when facing 
wicked problems that require more than one person’s knowledge (Head and Alford 2015).  
While engagement methods led by TPC are mostly regarded as open and transparent, formal 
procedures (Figure 4.2) are too general to account for differences between processes and 
stakeholders. Methods have to be tailored to reach the different audiences that need to be 
involved in the process (Reed 2008). One example cited in this thesis is the fact that not all 
fishers have easy and regular access to the Internet, or that some might have insufficient literacy 
skills to deal with the complexity of some of the documents produced during the inquiries. The 
exhibition of inquiry documents and request for submissions for any consultation are publicly 
advertised online, in the gazette and some newspapers. Many stakeholders, however, do not 
read these publications, so most actors will only learn about the opportunity to comment if they 
are active members of relevant policy networks. Similar concerns have been raised in other 
circumstances, and are closely linked to power imbalances (Ansell and Gash 2008; Reed 2008). 
For example, in a journalistic analysis of the forestry debate in Tasmania, some loggers claimed 
that forestry spokespeople did not represent their views, but they felt that they lacked the 
appropriate skills to articulate their own arguments and voice them (Krien 2010). A systematic 
assessment of stakeholders, discussed in section 8.2, before initiating a consultation process can 
guide the selection of specific tools.  
Another important issue raised in this study, was the need to start public engagement early in 
the decision making process. Most consultation processes in Tasmania invite public comment 
once the problems to be addressed have been identified (in this case study, biodiversity loss) 
Chapter 7 – Synthesis 
156 
 
and the solutions have been devised (in this case study, the establishment of an MPA system). 
Several authors recommend involving all relevant stakeholders from the beginning of the 
process, rather than request comments on pre-conceived actions (Reed 2008). In many cases, 
this early involvement needs to start by framing the problem (Schusler et al. 2003), but can also 
involve the validation of the selection of stakeholders invited to participate (Living Oceans 
Society and World Wildlife Fund Canada 2005; Reed et al. 2009). This is particularly important 
when dealing with contentious issues (Sewell et al. 1989). A clear example is the initial failure 
to establish an MPA system in Californian waters in the United States. With a strong scientific 
basis, MPA proposals were presented to the community in 2001. Commercial and recreational 
fishers reacted to these proposals with outrage, effectively bringing to an end this first attempt. 
One of the key reasons was that these stakeholders had not been previously consulted, so that 
presentation of printed maps showing new proposed reserves gave these stakeholders the 
impression that they were being presented with a fait accompli (Weible 2008).  
Face-to-face dialogue opportunities are fundamental to building trust (Schusler et al. 2003; 
Pahl-Wostl and Hare 2004; Ansell and Gash 2008; Dryzek 2010; Roberts and Jones 2013; but 
see Muro and Jeffrey 2008). As discussed in section 8.4, trust in turn is fundamental for 
collaborative approaches, but usually requires significant time to develop, particularly in cases 
with high levels of conflict. In Tasmania, planning inquiries are limited in time and scope. 
Dialogue opportunities are restricted to a few hearings, in which key stakeholders are invited to 
present information and participants can briefly comment. Communications in these venues are 
mostly one-way, with a panel receiving information from various sources, but with limited 
deliberation. FACs and the NPWAC are probably an exception, as these forums meet 
periodically to discuss ongoing and emerging issues. Several authors highlight the need to 
establish long-term collaborative efforts to manage natural resources (Pahl-Wostl and Hare 
2004; Keough and Blahna 2006; Govan et al. 2009a). Stakeholders have to be involved beyond 
the consultation step in the planning phase, in order to promote local stewardship. Participation 
should be an ongoing process of planning, implementation, monitoring of agreements and 
outcomes, and adjustment of plans. In an example of community-based management, ongoing 
discussions about action plans, monitoring results and adjustments have supported a successful 
system of Locally Managed Marine Areas in the South Pacific (Govan et al. 2009a).    
An inclusive, ongoing deliberative process, however, does not guarantee a high level of 
participation. Participation levels vary significantly, depending on the trade-offs perceived by 
stakeholders between incentives and costs. For this reason, the design of a participatory process 
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needs to consider ways to increase involvement. For example, power imbalances and unfair 
decisions discourage participation, but stakeholders will be motivated if they believe that their 
participation will be reflected in final decisions; participation will also increase if actors believe 
that the achievement of their goals depends on the commitment of other stakeholders (Ansell 
and Gash 2008). According to the findings of this study, actors involved in the MPA planning 
process currently lack most of these motivations. An incremental process, in which stakeholders 
build momentum from small goals towards bigger challenges, can increase motivation to 
participate (Living Oceans Society and World Wildlife Fund Canada 2005; Ansell and Gash 
2008; García et al. 2014; Schirmer et al. 2016). Such incremental processes could help create 
the necessary interest in Tasmania to participate in a collaborative effort. 
Another important incentive for stakeholders to participate in a collaborative process is the 
absence of alternative venues to advance their positions. Ansell and Gash (2008) explain that if 
participants believe they have a better option of influencing a decision in court or by lobbying 
decision-makers, their commitment to a collaborative process will be low. If the only option for 
reaching a decision is through a collaborative process, participation increases. For example in 
Nevada, United States, a classical confrontation between pro-development parties and 
environmentalists started when the desert tortoise was listed as endangered; as this action 
stopped further development in the area, local developers and local and State governments sued 
the Department of Interior. When the court invalidated this claim, the only possibility left was to 
engage in a collaborative process. Although the process was far from perfect, the results showed 
that collaboration was possible, even when participants have substantially different positions 
(Reilly 1998). In the case of Tasmanian MPAs, there have been alternative ways of influencing 
decisions, namely lobbying the relevant Minister. This avenue was particularly suited to the  
interests of lobbyists, as the legal framework does not compel the decision maker to follow the 
recommendations from consultation processes. A different example in Tasmania can be drawn 
from the forestry debate. As the usual decision-making process had not solved years of bitter 
and sometimes violent confrontation, the key contenders decided to initiate a deliberative 
approach to solve profound conflicts (Schirmer et al. 2016). Although the final agreement was 
repealed when the Liberal party gained power in 2014, the deliberative process generated 
longer-term trust and commitment for working together.  
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7.1.2 Accountability and transparency 
Legal frameworks and formal institutions that establish responsible agencies and governance 
arrangements have an important influence on governance quality. In previous chapters, several 
problems were detected at this level, including unclear roles, divisive responsibilities and highly 
politicised decisions. This clarity of roles and responsibilities of government agencies and 
personnel are necessary to increase accountability (Lockwood 2010; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
2013).  
The procedure for MPA designation inquiries has been transparent, providing relevant 
information to the public, including background information, planning proposals, and 
consideration of submissions. In contrast, the Minister and Cabinet are not required to keep 
public records of discussions, or to provide a justification if they decide to dismiss TPC’s 
recommendations. If those decisions need to be approved by Parliament, there is another option 
for public scrutiny. If decisions are only tabled, as in the case of the MPA designations in the 
Bruny Bioregion, these do not need to be explained. The principle of transparency is based on 
ethical grounds, respecting the right of affected people to know why and how decisions are 
made (UNDP 1997; Lockwood 2010). It is also a requirement to create and maintain the trust of 
stakeholders in decision-makers and to legitimate decisions.   
7.1.3 Legitimacy 
MPA consultation processes in Tasmania used scientific information on habitat distribution to 
address representativeness of the MPA system. Scientists and marine research organisations that 
generated this information are recognised for their high scientific quality (Australian Research 
Council 2016). Unfortunately, not only are there significant information gaps (Bennett et al. 
2015), but available information is characterised by varied levels of uncertainty (Jasanoff 2003; 
Hobday et al. 2006). The production of relevant science is subject to technical and budgetary 
limitations, which prevents covering all information gaps and reducing uncertainty. As 
discussed by Head (2010), government funding for research and monitoring is usually allocated 
on a short-term basis, whereas monitoring programs to evaluate the effectiveness of policies 
need to be long-term. The inadequacy of management plans and associated monitoring 
programs for Tasmanian MPAs is discussed below within Section 7.1.4.  
There are other problems associated with evidence-based decisions. For example, scientists are 
not exempt from personal values and beliefs, or from furthering personal or third party interests 
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(Jasanoff 2003; Head 2010; Lewandowsky and Bishop 2016). The extreme positions of some 
scientists found in this study can be an indication of deep values, which might affect their 
objectivity. Some interviewees also blamed scientists of being biased, due to their associations 
with interest groups either from the fishing industry or from conservation organisations. Juntti et 
al. (2009) found that in Europe, decisions that balance environmental and socio-economic 
variables are few, some decisions use evidence selectively to legitimise policy decisions, and 
some even disregard it completely. These authors further describe how decisions on what 
constitutes good evidence are also informed by power structures and embedded assumptions 
(see section 8.2).  
One of the arguments against MPA processes in Tasmania was that, even though the 
information on ecological representativeness was sound, the TPC only had limited information 
on socio-economic issues (Resources Planning and Development Commission 2008). This 
might have reduced support and credibility of the process with some sectors. One interviewee 
commented that an assessment on pressures, risks and best management options should have 
complemented information on representativeness. With that information, it would have been 
possible to decide if establishing MPAs was the best management option, or if other 
management strategies could have been used to address those threats. No-take MPAs can have 
important benefits on biodiversity, biomass and fisheries (e.g. Edgar and Barrett 1999; 
McClanahan 1999; Roberts et al. 2001; Gell and Roberts 2003; Hilborn et al. 2004; Barrett et 
al. 2007; Barrett et al. 2009)); they can also increase the resilience of a system to external 
threats such as climate change (Hughes et al. 2003; Bellwood et al. 2004; Babcock et al. 2010). 
In other circumstances, no-take MPAs can be ineffective to deal with external pressures such as 
pollution or invasive species (Carlton 1989; Allison et al. 1998), or even have negative socio-
economic impacts (Hilborn et al. 2004; Mascia et al. 2010; van de Geer et al. 2013). In those 
cases, other management options could be more appropriate to deal directly with the source of 
the threat or to offset the costs of no-take MPAs.  
Several authors have highlighted the importance of other place-based approaches to 
conservation (McClanahan 1999; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2004; Govan et al. 2009a). Policies 
and strategies need to consider ocean biodiversity beyond MPAs to tackle external and long-
ranging threats (Allison et al. 1998; Bellwood et al. 2004; Toropova et al. 2010). To address 
these needs, Aichi target 11 (see note 4 in Chapter 4) addresses the designation of protected 
areas, but adds a note to include “other effective area-based conservation measures, and 
integrated into the wider landscape and seascape”. In 2013, the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, 
Chapter 7 – Synthesis 
160 
 
Technical and Technological Advice of the CBD discussed the need to clarify what constituted 
other effective area-based conservation measures. In 2015, IUCN established a task force to 
advance these ongoing discussions, with the aim of developing a consultation draft in 2017 and 
present final guidance for the 14
th
 meeting of the CBD. While the importance of complementary 
in-situ conservation strategies has been officially recognised in international arenas, the concept 
was still under development at the time of writing this thesis.   
Probably the most problematic aspect in the Tasmanian planning regime is the fact that 
decision-makers can disregard the evidence from consultation processes. Although 
recommendations from the TPC are usually taken on board, at least partially, the system allows 
the Minister to make a completely different decision, without needing to explain or without the 
overview of a third party. A highly controversial process can trigger a Minister’s urge to 
override the consultation process. For example, another highly contentious issue in Tasmania, 
the Gunns Pulp Mill project, also resulted in the Government withdrawing assessment of the 
proposal from the planning system. To support an expeditious decision about this project, the 
Government established the Pulp Mill Assessment Act. In an analysis of quality of governance, 
Gale (2008) showed how achieving a rapid decision was pursued at the expense of transparency, 
openness and horizontal accountability.  
Tasmania is a small state with a well-connected community, and this can facilitate the 
effectiveness of lobbying efforts, even when these efforts are generated by a relatively small 
number of stakeholders. Bibby (2013) argues “This can have advantages. People are friendlier, 
the sense of community is strong, and it can be easy to get things done. But occasionally it can 
be too easy to get some things done”. Lobbying, by both sides of an argument, has been 
commonplace in Tasmanian environmental debates (Baidya 1984; Sewell et al. 1989; Gale 
2008; Krien 2010). As discussed in section 8.2, powerful actors have an advantage when 
influencing final decisions. In the case of the Gunns Pulp Mill debate, the boundaries between 
Government and industry became “blurred”, allowing industry members to dominate the 
process (Bibby 2013). As happened in the Bruny Bioregion Inquiry, a decision informed by 
specific lobbyists, effectively left out the views of many stakeholders or favours particular 
interests. The resulting decisions are perceived as unfair in that they privilege certain 
stakeholders’ interests. This is turn can undermine wider stakeholder support for and trust in 
decision making processes, thereby undermining “earned” legitimacy (Lockwood 2010).   
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Consultation that does not inform final decisions can be considered a token participatory 
process (Arnstein 1969). The consequences of deceiving participants in this way are not limited 
to the particular decision at stake, but resonate in the overall governance regime and the 
legitimacy of a democratic government. Token participatory processes are not transparent, 
reducing trust of participants, and generating long-lasting apathy in the general public. Ansell 
and Gash (2008) discuss how the incentive of different stakeholders to participate is affected by 
the perception of how their input would be actually be used in the final decision. A symbolic 
participatory process can also lose one of the main benefits of an inclusive approach to 
planning, which is the integration of different forms of knowledge (Berkes et al. 2003).  
7.1.4 Performance 
Leadership is a key requirement for adaptive management of natural resources (e.g. Ansell and 
Gash 2008; Lockwood et al. 2012). It is necessary to create a long-term vision, to give direction 
to a process, and to embark in collaborative approaches to planning. Political leadership and 
social entrepreneurship require strong commitment and appropriate skills and resources (Selsky 
and Smith 1994; Weerawardena and Mort 2006). Ansell and Gash (2008) point out that all 
leadership attributes do not need to be concentrated in one person or organisation. Different 
steps of a process might require the involvement of different kinds of leaders. But various kinds 
of leaderships are interdependent. If a local leader mobilises a community in a collaborative 
approach, they will eventually need the backing of higher-level leaders to institutionalise the 
process and to formalise agreements. In the same way, leaders at higher levels depend on local 
leaders to generate necessary input and support.  
Policy tools such as the Natural Heritage Strategy (Department of Primary Industries Parks 
Water and Environment 2013) and the TMPAS (Marine and Marine Industries Council 2001) 
give direction to sound environmental planning. For example, the former calls for a landscape 
and adaptive approach to manage natural resources. Specific actions include the incorporation 
of resilience, coordination and collaboration structures into the management and planning 
system. Unfortunately, these strategies lack the political weight to be of much consequence. 
Government and agency leaders have failed to develop or drive implementation programs that 
would have given substance to such strategies. For non-mandatory policy tools, a set of 
incentives needs to be in place to encourage their implementation. In Tasmania, opposition from 
powerful actors is a clear disincentive for actions that further control the use of marine 
environments.  
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The Resource Management and Planning System was designed to lead integrated approaches to 
planning and decision-making. Several policy tools exhort the Government to integrate planning 
across sectors, and increase coordination between different levels of government, different 
agencies and terrestrial and marine management (e.g., Natural Heritage Strategy,  Tasmanian 
State Coastal Policy 1996,  Oceans Policy). In an analysis of marine governance regimes in 
three regions of Australia, Lockwood et al. (2013) analysed how each performed according to 
adaptive governance requirements. The governance regime for the Tasmanian East Coast, 
among other deficiencies, lacked both integration and coordination. This study confirmed that 
the implementation of these precepts remains at a very low level.       
A separate issue that was rarely mentioned in this study was the performance of existing MPAs. 
The main purpose of establishing an MPA system is to “contribute to the long-term ecological 
viability of marine and estuarine systems, to maintain ecological processes and systems, and to 
protect Tasmania’s biological diversity” (Marine and Marine Industries Council 2001). The 
TMPAS includes a section on management of the MPA system, but political pressure has been 
mainly focused on designation of MPAs rather than on implementation. This focus on 
numerical targets instead of ecological representation, conservation needs and effectiveness is 
not isolated, and is similar in the rest of Australia (Barr and Possingham 2013; Barnes 2015; 
Grech et al. 2015), and around the world (McClanahan 1999; Agardy et al. 2003). In a global 
study of 87 MPAs, Edgar et al. (2014) found that more than half were not different from 
unprotected waters. Ineffective MPAs lacked key features, namely appropriate size, sufficient 
time to accrue benefits, appropriate protection or enforcement, or no-take status. For this reason, 
implementation and monitoring of progress should accompany MPA designation. The 
importance of effectiveness has been amply discussed (e.g. Pomeroy et al. 2004; Hockings et al. 
2006; Laffoley 2008; Lester et al. 2009; Toropova et al. 2010; Worboys et al. 2015), ), and the 
Programme of Work on Protected Areas of the CBD, for example, clearly set goals and actions 
to monitor effectiveness of protected areas.  
The neglect of existing MPAs in Tasmania is probably a consequence of the short-term focus on 
designation. Few MPAs have management plans and the existing ones are out of date or 
pending approval. Management strategies proposed in those plans have not been executed, and 
limited financial and human resources are invested in MPAs. Additionally, coordination 
between PWS and supporting agencies and organisations could be improved. According to the 
TMPAS, a monitoring program was to be established to assess individual MPAs and the system 
as a whole. Those results of monitoring and research where to “be fed into the management 
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planning process” to “ensure that the management plan of each MPA is based on the most up to 
date information available” (Marine and Marine Industries Council 2001). While IMAS has 
conducted periodic surveys of some MPAs (Edgar and Barrett 1999; Barrett et al. 2007; Barrett 
et al. 2009), this information has not been used to update or even to develop management plans. 
A monitoring system for all PWS was finalised in 2013 (Parks and Wildlife Service 2013). The 
goals of this system are to provide feedback in an adaptive management cycle, and to increase 
transparency and accountability by showing how public funds are invested. This system urges 
the participation of external stakeholders and experts, as well as staff members. If this system 
were to be implemented, a first step would be to develop management plans, with specific 
objectives and appropriate indicators of status and impacts. The responsibility of developing and 
implementing management plans legally lies with PWS. However, as one interviewee pointed 
out, before developing a management plan, the director needs the approval of both the Minister 
for Primary Industries and Water, and the Minister for Environment, Parks and Heritage. 
Global change and the increasing complexity of interrelations between social and ecological 
systems put pressure on governance institutions. Under these circumstances, new governance 
systems, more collaborative and open to innovation, have emerged (Ansell and Gash 2008). Asa 
climate change hotspot, Tasmania (Hobday and Pecl 2013) is particularly in need of new 
planning and management paradigms. Lockwood et al. (2012) identified the requirements for 
adaptive management of marine resources. These requirements include: good understanding of 
the socioecological system; networks to share information and learning opportunities; decision-
makers and stakeholders open to change; new ideas and experimentation; institutional forms 
that can adapt to unexpected and rapid change; leadership that enhances collaborative 
approaches and appropriate capacity (skills, funds and other resources); effective engagement 
and the capacity to deal with conflict; cohesion and direction across geographical, jurisdictional 
and sectoral boundaries; and quality governance. These authors found that most requirements 
had a poor performance in Tasmania. In order to improve adaptive governance, Tasmania would 
need to deal with existing conflicts, both within Government and between stakeholders. It 
would also be necessary to build trust in the MPA system and address its capacity shortages. I 
posit that trust in Tasmanian MPAs depends on evidence of MPA effectiveness. Evidence of 
benefits would require a design based on sound ecological information. Further, management 
plans would need measurable objectives with key indicators to be monitored in the long term. 
Public engagement through communication, advisory groups or citizen-science can improve 
governance and ultimate outcomes.  
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Poor governance results thus in a series of consequences that, in a vicious cycle, affect the 
performance of the regime. The prescribed engagement tools used in the planning system of 
Tasmania do not encourage an ongoing and rational dialogue. This in turn increases the 
misunderstandings and exacerbates differences of opinions. Key actors have few chances of 
engaging in social learning processes, in which they could build empathy for other sectors and 
find common ground. Under these circumstances, trust relationships are very difficult to create 
or maintain. Trust in turn is fundamental in a collaborative approach to manage common-pool 
resources and to try solving wicked problems. Non-tailored or inappropriate methods of 
participation also reduce willingness to participate. Direct participation in decision-making 
processes tends to be low on most people’s priorities. If participant’s inputs are not reflected in 
final decisions, the interest in participating will become even lower (Ansell and Gash 2008). I 
finish this section by briefly discussing some of the proposals found in the literature to address 
these problems. 
Rational, open dialogue helps stakeholders to understand why others have a specific position 
and assists in determining their values. Face-to-face interactions help the establishment of 
personal relationships, and these can often be based on unrelated topics. Under these 
circumstances, there is a better chance of building empathy across different sectors. Such a 
process, sometimes referred to as social learning (Pahl-Wostl 2002; Schusler et al. 2003; Pahl-
Wostl and Hare 2004; Keen et al. 2005; Armitage et al. 2007; Berkes 2009) or mutual 
understanding (Ansell and Gash 2008), helps build trust among participants. Under the right 
circumstances and effective facilitation, it might also allow stakeholders to find common ground 
and eventually formulate shared objectives. Respect, trust and common purpose are essential 
elements of collaborative approaches to natural resource management (Reilly 1998; Innes and 
Booher 1999; Hartz-Karp 2007; Robins et al. 2011; Long et al. 2013). Collaborative 
governance might be initiated by government agencies (Ansell and Gash), but many 
collaborative modes of governance have been initiated by communities or other non-
government actors, and public agencies became involved once the process was underway 
(Govan et al. 2009a; Emerson et al. 2012; García et al. 2014). In this study, however, most 
respondents accept the Government as the legitimate decision-maker, even if they do not agree 
on how decisions are made. This acquiescence would call for strong leadership if non-
government actors were to initiate a collaborative approach to marine conservation.  
In order to add credibility to a participatory process, Government or responsible agencies should 
be guided by the same principles of good governance as the ones they promote (Islam 2013). 
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Influenced by corporate management, the approach to natural resource management has 
changed. It is no longer enough that managers direct actions and coordinate people. Managers 
need to have leadership skills, making sure that their staff work as a team, motivated to reach 
specific goals and to solve problems. A good leader listens to their staff and values their 
contributions, and develops teams that can work collaboratively. Apart from developing 
teamwork inside their organisation, a leader is able to navigate a network of external 
collaborators and stakeholders (Londoño et al. 2015). This change, however, is very difficult, as 
there are entrenched assumptions about the expectations from and responsibilities of each group 
or individual within a hierarchal arrangement. 
New paradigms of leadership, where all members of a team are valued for their contribution, are 
also a key component of adaptive management. Natural resource management inevitably has to 
rely on incomplete information and a variable level of uncertainty (Jasanoff 2003). This level of 
uncertainty is heightened by changing conditions, associated to global change in general, and 
climate change in particular. To deal with uncertainty and changing conditions, adaptive 
management is required (Olsson et al. 2004; Armitage and Plummer 2010). Adaptive 
management is a cycle of constant learning, where planning, implementing and evaluating 
mutually inform each of the other phases. A series of management objectives inform the most 
appropriate strategies and actions. The selection and monitoring of indicators provide evidence 
on which the planning and implementation phases can be adjusted. Reporting of results provides 
transparency to the management process and the responsible agency. On-the-ground experience 
and experimentation become a key input in the management and planning cycle. With this 
purpose, leadership is needed at various levels; at high levels to create a vision of resilience in 
the planning and management system; at intermediate levels, to bring together different sectors 
and facilitate shared meaning of the process; and at the local level, to make implementation 
feasible. Brokerage leadership can also build bridges across levels or sectors, increasing 
communication and coordination in a multi-level system (Cash et al. 2006; Long et al. 2013).   
 
7.2 Power structures that advance particular interests  
In Tasmania there is a highly skewed distribution of influence regarding MPAs, with most 
power concentrated with a few actors. This unequal distribution of influence was reflected in the 
way various stakeholders were ranked as more or less important by survey respondents. As part 
of the engagement process adopted for Tasmanian inquiries into the designation of new MPAs, 
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selected stakeholders were contacted before the inquiries were made public. This gave these 
stakeholders privileged access to the process and greater opportunity to influence the outcomes. 
Other stakeholders were afforded opportunities later in the process to make submissions, but 
there was no transparency about the rationale for given selected stakeholders early access, or 
why these particular individuals were chosen. This exposes the process to accusations of bias 
and opportunities of undue influence.  
Schneider and Ingram (1993) posit that treatment of actors, agenda setting and policy choices 
are informed by the social constructions surrounding them, and by their relative power. 
According to this theory, there are four categories of actors: strong and positively constructed 
(advantaged); strong and negatively constructed (contenders); weak and positively constructed 
(dependents); and weak and negatively constructed (deviants). They note that for advantaged 
actors, benefits tend to be oversubscribed and burdens undersubscribed. This makes sense when 
decision makers are politicians expecting to be re-elected, as benefiting this group of actors will 
support the group and the population at large. In contrast, weak actors who are positively 
constructed (dependents) tend to obtain limited benefits; politicians are disposed to show their 
interest through symbolic policies that minimise actual investments (Schneider and Ingram 
1993). 
Constructions tend to be dynamic in time, and subject to manipulation by different parties, such 
as politicians in power, opposition political parties, the media, artists and scientists (Schneider 
and Ingram 1993). I suggest that it is easier to manipulate the image of actors who have unclear 
constructions. For instance, in Tasmania environmentalists are both positively and negatively 
constructed by different sections of the population (ambiguous construction), and divers might 
not have a clear construction. Powerful politicians will use their own ideologies to re-classify 
certain groups, depending on specific goals, or to align their own constructions to reflect images 
that are more popular. With the growing awareness of environmental issues (Dunlap and Van 
Liere 1978), environmental groups have gained positive backing from the general public. In 
Tasmania, such support was manifest in the early environmental debates (Sewell et al. 1989). 
But as environmental claims started to block development initiatives such as logging old-growth 
forests (Krien 2010), politicians used specific discourses in an attempt to change the public’s 
perception of environmental groups (Gale 2008). A clear example is an article by Barnett 
(1999), which pictures the Greens as interested in economic stagnation, rather than in the 
defence of the forest. In the case of forestry debates, these constructions were manifest in overt 
aggressions, including bumper stickers like “Save a job, shoot a greenie” and even physical 
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violence (Krien 2010). From this study, I infer that currently, there are variable opinions about 
environmental organisations. The constructions of such groups, and as a consequence of the 
issues they advance, range from positive (e.g. “defenders”) to negative (e.g. anti-development). 
Considering that the power of NGOs is limited, following Schneider and Ingram’s theory, most 
policies will tend to have only symbolic benefits for NGOs and their constituencies or create 
burdens. For example, in Tasmania, the Labor party have policies that openly support MPAs, 
but during several periods in power, they made little progress. More recently, anti-protest laws 
have been passed in Tasmania, representing an overt burden on environmentalists (Gogarty 
2014). Considering the slow economic growth of Tasmania, policies that affect the environment 
and environmental organisations can be justified through public good rhetoric associated with 
economic development and the generation of jobs. 
The power of highly influential stakeholders in Tasmania can be traced to their statutory 
authority, their economic importance in terms of representing fisheries interests, or their 
lobbying capacity. While the hierarchy of influence and the main sources of power are obvious 
to most respondents, the social constructs behind them are not readily apparent. I argue that the 
historical contribution of the extraction of natural resources to the State’s economy has 
contributed to the social importance attributed to fisheries. There are significant cultural roots 
that value a close relationship with nature, and the ability to provide food for yourself or your 
family. As fishing is an important part of the Australian identity (Franklin 1996), both 
commercial and recreational fishers have gained high social standing. Minnegal et al. (2003) 
explore the social constructs of commercial fishers who face threats to their practice from 
managers, recreational fishers and environmental organisations. These authors suggest that, in 
an effort to defend their occupation, fishers have reshaped their identity based on place, 
tradition and practice. Such constructions legitimise their practice, and allow them to draw on 
historical roots to defend their status. Apart from these situated constructions, there might be 
other non-obvious reasons for the importance of key industries, which can be tentatively linked 
to general constructs of modern societies. For example, the importance of some industries for 
the provision of jobs and economic revenue can be heightened by capitalist assumptions that 
connect human well-being to materialistic wealth (Kasser et al. 2004).  
The use of evidence in a decision-making process is another aspect where embedded power 
structures have an influence. Juntti et al. (2009) explain that, in the dichotomy between expert 
and lay knowledge, the former has traditionally been dominant. In many cases, the superiority 
of scientific information is institutionalised and embedded in decision-making assumptions, so 
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the question of “what constitutes evidence?” is not critically assessed. Complex interactions 
between science as evidence, socio-economic factors and society premises result in high levels 
of uncertainty over causal links and outcomes of a given policy (Jasanoff 2003; Juntti et al. 
2009). For this reason, political and normative views of the problem and possible solutions are 
now often included explicitly in decision-making processes. Scientists need to be involved in 
the conversation between different stakeholders, with different kinds of knowledge. As 
Macilwain (2016) remarks “We like to talk about ‘engaging the public’, but many scientists 
really just want to talk at them”.  
Taking into account the previous considerations, a participatory planning process needs to 
acknowledge embedded biases and power differences, in order to be inclusive and fair. A 
systematic analysis of stakeholders is a first step, but it should aim at identifying key 
stakeholders and at appraising the distribution and sources of power. Approaches to stakeholder 
analysis can vary substantially, based on the theoretical grounds; depending on the purpose of 
the analysis (identification of stakeholders, their categorisation or relationships between them), 
Reed et al. (2009) present a typology of the most common methods used. The classification of 
stakeholders according to their interests and legitimacy, however, can be highly subjective 
(Gass et al. 1997). In order to use stakeholder analysis as a tool to counterbalance power 
structures, the facilitating agency should not have an immediate interest in the issue. 
Characterisation of stakeholders should include levels of influence and participatory methods 
can be used to validate the results. Complementary analyses (e.g. institutional analysis or social 
impact analysis) can be used strategically to balance power inequalities (Kende-Robb and Van 
Wicklin III 2008). For example, understanding financial limitations of certain actors might 
require allocating transportation expenses in the budget, or limited skills of some sectors can 
involve capacity-building workshops.      
The identification of key stakeholders by the leading or facilitating actor, however, is not devoid 
of problems, even if a systematic approach is used. This step was considered one the most 
difficult for the definition of the Tortugas Ecological Reserves in the Florida Keys, which aimed 
at forming a collaborative decision-making body (Living Oceans Society and World Wildlife 
Fund Canada 2005). A deficient selection of stakeholders can generate conflicts or exacerbate 
existing ones. Inappropriate representation is a common problem, where representatives do not 
reflect the position of their constituents, lack the authority to make decisions, or where several 
individuals/groups claim to be the legitimate representative (for a discussion on the legitimacy 
of representation see Parkinson 2003). For example, in the Race Rocks MPA planning process 
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in Canada, the leading agency established a multi-stakeholder advisory board, but it later 
became apparent that First Nations representatives on that board were not supported by all 
indigenous groups. The process was thus delayed, as they had to retrace some steps and start 
again with the appropriate representatives (Living Oceans Society and World Wildlife Fund 
Canada 2005).  
Official representation also increases the chances of an organisation of exerting influence, as it 
provides a unified voice for a sector. This is particularly true when the groups are officially 
recognised by government. Furthermore, some organisations receive government financial 
support for their basic operations and for the provision of certain services or through specific 
projects. As found in this study, an on-going link of this kind with government gives more 
weight to those organisations. A sector with a well-structured organisation can exert more 
influence than sectors with conflicting, unstable or non-existent representative bodies. Usually, 
organisations that represent strong industries, have the necessary resources and skills, and are 
better organised as a sector to effectively lobby decision-makers (Gunderson and Holling 2002; 
Sklair 2002). In Tasmania, recreational divers are probably one of the least organised groups.  
In summary, the distribution of power, social constructions of the importance of different 
stakeholders, unequal representation and organisational capacity all affect lobby capacity and 
influence over decision-making processes. These power structures affect inclusiveness, because 
influential actors have a better chance of having their views heard. The result in the case of the 
Bruny Bioregion was an unfair decision, with benefits skewed toward the powerful. If the 
powerful use covert strategies, such as lobbying, the process loses transparency. All these 
factors reduce faith in the process, compromising future participation in other processes, 
reducing legitimacy and ultimately affecting performance. 
 
7.3 Polarisation 
A schism between pro-development and pro-conservation interests in Tasmania has been 
evident for decades, and has been manifest, for example, through protests against hydroelectric 
dams, forestry and other development proposals (Baidya 1984; Sewell et al. 1989; Gale 2008; 
Krien 2010). The designation of MPAs, particularly in the Bruny Bioregion case, was 
associated with high levels of conflict between proponents of resource extraction and 
conservation. This is not surprising, considering that human activities are concentrated in 
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coastal waters. Designation of MPAs is subject to more controversy closer to the coast, 
particularly near populated centres (Edgar et al. 2000; Laffoley 2008; Toropova et al. 2010).    
Polarisation of opinion in Tasmanian environmental debates can be based partly on the high 
stakes involved. Commercial fishers are dependent on the extraction of marine resources for 
their livelihoods. Many of these fishers might not have the necessary skills or financial ability to 
change their livelihood, as found by Marshall and Marshall (2007) in the north of Australia. The 
lifestyle and sense of freedom associated with fishing is not usually found in more traditional 
jobs, so changing jobs might result in a significant loss of identity for some people. This is an 
important reason for fishers to unite in the defence of their source of livelihood and their 
lifestyle (Minnegal et al. 2003; Hislop 2006). On the other hand, other stakeholders depend on 
high conservation status of marine resources. For example, dive operators need to have at their 
disposition dive sites that meet general diver expectations, such as viewing large animals,  
schools of fish, species richness and rare species (Williams and Polunin 2000). Apart from 
dedicated recreational fishing studies (Lyle and Morton 2004), there is little socio-economic or 
cultural information about the diving sector in Tasmania and their relation with marine 
conservation. However, studies in other places indicate that regular underwater contact with the 
marine environment engenders strong place attachment in divers (Moskwa 2012). Divers who 
derive a livelihood from this activity, such as researchers and dive operators, probably have the 
highest stakes. Other actors have strong feelings about the marine environment based on ethical 
or spiritual motivations. Thus, different actors have conflicting interests, based on different 
motivations, interests and values. Under certain circumstances, such differences can lead to a 
polarisation of opinion.  
Both the media and politicians use debate to further their own interests, either to reach a wider 
audience or to build support for a specific policy. Manipulation of a debate increases the 
perception of polarisation and, in a vicious circle, it can increase polarisation. One interviewee 
in this study pointed out that the dominant political parties tend to do the opposite of whatever 
the Greens suggest, no matter how sensible the idea. A clear example in Tasmania was the 
unreasonable defence of the woodchip industry using old-growth forests. Signs in the global 
market clearly indicated that it was not viable to continue this practice, but the Labor 
Government at the time insisted on supporting the industry. When the most important company 
collapsed, politicians put the blame on environmentalists and the Greens (Krien 2010). In the 
case of MPAs in Tasmania, politicians might have used conflict to avoid taking actions that they 
did not fully support. In an analysis of the Tasmanian MPA process up to 2004, Hislop (2006) 
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suggested that the Government inertia could become behaviourally entrenched. In fact, ten years 
later, her prediction proved to be accurate, as subsequent Labor Governments made little 
progress on MPAs, and the current Liberal Government have explicitly stated that there will be 
no further progress on MPAs during their period in power.  
Regardless of differences in opinion, results from this study suggest that those differences are 
not as marked as depicted in the media or in political discourses. While organisational 
representatives have varied views on MPAs, these tend not to be extreme, and most have 
indicated an understanding of the view of other sectors. Some of the most extreme views, both 
for and against MPAs, were held by scientists. This might seem surprising, considering that 
science is regarded as objective and independent, but in fact, scientists are not exempt from 
personal values and interests (Jasanoff 2003) or pressure from third-party interests 
(Lewandowsky and Bishop 2016). Even though participants in this study stand for the main 
organisations and bodies, they were not a statistically representative sample of each sector. For 
this reason, a statistically representative survey would be needed to analyse the differences 
between the positions of spokespersons and the rest of their constituency. This information 
would shed light on the level of polarisation in the community at large.   
Perceived polarisation can also be partly an artefact of participatory processes. Participation is 
time consuming, and requires an effort to understand what is discussed and to construct 
arguments to defend a position. The majority of people will not be willing to sacrifice personal 
time to participate in a consultation process (Carpini et al. 2004). Most participants tend to be 
passionate enough about the issue to sacrifice their time; thus, extreme views are likely to be 
overrepresented (Fiorina et al. 2006). Token participatory processes exacerbate this tendency, 
and balanced positions might be mostly from those who are required to be there as part of their 
job. 
Another problem associated with polarisation concerns the communication of arguments and 
supporting information. As a debate becomes public, the various parties select information that 
better justifies their views, sometimes exaggerating particular pieces of evidence. More 
balanced or conflicting information is ignored or refuted. Information perceived by the public is 
therefore oversimplified (Tumposky 2004), and sometimes wrong (Clark 2009). The complexity 
of environmental problems requires the collation of diverse sources of information, but 
simplified arguments are easier to remember.  
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Polarisation and its manipulation also make participatory processes more difficult, because 
individuals with extreme positions will tend to express their ideas without listening to others. 
Correspondingly, it becomes more difficult to make decisions, as there will always be a portion 
of the population strongly opposing any decision. Polarisation, however, is not necessarily an 
impediment for collaborative problem solving (Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson et al. 2012; 
Roberts and Jones 2013; Laws et al. 2014). Ansell and Gash (2008) propose that collaborative 
processes are still viable if stakeholders are interdependent, and if collaboration is the exclusive 
forum of solving a problem. Meaningful face-to-face dialogue and consensus-oriented processes 
might need professional facilitation or mediation. Laws et al. (2014) analysed the stages of 
conflict and its escalation, and concluded by exploring how conflict could be turned into an 
opportunity for collaboration. They specifically argued that strong emotions and associated 
forceful positions were an important source of understanding of local issues; if appropriately 
harnessed, this passion could result in strong commitment to a process. They also explored how 
conflict could bring individuals together, increasing organisational capacity, which was in turn 
fundamental for cooperation.    
 
7.4  Reduced trust   
In Tasmania, trust in government organisations and decision makers is low. Many of those who 
participated in the Bruny Bioregion Inquiry, felt that the process had been a “fiasco” and that 
they had been “cheated”. Under the prospect of new consultations, some respondents cynically 
asked “why bother?”. Some feel that these procedures are just a formal requirement and that 
they serve to legitimise decisions that are not open to discussion. Most of the failures in 
governance quality discussed above affect trust in Government: token participatory processes, 
lack of transparency, and the disregard of evidence. Furthermore, many interviewees believe 
that politicians further their own interests, rather than the public good for which they are 
elected. A government bias towards larger and therefore more powerful economic interests is a 
problem that is not specific to Tasmania, but has been widely reported around the world (Juntti 
et al. 2009; Jones 2015; Agardy 2016; Chylarecki and Selva 2016). In Tasmania this problem is 
amplified, given that it is a small economy dependent on relatively few enterprises:  
Tasmania has a history of placing its eggs in one basket. Agriculture, then 
hydroelectricity, then forestry … When so much hope is placed in one industry, or one 
company, any criticism becomes a highly contentious and political act, polarising the 
community (Bibby 2013).  
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The history of Government bias or negligence in environmental debates, the thin line between 
politics and “mateship”, and sometimes even “improper behaviour” (Krien 2010; Bibby 2013), 
have decreased trust in Government. 
Apart from a reduced trust in Government, some respondents suggested a lack of trust in other 
stakeholders. For example, they had pre-conceptions about the unreliability of key actors in 
sectors other than their own, or felt that the official positions held by certain organisations were 
not honest. This is fuelled by conflicting interests and values, and the more passionate people 
are about them, the less open they are to different points of view. Manipulation of polarisation 
can increase these conflicts. A lack of opportunities for dialogue between opposing parties 
enhances pre-conceptions about the “others”, and prevents learning about values, interests and 
needs of different sectors. Without such understanding, it is easier to dismiss points of view held 
by opponents without giving them fair consideration. Ansell and Gash (2008) point out that a 
history of conflict generates a vicious cycle of suspicion and stereotyping.   
Reduced trust in Government and opposing sectors affects the willingness to participate in a 
collaborative approach to the conservation of the marine resources, and reduces the chances of 
success of any kind of cooperation. Nevertheless, as discussed above, reduced trust associated 
with polarisation is not necessarily an impediment to initiate a collaborative process. 
Collaboration can be seen as the last resort to resolve a long-lasting dispute (Sewell et al. 1989; 
Ansell and Gash 2008). The required trust can be built along the way, as a by-product of the 
process. A process can progress from less risky dynamics, such as coordination, to more 
demanding collaboration (see Chapter 2 and 6 for a discussion of costs and risks of different 
social dynamics). Several authors mention that small steps can help develop the trust and mutual 
understanding necessary to create shared meaning and goals, and eventually be scaled-up to 
more challenging initiatives (Living Oceans Society and World Wildlife Fund Canada 2005; 
Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson et al. 2012). The Tasmanian forest conflict provides such an 
example; after years of open confrontation, the contenders decided to start conversations, and an 
incremental process resulted in the development of trust and the eventual signature of the 
Tasmanian Forest Agreement (Schirmer et al. 2016).      
So far I have discussed the major challenges for the governance of MPAs in Tasmania. 
However, two major factors revealed by this study provide hope to the possibility of 
establishing a collaborative approach to marine resource management in Tasmania:  the 
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existence of common ground across sectors; and power structures that can facilitate the search 
for common goals. 
 
7.5 Common ground 
The literature indicates that in order to have a successful collaborative process, among other 
factors, it is necessary to set a common goal (Robins et al. 2011). The establishment of an MPA 
system in Tasmania, as in other places, has been surrounded by controversy. Opinions about the 
effectiveness of MPAs for biodiversity conservation vary substantially. As the establishment of 
MPAs has been perceived as a goal in itself, it would be appropriate to conclude that there is 
currently no common ground between MPA supporters and opponents. Here I posit that if the 
problem is examined from a different perspective, such common ground might not be difficult 
to reach.  
Questionnaire results show that representatives of all sectors have a strong connection with 
Tasmanian marine environments. Coupled with comments made during interviews, this 
indicates that there is a common interest in the conservation of marine resources. Different 
sectors and individuals, however, have different views about the impacts of different uses and 
about the best management options. For this reason, a participatory/collaborative process should 
start by analysing the issues and framing the problem. Several authors highlight the importance 
of developing shared meaning to enable a collaborative process (Innes and Booher 1999; Pahl-
Wostl and Hare 2004; Ansell and Gash 2008; Robins et al. 2011; Emerson et al. 2012). For 
instance, Emerson et al. (2012) suggest that “principled engagement” and “shared motivation” 
enhance each other in an iterative process. “Principled engagement” refers to the discovery of 
shared interests and values, critical deliberation, the articulation of common purpose and the 
determination of key agreements. “Shared motivation” involves the development of trust, 
mutual understanding and a shared commitment to the process. In the case of marine 
conservation in Tasmania, it is possible that such process of developing shared meaning results 
in solutions that do not include MPAs.  
Collaborative processes have provided the means for actors to realise that, even with a variety 
of conflicting interests, there are usually shared problems and solutions that can benefit more 
than one party. In an example in Lake Ontario in the United States, Schusler et al. (2003) 
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analysed the extent of social learning after a search conference.
22
 These authors defined social 
learning as “learning that occurs when people engage one another, sharing diverse perspectives 
and experiences to develop a common framework of understanding and basis for joint action”. 
In the Lake Ontario case, participants were surprised to learn that they shared many points of 
view with other actors, and among other things, reported learning about others’ concerns, about 
different options of addressing the problems, and some even changed their views about the 
problem. Starting with small steps, such as finding common ground and developing shared 
meaning, social learning can be the base for more challenging initiatives.    
 
7.6  Power structures that advance common interests 
Results from this study indicate that the network of actors with an interest in marine issues is 
well connected. A highly connected network is predictable in a small place like Tasmania, 
where people tend to have few degrees of separation from any other person in the island. This 
“small-worldness”23 is neither bad nor good; although it facilitates undue influence of 
unrepresentative lobby groups and other negative uses of power (Bibby 2013), it can also 
facilitate development of strong social capital and sense of community (Woolcock and Narayan 
2000). A highly connected network can probably include social structures necessary for 
collaborative approaches.  
A model of the network of information exchange between the main actors involved in MPAs or 
marine resource management in Tasmania revealed that several social structures and positions 
could enhance collaboration. The existence of closure (see Section 2.5 for an explanation on 
social structures) has been closely related to collaborative structures and to high levels of trust 
(Borgatti et al. 2009). In the Tasmanian case, the existence of closure structures or triangles, 
was higher than expected by chance. Although most of these structures refer to intra-sector 
triangles, the trusting nature of actors involved in such relationships provides the possibility of 
crossing bridges across sectors. This possibility is further increased when examining cross-
sector stars or bridging links, which were found to be more prominent than expected by chance. 
Enqvist et al. (2014) posit that such connecting links between subgroups and across networks is 
crucial to build trust and reduce conflict. Nevertheless, the potential to use this structure to 
                                                     
22
 A search conference is a participatory method in which participants can find points of disagreement and 
common ground, with the purpose of developing a plan that they can support and help implement.  
23
 Networks in which most nodes are connected to each other, either directly or through common nodes 
(Watts 1999).  
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advance a collective development of management alternatives depends on the motivation and 
leadership skills of the specific actors who hold those positions. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
power structures are not necessarily negative or positive. Such structures can help or impede 
collaboration depending on the interests of the powerholders, their commitment and the way in 
which they choose to wield, or not, their power. 
The reduced number of links across sectors, on the other hand, can be related to the vicious 
cycle of polarisation, either perceived or real. In polarised communities, it is common that 
opposing parties view each other with suspicion, have limited communication with each other, 
and trust is thus reduced. The existent bridging links across sectors can probably be explained 
by the fact that organisation representatives tend to be more diplomatic, as they need to interact 
in different forums with all kinds of actors. Openness to different ideas and the capacity to 
debate in a respectful manner are fundamental requirements for collaborative initiatives.  
Enqvist et al. (2014) mention that there are no “ideal” network configurations, but that certain 
structures can increase or prevent certain desirable traits for collective action. But there are 
important trade-offs to consider. Well-connected actors in a network can act as coordinators, 
and capitalise on the flow of resources and information (Cash et al. 2006; Borgatti et al. 2009); 
nevertheless, the energy and time to maintain social relationships and deal with information are 
not unlimited, and place a burden on those central actors. In a similar way, actors acting as 
brokers between two or more sectors, can take advantage of being an intermediary, but many 
times face tensions between different interests (Ferriani et al. 2009). Barnes et al. (2016) studied 
the relationships of three distinct ethnic networks in Hawaiian fisheries. They found that 
productivity of brokers was significantly lower, because they were distrusted by the different 
cliques and were denied key information. High centralisation can also have advantages and 
disadvantages. A highly centralised network is more efficient to share information; it can also 
increase external legitimacy, because one actor can represent the whole network. At the same 
time, the same network can result in less inclusiveness and internal legitimacy (Enqvist et al. 
2014). Long et al. (2013) also explain how dense networks optimise information sharing, but 
impedes innovation, as ideas are homogenised; innovation is more probable in networks with 
structural holes, where new ideas can emerge in dissimilar groups.  
In this way, coordination, brokerage and collaboration have associated costs and risks (Berardo 
and Scholz 2010; Robins et al. 2011; Barnes et al. 2016). But if cooperation can result in 
synergistic benefits, network members might be willing to assume the risk. To do so, members 
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need to trust that others will commit to their part of an agreement. If a minimal level of trust is 
not present, it has to be built, and building trust is a process that requires time and ongoing face-
to-face contact. With this in mind, understanding a specific network is important to evaluate 
weaknesses and strengths, but the decision to engage in a collaborative approach depends on a 
series of variables already discussed (Ansell and Gash 2008). It is important to bear in mind that 
a collaborative process would result in changes in the existent relationships. Bridging 
organisations can initially serve as coordinators to bring together actors from different sectors. 
In processes that rely mainly on coordination, trust is less important than in collaboration. 
Collaboration involves more risks, because actors depend on each other to achieve results. 
Closure in a network, given by the presence of triangles and more complex social structures, is 
particularly important, because it reassures actors that there are “checks and balances” in the 
network (Berardo and Scholz 2010; Robins et al. 2011). As coordinated actions develop, more 
trust might be generated, which can eventually evolve into collaborative initiatives.  
A final point is that policy design and accompanying participatory methods need to consider the 
nature of human behaviour. Fehr-Duda and Fehr (2016) uncover typical tendencies, which 
determine the success or failure of certain policies. For example, many people put the interest of 
the group first, but this behaviour is sustained only if they are assured others do the same; in this 
case, social norms can have an important effect. Most of the times, there are also “free riders”, 
and these need to be “punished” in order to sustain cooperation. Long-term risk tolerance is 
relatively high, compared to immediate risks, affecting the viability of policies aimed at future 
problems.  
 
7.7 Interrelations between themes 
The different themes discussed do not have isolated effects. There is a complex set of relations 
between each of them, which I analyse in the matrix shown in Table 7.1. The matrix is 
directional, meaning that theme A can have an impact on theme B, and theme B can have a 
different effect on theme A.  
The next and final chapter examines how each of the objectives was answered, indicates how 
this research contributes to the existing literature, and suggests further research needs. I finish 
with specific recommendations on ways to improve the governance of MPAs in Tasmania. 
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Table 7.1 Matrix showing relationships between main themes of the Tasmanian MPA governance system 
 AFFECTED THEME 
INFLUENCING 
THEME 
 
Good governance criteria 
Power structures that 
advance particular 
interests 
Polarisation Reduced trust Common ground 
Power structures that 
advance common 
interests 
Inclusiveness and 
fairness 
Accountability and 
transparency 
Legitimacy Performance 
G
o
o
d
 g
o
v
er
n
a
n
ce
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ri
te
ri
a
 
Inclusiveness 
and fairness 
 - 
An inclusive process 
can enhance 
information sharing, 
and transparency 
Needed for 
stakeholder 
support 
Can increase local 
empowerment to 
implement actions 
  
Limited dialogue 
prevents solving 
conflicts and may 
exacerbate 
polarisation 
Limited dialogue 
prevents 
developing trust 
relationships 
Limited dialogue 
prevents finding 
common ground and 
shared meaning 
  
Accountabilit
y and 
transparency 
   - 
Needed for 
stakeholder 
credibility 
Indirect - low 
credibility results 
in little motivation 
for implementation 
support 
          
Legitimacy      - 
Can generate 
necessary local 
support for 
implementation 
          
Performance     
Good 
performances 
gives credibility to 
the process 
 -           
Power structures 
that advance 
particular interests 
Successful lobby 
effectively leaves 
out disempowered 
actors 
Lobby meetings and 
results are usually 
not trackable 
Lobby uses 
unofficial channels 
affecting statutory 
legitimacy 
Indirect - less 
support from 
stakeholders 
affects 
implementation 
 - 
Powerful actors 
tend to dominate 
the debate, taking 
the discussion out 
of the hands of the 
rest of the 
stakeholders and 
possibly increasing 
polarisation 
Diminished 
inclusiveness, 
transparency and 
legitimacy reduces 
trust in 
government and in 
powerful actors 
If powerful actors 
feel that they can 
obtain better results 
by lobbying decision 
makers, they might 
not participate in 
collaborative 
approaches to find 
common ground and 
work cooperatively 
  
Stakeholders are 
aware of some 
lobby efforts, 
reducing 
credibility of 
decisions, and 
corresponding 
support 
Embedded 
constructs 
determine "key" 
stakeholders. The 
Embedded constructs 
inform special 
treatment of "key" 
stakeholders and 
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 AFFECTED THEME 
INFLUENCING 
THEME 
 
Good governance criteria 
Power structures that 
advance particular 
interests 
Polarisation Reduced trust Common ground 
Power structures that 
advance common 
interests 
Inclusiveness and 
fairness 
Accountability and 
transparency 
Legitimacy Performance 
absence of a 
systematic 
stakeholder 
analysis gives 
advantage to more 
salient actors. This 
is true within 
government as 
well. 
policy preferences. 
This social constructs 
are seldom openly 
acknowledged 
Hierarchical 
structure of 
government tends 
to disregard the 
opinion of low  
level staff (on the 
ground) 
                
Polarisation 
Discussions might 
reiterate extreme 
positions of salient 
actors, leaving out 
the views of some 
stakeholders 
Information available 
to the public might 
become 
oversimplified and 
moulded to fit the 
position of opposing 
sides 
Cynic view of any 
decision that is not 
100% of what 
polarised actors 
expect 
Contentious debate 
might deviate 
efforts from more 
constructive 
alternatives to 
solving problems, 
although in some 
circumstances it 
can force 
cooperation 
It might enhance the 
position of the most 
salient actors in the 
debate 
 - 
It might exacerbate 
prejudices about 
other actors,  
significantly 
affecting trust 
between actors 
involved in the 
debate.  
Even if the majority 
of actors have issues 
in common, a 
polarised discussion 
will focus on the 
differences, rather 
than the similarities  
Polarisation can reduce 
the viability of using 
collaboration or 
bridging structures. 
However, actors tired 
of long debates might 
eventually engage in 
collaborative initiatives  
Reduced trust     
Reduces the earned 
legitimacy of 
government 
Less support from 
stakeholders 
affects 
implementation 
     - 
More difficult to get 
together to initiate a 
collaborative 
approach that helps 
finding common 
ground between 
different actors 
Collaboration 
structures across 
sectors are less likely to 
be sustained in time 
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 AFFECTED THEME 
INFLUENCING 
THEME 
 
Good governance criteria 
Power structures that 
advance particular 
interests 
Polarisation Reduced trust Common ground 
Power structures that 
advance common 
interests 
Inclusiveness and 
fairness 
Accountability and 
transparency 
Legitimacy Performance 
Common ground     
If common ground 
is found, shared 
meaning can be 
created for 
problem framing 
and solutions. 
Shared meaning 
can improve 
earned legitimacy 
of a process 
More stakeholder 
support can 
improve 
implementation 
Common ground can 
dissolve the need to 
push for particular 
interests 
It can draw the 
attention from 
extreme views 
towards shared 
meanings 
The process of 
finding shared 
meaning can 
generate new 
relationships that 
increase trust  
 - 
It can give sense to 
engaging in a 
coordinated/cooperativ
e initiative 
Power structures to 
advance common 
interests 
Have the potential 
of bringing 
together a range of 
different actors 
Informal 
coordination/coopera
tion processes, 
especially if led by a 
non-government 
actor, risk 
insufficient 
transparency and 
accountability 
High centralisation 
increases external 
legitimacy. 
Networks with 
high closure have 
less external 
legitimacy 
Depends on the 
structures, 
motivation and 
performance of 
key actors, and on 
the evolution of 
the network 
  
Bridging structures 
can connect 
dissimilar groups. 
Collaboration can 
help opponents 
develop shared 
meanings 
Depends on many 
variables. It can 
generate trust 
across sectors, but 
the broker can also 
be seen with 
suspicion by both 
parties 
Can facilitate the 
finding of common 
ground and the 
development of 
shared meaning 
 - 
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7.8 Significance of main findings  
 
The ideas discussed throughout this chapter were drawn from the results of this study, but few are 
exclusive to the Tasmanian case study. Several of the examples used throughout this discussion 
illustrate the relevance of this thesis to the international efforts to improve MPA governance and to the 
governance literature. The following section highlights the significance of some of the most important 
ideas drawn from the Tasmanian experience for the broader conservation community and the 
literature. This section is the basis for recommendations of Section 8.4 for MPA governance 
elsewhere: 
A limited vision of the usefulness and requirements of an MPA system reduces its value for marine 
conservation. If an MPA system is conceived only as a designation process, key features of MPA 
management are probably neglected, reducing possible longer-term benefits. Many authors highlight 
the need to focus efforts on ecological representation and effectiveness (e.g. McClanahan 1999; 
Agardy et al. 2003; Pomeroy et al. 2004; Hockings et al. 2006; Laffoley 2008; Barr and Possingham 
2013; Edgar et al. 2014; Barnes 2015; Grech et al. 2015). Fewer authors emphasise the need to plan 
for implementation prior to, during and after the designation process. Such lack of planning is evident 
when neither the legal framework nor the long-term budgets provide for appropriate management, 
including staffing, education, stakeholder involvement, surveillance, monitoring of objectives and 
adaptive management of each area and the system. The findings of this study suggest that if MPAs are 
not continuously managed and monitored, managers might be unable to show benefits.  
Marine ecosystems have both small and large-scale issues, as well as significant variability in space 
and time. If governance regimes do not take into consideration this complexity, MPAs can fail to 
provide expected results (Olsson et al. 2004; Armitage and Plummer 2010; Lockwood et al. 2012). 
Evidence of this problem includes a lack of coordination between authorities at different scales, poor 
integration of policies and rules across scales and limited structures to provide resilience to change. 
Findings of this thesis reinforce normative developments in the literature calling for better 
coordination across levels and sectors in the literature, and greater adaptability (Underdal 1980; UNDP 
1997; McLeod and Leslie 2009; Lockwood 2010; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2012; Borrini-Feyerabend 
et al. 2013; Lockwood et al. 2013).  
When participatory processes of establishing an MPA system do not carefully follow good governance 
principles, their results can be counter-productive. If participants feel their input is ignored, and that 
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their engagement is of a token nature, they will lose trust in the process and leading actors. Unequal 
participation and influence over decisions aggravate this problem. Consequently, stakeholders will 
likely distrust future participatory processes or decide not to participate at all. The importance of 
inclusiveness and fairness is highlighted in governance guidelines (UNDP 1997; European 
Commission 2001; Graham et al. 2003). Other authors provide more detailed theoretical development 
of these principles, including references to empirical examples (Chambers 1994; Reed 2008; 
Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2012; Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 
2013). The case study explored in this thesis revealed some of the intricacies associated with 
implementing these principles. For example, open access to information might not be enough to 
involve all relevant stakeholders, as people have different skills and motivations to critically examine 
the information and argue their points of view. In this way, equal access to information does not 
necessarily result in an inclusive and fair process. Trade-offs between different principles might be 
also unavoidable. Making sure that all stakeholders have a fair opportunity to express their opinions 
and be considered might involve lengthy processes of stakeholder analysis, meaningful dialogue and 
collaborative problem solving. Following principles of inclusiveness and fairness might therefore 
substantially affect the efficiency of a process.    
Trust is a key feature of governance, but is easily broken and hard to regain. This thesis demonstrates 
that trust is vulnerable to a variety of aspects of the governance regime. Apart from inconsequential 
participation, other issues can affect trust. Stakeholder support and ownership of a process is reduced 
if participation does not start from the beginning (Reed 2008). Results of this study clearly support this 
notion, indicating that participation should start by analysing the issues and deliberating upon possible 
solutions, rather than considering the solutions previously devised by government. Polarisation of 
opinion, perceived and real, reduces trust between different sectors (Ansell and Gash 2008). This was 
confirmed here by the attitude of contempt or distrust that some interviewees had towards those they 
perceived as holding opposing views to their own. Manipulation of the debate has been used on 
several occasions in Tasmania to further the interests of particular  groups (Hislop 2006; Gale 2008; 
Krien 2010). Polarisation can be augmented by the media and the manipulation of information by 
highly visible actors. Lack of meaningful dialogue opportunities further divides opinions (Pahl-Wostl 
2002; Ansell and Gash 2008). Results from this study suggest that different stakeholders in the 
Tasmanian case might be willing to learn about the reasons behind other actors’ positions, if they had 
that opportunity. Another issue found in this analysis is that limited existence or use of evidence to 
support decisions also reduces trust in the process. By analysing the different aspects that have 
affected trust in the Tasmanian case study, this thesis contributes to the weight of evidence that 
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emphasises the critical importance of building stakeholders’ trust in decision making and associated 
governance processes.  
Power distribution is rarely uniform, and this study shows that ignoring distributional issues can 
exacerbate stakeholders’ sense of unfairness, distrust and powerlessness. Power is sometimes used to 
maintain the status quo. Changing the distribution of power can be extremely difficult, not only due to 
the possible backlash by powerful actors, but because often the sense of powerlessness or dominance 
are underpinned by unconscious preconceptions (Schneider and Ingram 1993). One of the main 
contributions of this thesis to the governance literature is the further development of the role of power 
in decision-making situations. In particular, I was able to show that certain unconscious biases assign 
more credibility or validity to certain actors, and that such biases can pre-determine the results of a 
consultation process. On the other hand, in this study I portrayed power as neither bad nor good, but as 
an attribute of social relationships that can be used either to advance particular or common interests. 
Several studies highlight the importance of leadership, coordination and collaboration for fair and 
effective governance (Olsson et al. 2004; Charles 2007; Lockwood et al. 2012; Berkes and Ross 
2013). Few of these authors, however, articulate the close relationship between these characteristics 
and power. In Section 7.6, I explained how power relationships are closely linked to these necessary 
attributes, particularly through social network structures and actors assumed or assigned roles. Such 
findings are of significance for case studies beyond Tasmania, in that they indicate the kinds of power 
dynamics that must be considered in the design and implementation of MPA designation processes.
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Chapter 8 Towards better governance of MPAs: concluding 
remarks and recommendations 
In this Chapter, I first indicate how  the objectives of the study have been met. I also address the 
limitations arising from the focus of the study and the methods adopted. I then evaluate the ways in 
which this study contributes to the literature on natural resource governance, the significance of my 
findings and suggest future research needs. I finish by making specific proposals about ways to 
improve the quality of Tasmanian governance of MPAs and marine conservation in general.  
8.1 How did the results answer the research objectives? 
The aim of this thesis was to understand how MPA governance could be improved to enhance marine 
conservation in Tasmania. The specific objectives of this thesis were: 
1. To analyse the core elements and context of the governance regime for Tasmanian MPAs.
2. To evaluate the extent that the Tasmanian MPA governance regime follows good governance
principles.
3. To assess power dynamics in the Tasmanian MPA governance regime and how they have
affected the quality of governance.
4. To make recommendations for improving the Tasmanian MPA governance regime.
5. To draw out lessons from the Tasmanian case study that can inform the design of MPA
governance regimes elsewhere.
In Table 8.1, I summarise how the methods addressed each objective, the main findings and the 
limitations of the study. Limitations of the research were consequent on the scope of the thesis and the 
resources available to conduct the research, but did not undermine achieving the aim and meeting the 
associated objectives. 
Table 8.1 Research objectives, methods, findings and limitations 
Objectives Relevance of methods used, main findings and limitations 
1. To analyse the core elements
and context of the governance
regime of Tasmanian MPAs.
RELEVANCE OF METHODS 
It was possible to make a general characterisation of most elements of the governance 
regime through the review of key documents and selected questionnaire results.  
MAIN FINDINGS (Chapter 4) 
Problems: Tasmania is a climate change hot-spot, with synergistic impacts of climate 
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change, invasive species, fishing and pollution. Research and monitoring are not 
appropriately funded, and there are significant information gaps and uncertainties. 
There are regime deficiencies to deal with change and for an integral approach to 
marine sustainability. 
Instruments: There are national and international tools that support the creation of 
MPA systems, but states are mostly autonomous regarding their jurisdictional waters. 
There is limited integration of policies across sectors or government levels. The 
Tasmanian MPA system is not ecologically representative, and there are important 
deficiencies in the governance regime. 
Actors: The main sectors include: elected government and bureaucracy, commercial 
and recreational fishers, conservation organisations, divers, research and tourism. 
Aboriginal interests were beyond the scope of this study. 
Decision arenas: There are no official, on-going forums to discuss MPAs or other 
marine conservation tools, other than to discuss fisheries-related issues. Consultation 
processes have been ad-hoc.  
Socio-economic context: Tasmania is characterised by a small economy, which has 
been strongly dependent on the extraction of marine resources. Activities that represent 
a short-term economic benefit are therefore prioritised in State politics. 
Cultural context: Tasmanian communities have a significant connection to the coast 
and the marine environment. Recreational fishing is an important activity, with 
approximately 98,000 fishers in 2013, giving them significant political leverage.  
Political context: Labor and Liberal parties have dominated the recent political arena 
in Tasmania. Labor’s policies support MPAs under certain conditions, but progress in 
establishing an MPA system was slow. The Liberal party openly opposes the 
designation of new MPAs. The political system determines that decisions tend to be 
politicised, and ministers usually prioritise short-term results. 
Natural context: Tasmania is characterised by significant marine diversity and 
endemism. A high productivity has sustained valuable fisheries. 
LIMITATIONS 
The review of key documents and questionnaire results provided limited material on 
the following elements of the analytic framework: rules, incentives (both planned and 
unanticipated) and norms, and associated levels of compliance. Similarly, there is scant 
information about the dependence of key stakeholders on specific resources or 
livelihoods. There are a number of information gaps regarding the relations between 
natural dynamics, extraction levels, and other impacts. Some of these information gaps 
could be addressed through specific research projects (e.g. incentives), while other are 
related to insufficient monitoring and reporting of government agencies (e.g. 
compliance levels, effectiveness of MPAs).  
Aboriginal interests in marine issues and MPAs in particular were not covered in this 
thesis. The complexity of this issue deserves a dedicated study sanctioned by the 
Tasmanian Aboriginals.      
2. To evaluate the extent to 
which the Tasmanian MPA 
governance regime follows good 
governance principles.  
RELEVANCE OF METHODS  
Interviews were an appropriate method for exploring governance issues in depth, as 
perceived by the main stakeholders. The selection of interviewees proved to be 
effective, as they had relevant knowledge of the ecological and socio-economic aspects 
of the MPA governance regime. Although many were not experts on governance or 
planning, issues were treated with common sense and addressed critically.     
Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
187 
 
MAIN FINDINGS (Chapter 5) 
Inclusiveness and fairness: Consultation processes were considered inclusive, but 
some believed that engagement methods could be improved to increase rational 
dialogue across sectors. Final decision processes were perceived to have discounted 
some sectors and to be biased towards economic interests. 
Accountability and transparency: The consultation process was perceived to be 
transparent, but the legal framework and roles of different agencies should be clearer. 
Proposals were based on good ecological information, but did not consider socio-
economic information. There are also many information gaps and a high level of 
uncertainty. Final decisions lack transparency.  
Legitimacy: The Government is generally accepted as the legitimate decision-maker, 
but there are low trust levels. Decisions are perceived to be insufficiently based on 
evidence.  
Performance: When final decisions can disregard recommendations from consultation 
processes without clear justification, it is perceived that funding and the efforts of 
participants are wasted. Direction, political leadership and coordination across sectors 
and across government levels are perceived to be poor. MPA management is 
underfunded and not adaptive.  
LIMITATIONS 
Views correspond to representatives of the main organisations involved in MPA 
governance. As such, results cannot be generalised for all stakeholders. 
The use of relatively open-ended questions in interviews provided an effective means of 
eliciting key issues. The disadvantage of this approach is that information about rarely 
mentioned issues might be insufficient to draw valid conclusions. The following good 
governance sub-criteria were not mentioned in detail, or not at all: authority by law; 
operational planning and management; responsible bodies answer for outcomes; 
subsidiarity; respect for different points of view and cultures; fair sharing of costs and 
benefits; and resilience. The scant mention of these matters does not necessarily mean 
that they are unimportant. Dedicated investigations would be needed to better 
understand these issues.           
3. To assess power dynamics of 
the Tasmanian MPA governance 
regime and how they have 
affected the quality of 
governance. 
RELEVANCE OF METHODS  
The mix of methods comprising social network analysis, interviews and media 
prominence analysis were complementary, providing both quantitative and qualitative 
information about power dynamics in Tasmania. To understand other dimensions of 
power dynamics, such as mobilisation of funds or success of specific proposals or 
vetos, I could have extended the methods used here or I could have used additional 
methods. This, however, would have required more dedication from key informants, or 
riskier exposure of sensitive issues, eventually hindering overall participation. I believe 
that the specific objectives, however, were satisfactorily covered by the methods used.    
MAIN FINDINGS (Chapter 6) 
Ambivalence of power structures: Power can have both negative and positive 
impacts on natural resource management. In many cases, power has been related to 
unfair decision processes, but power is a necessary feature of positive leadership, 
coordination and brokerage processes. 
Distribution of influence: Influence was concentrated in relatively few actors, mostly 
members of the commercial and recreational fishing sectors, some government 
agencies, and the relevant Minister.  
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Polarisation: Perceived differences in opinion and existence of coalitions suggest 
higher levels of polarisation than results from interviews and the information exchange 
network.  
Social structures for collaborative approaches: An analysis of social structures in 
the information exchange network shows that there are opportunities for collaborative 
governance approaches, although across sectors relationships currently depend on a 
few bridging organisations. 
LIMITATIONS 
SNA comprises such a variety of methods and approaches to understanding networks, 
that there is always an opportunity to expand on the selected methods. First, SNA 
results are fixed in a particular period and context. In a more extended study this could 
be addressed by conducting a longitudinal analysis. Second, it is debatable whether 
choosing organisational ties over personal ties is preferable; it is undeniable that 
relationships depend significantly on personal contacts and attributes, but in a 
governance network certain relationships will exist regardless of who represents an 
organisation. Additionally, organisations possess collective resources that are often 
essential for maintaining relationships with key actors (Ernstson 2011). Third, networks 
can vary significantly depending on the kind of questions asked. In this study, I chose 
information exchange relations, assuming they did not require high levels of trust, and 
therefore could give me an idea of the viability of future collaborative approaches in 
what seemed a highly polarised political arena. Questions on collaboration links could 
have provided a better indication of trust relationships, but if I had focused on these 
stronger links, I might have overlooked key social structures for potential 
coordination/collaboration.  
A specific limitation I found when using the Hubs and Authorities procedure in the 
SNA was the limited usefulness of the “hubs” score. Ideally, this score would have 
showed which actors where more knowledgeable of the distribution of influence. When 
I ran the analysis, however, I found that some “hubs”, rather than selecting “authorities” 
(influential actors) accurately, simply selected a large number of actors. This limitation 
prevented the identification of “knowledgeable” actors in the network.  
Power is a multi-faceted topic, and although this study covered enough aspects to meet 
the objectives, other approaches found in the literature could complement my findings 
(see Section 8.2).  
4. To make recommendations to 
improve the governance regime. 
and 
5. To draw out lessons from the 
Tasmanian case study that can 
inform the design of MPA 
governance regimes elsewhere 
and contribute to the academic 
literature. 
MAIN FINDINGS (this Chapter) 
Using results from Chapters 4-6, and the general discussion of results in Chapter 7, I 
make recommendations for improvement both for the Tasmanian case (see Section 8.3) 
and recommendations applicable in other settings (see Section 8.4).  
LIMITATIONS 
Implementation of the recommendations from this study would require acceptance of 
findings amongst key actors, and commitment to change. I understand that change is not 
an easy undertaking; some organisations will be more reluctant to embark in a process 
that would not be a “quick-fix” to governance problems. The pathway to change is 
likely to involve an incremental process of collaborative co-production through trial, 
error, and adjustment.       
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8.2 Significance of this study 
The process of establishing an MPA system in Tasmanian waters evolved from the ad hoc selection of 
some key ecological places in the early 1990s, to a more systematic decision-making process 
supported by policy and legal instruments in the early 2000s (Chapter 4). An encouraging first 
example in the Kent Group and Port Davey became a disaster in the Bruny Bioregion. Key actors in 
Tasmania have a good understanding of flaws in the governance regime, but this study systematises an 
important portion of that knowledge. From the perspective of good governance principles and the 
influence of power structures, this study analyses the different aspects that affected the governance of 
MPAs in Tasmania and that resulted in a grinding halt in further efforts since 2009. This thesis 
supports findings from other studies in Tasmania, related to the governance of both marine and 
terrestrial natural resources. These investigations raise questions about the appropriateness of the 
governance regime and the decision making process (Hislop 2006; Gale 2008; Lockwood et al. 2013; 
Clement et al. 2016). A better understanding of the faults in a governance regime provides a 
justification for change, and supports recommendations for building a more equitable, better-informed 
and suitable governance regime. 
In a broader sense, this study provides an empirical contribution to the literature on governance of 
MPAs, and more generally of natural resources. Here I show a clear link between insufficient attention 
to key good governance principles and planning outcomes. In particular, a process that was originally 
conceived to be developed in the medium term was completely abandoned after evaluating three 
bioregions. This study supports the claims of several authors in the natural resource governance and 
environmental planning literature. For example, this study provides evidence for the need to conduct a 
stakeholder analysis (Reed 2008; Reed et al. 2009; Ban et al. 2013), to tailor engagement methods 
(Chambers 1994; Reed 2008; Lockwood et al. 2010) and to make participation meaningful (Arnstein 
1969; Agrawal 2005; Keen et al. 2005; Charles 2007; Jones 2009). Several authors also support the 
importance of real dialogue opportunities to build trust and collaboration (Healey 2003; Ansell and 
Gash 2008; Reed 2008). Transparency in decision-making is important not only for ethical reasons, 
but for practical reasons (UNDP 1997; Lockwood 2010; Cinner et al. 2012b; Ban et al. 2013; Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2013). Also, integrating different sources of knowledge to support decisions (Berkes 
and Folke 2002; Reed 2008; Berkes 2009; Armitage and Plummer 2010; Ban et al. 2013), and 
acknowledging uncertainty can help design more adaptive governance structures (Pahl-Wostl 2002; 
Berkes et al. 2003; Armitage and Plummer 2010; Lockwood et al. 2012). Coordination across 
governance levels and sectors was also highlighted by several authors as a key element of governance 
(Living Oceans Society and World Wildlife Fund Canada 2005; Pahl-Wostl 2006; McLeod and Leslie 
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2009). Effective implementation should be part of the original planning (Pomeroy et al. 2004; Alcala 
and Russ 2006; Charles 2007; Edgar et al. 2014). Finally, several authors also highlight the need to 
understand and balance power structures (Forester 1989; Healey 2003; Schneider et al. 2003; 
McCullum et al. 2004; Ansell and Gash 2008; Kende-Robb and Van Wicklin III 2008).     
The impact of power structures on governance of natural resources has been highlighted by many 
authors in the natural resources governance literature. However, relatively few studies include specific 
methods to understand the distribution of power and its impact on decision-making processes. There 
are interesting empirical examples in the health literature (Muller and Headey 1996; Lewis and 
Considine 1999; Lewis 2006; Oliver et al. 2013), psychology (Neal and Neal 2011), and politics and 
local government (Mills 1956; Dahl 1961). There are fewer examples dealing with natural resource 
management (Muller and Headey 1996; Raik et al. 2008; Islam 2013) and particularly with marine and 
coastal resources (Crona and Bodin 2010; Njaya et al. 2011; Nayak et al. 2015). This study offers a 
methodological approach to understand one of several aspects of power, indicating that power 
structures affect decision-making processes and the quality of governance. Empirical information 
gained in this thesis supports theoretical developments that suggest the importance of taking into 
consideration power in governance studies (Forester 1989; Raik et al. 2008; Armitage et al. 2009; 
Neal and Neal 2011). Results also support a notion less developed in the literature, in which power is 
neither good nor bad (Jentoft 2005); instead, the consequences of existing power structures depend on 
the values, intentions and success of the powerholders. 
This thesis also provides a strong foundation for future research. In particular, inquiries into the 
following topics would be helpful to gain a more complete picture of the MPA governance regime in 
Tasmania and the several aspects that affect the regime.  
1. This study made an initial attempt at identifying key organisations with an interest in MPAs in 
Tasmania. Members of these organisations provided crucial information, but a representative sample 
would be needed to ascertain if the views from informants reflect those of the broad organisation, local 
communities and interest groups. A study focusing on values of the marine environment, concerns, 
expectations and opinions on marine conservation issues of different actors, would be essential for a 
comprehensive stakeholder analysis. Other relevant topics could include costs and benefits of 
alternative management options for different stakeholders, and the level of dependence on specific 
resources or livelihoods. A more focused study would be needed when dealing with particular MPAs 
or regions, as local organisations were not covered in this thesis. It is also important to consider that 
many interested individuals do not belong to formal groups, and this should be considered in a sample 
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of key actors and in a stakeholder analysis. There might be low profile and emergent interests and 
groups that were not evident at the time of designing this study, and these would need to be included. 
As already mentioned, Aboriginal interests warrant a dedicated study. 
2. Diverse incentives play a key role in the conservation of natural resources. There are formal 
incentives, created on purpose to motivate individuals or collectives to follow good practice 
guidelines; these can be punishments (e.g. fines), or rewards (e.g. tax exemptions or funding of 
sustainability projects). Policies from non-conservation sectors or even conservation-focused legal 
instruments can create unexpected or “perverse” incentives (McNeely 1993; Lueck and Michael 2000; 
Jones et al. 2013). Some incentives rely on the voluntary application of standards, such as certification 
processes (e.g. Sustainable Fishing Council). Even more, some individuals might engage in good 
practices out of moral motivations, without the intervention of third parties. Social norms based on 
collective constructions of the environment can also play a key role. A comprehensive study on the 
use of incentives to improve the status of the marine environment would be useful.  
3. This thesis focused on a relatively narrow aspect of power, and other approaches can increase the 
understanding of this key variable. For example, future studies can aim to answer key questions such 
as how and why different people respond to power manifestations (e.g. rewards, punishments, social 
norms, perceived integrity of the political class)? At what level do different people/organisations have 
influence in the following: initiating proposals; veto/approval stage of a proposal; the agenda setting 
stage of policy development; and the manipulation of people’s points of view and perceived needs 
(creating/modifying social constructs). What is the role of the media and communications in exerting 
influence (intentional or unintentional) over society? One problem arises when trying to understand 
embedded structures or social constructs of power, as both the powerful and powerless are often 
unconscious of such structures. Another significant challenge for the understanding of power is that it 
is often exerted behind the scenes. Studying covert power depends on finding knowledgeable 
informants and “insiders” willing to participate.  
4. Considering that SNA is a useful tool to study power structures, future studies could focus on a 
more in depth analysis of networks; rather than just looking at information exchange networks, more 
demanding or costly links like collaboration and trust could be explored. To account for the dynamic 
nature of social networks, an ideal study of networks, and their role in collective resource management 
initiatives, should be replicated on a regular basis to understand changes and trends. Considering that 
networks are usually nested, a combination of different scales of analysis can be appropriate, including 
individuals, organisations and different levels of action. Understanding how local, regional, national 
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and international networks interact is particularly important when addressing the fitness between 
ecological scale and governance regimes. 
 
8.3 Recommendations 
The following proposals are based both on the results of this study and the literature. To present 
recommendations in a concise manner, references are not included here, but can be found in previous 
chapters. Although two options are developed, these complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
The first option refers to the use of existing attributes in the network of actors with an interest in 
marine conservation, and the creation of new ones. I call this option a collaborative approach, and it 
can be led either by government, or it can emerge from the bottom-up, through partnerships led by 
non-government actors. The second option involves a structural adjustment of the legal framework. 
Under the current circumstances, this legal change is unlikely, because for many years there has been 
little political will in State Government to advance in the conservation of marine ecosystems. If, 
however, a collaborative initiative is successful, enough Government support might be mobilised to 
consider formal institutional changes to improve governance. Such changes would benefit not just 
marine sustainability, but would improve governance of environmental planning in general. For each 
of the two options presented, I first briefly explain why it is needed, summarise the current conditions 
that could support implementation of the approach, and finally identify specific opportunities for 
improvement. 
8.3.1 Collaborative approach 
Why is it needed? 
Polarisation and manipulation of conflict has resulted in limited trust across sectors. The well-
grounded perception of unequal influence intensifies this lack of trust. As actors have not had enough 
opportunities to discuss their points of view, they have possibly not realised that they share several 
values and concerns. Most actors accept that the Tasmanian Government is the legitimate decision-
maker, and this can be an obstacle to cooperative non-government initiatives to frame the problems 
and explore improvement options. Nevertheless, some of the attributes of current networks between 
actors might be useful. Additionally, a process initiated by non-government actors has a better chance 
of reducing the effect of electoral politics, which can open up opportunities to explore innovative 
solutions, rather than entrenching oppositional stances. At the moment, this seems like one of few 
options to advance governance of marine conservation. 
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Supportive conditions 
 A well-connected network with social structures that facilitate cooperation within sectors and 
coordination across sectors.  
 A relatively small population in Tasmania facilitates the existence of closely-knit and 
supportive communities, with an important level of volunteerism. This sense of community 
can facilitate rational and respectful relationships across sectors.  
 Perceptions of the degree of polarisation between key interest groups appear to be 
exaggerated. 
 Actors in all sectors manifested a strong attachment to Tasmanian marine environments. This 
can be a starting point to cooperatively analyse problems and explore solutions.  
 Existing joint ventures between fishers and environmental NGOs show that, given a common 
purpose, different sectors can work together.  
 FACs have provided dialogue opportunities between certain actors, building respect across 
sectors, even if they do not agree on many points. 
 Some actors, particularly scientists, tend to be widely respected. Such actors can play a 
leading role in a collaborative initiative.  
 
Opportunities for improvement  
Bridging organisations as leaders. Brokers are in a unique position to facilitate dialogue among 
different actors. The success of a collaborative approach depends on: the perceived need of actors to 
initiate a dialogue on marine conservation; the willingness of key actors to assume the costs (time 
and effort) and risks (conflicting pressures) of a broker role; and their leadership skills to bring 
together actors with different interests and to focus discussions on finding shared meaning.   
Nested structures. High endemism and diverse coastal systems in Tasmania require that both 
decisions and actions fit local circumstances. At the same time, many threats occur at larger scales, 
as is the case of climate change. Up to a certain point, a collaborative approach should be multi-level 
as well. It is impracticable to conduct a unified process that involves all coastal communities and 
interested parties. To maximise local participation, a nested structure of collaboration can move 
issues from the local to the State level and vice versa. Legitimate spokespersons for different 
communities and interest groups have a bridging role across levels. Agreement on actions needs to 
cross the different levels of governance, in order to mobilise the necessary support for 
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implementation at the local (e.g. compliance, volunteer groups) and State levels (e.g. funds, 
authority).  
Inclusiveness. The process should involve all interested stakeholders, to increase the legitimacy of 
any outcomes. The decision on who should be involved must be discussed during initial meetings, to 
invite any group or individual that might have been overlooked. “Troublesome” individuals should 
not be excluded, but invited to share their views and interact with others in a respectful manner. Even 
if the process is initiated by non–government actors, relevant Government agencies and politicians 
should be invited to participate. While their involvement level might be low at the beginning, with 
time, a successful process might spark their interest. Government support will be needed eventually, 
if not from the beginning. It is also important to consider that different actors have unequal levels of 
representation; poorly represented actors should be encouraged to organise themselves, choosing a 
spokesperson to make participation more efficient. Sometimes exclusive forums are needed to solve 
particular issues; this can be justified on efficiency or practical grounds, but should be openly 
considered by all interested parties.  
Power structures honestly acknowledged. Decisions in a collaborative approach might be less 
influenced by politics, especially if Government representatives are not leading the process. For this 
reason, a genuine interest in improving marine sustainability can reduce the role of power structures 
in shifting final decisions. Different actors, however, might still have different levels of influence 
during an open discussion. For example, individuals in higher levels of management, considered as 
experts, or with better education, might have an advantage articulating arguments and voicing their 
opinions. Different methods and tools need to be used to explore the ideas and points of view of less 
assertive or less skilled individuals; these include individual interviews, surveys, small-group 
discussions and professionally facilitated workshops. The variable capacity to cover the financial 
costs of participating can become an issue and funds need to be raised to give all actors the same 
opportunity to get involved. 
Evidence-based discussions. Even if scientific evidence is devalued by decision-makers, most actors 
believe scientific information is the most reliable. A collaborative approach needs to bring to the 
table information from different sources, including socio-economic and cultural studies, but also 
information based on experience, beliefs and emotions. All actors need to agree from the beginning 
that any kind of information will be considered critically and respectfully. Actors need to 
acknowledge conflicting evidence, information gaps and uncertainties; a mechanism to resolve 
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conflicts and rank information can be helpful. The process might prioritise information needs to 
inform future decisions.  
Process management and conflict resolution. Principles of relationship and ground rules, 
established by participants, might be necessary to ensure a meaningful exchange of ideas and the 
continuity of the process. Nevertheless, a certain degree of flexibility is necessary to face unexpected 
events. A method of accountability can be established to monitor commitments and progress. Given 
the diversity of interests, conflicts are bound to emerge so a system of conflict resolution is 
advisable. 
Face-to-face dialogue. This is necessary to build personal relationships that can increase trust 
between actors and generate mutual understanding and shared meaning. It is important to bear in 
mind that there will always be extremists who will not change their position by any means. As long 
as participants agree on basic rules of respect and constructive discussion, such extreme positions 
should not prevent a consensus-oriented dialogue. Face-to-face dialogue can be complemented with 
less expensive methods of engagement, such as online forums, and surveys.  
Taking advantage of different venues. Participation is a highly demanding activity. A small 
proportion of people are willing or capable of meeting that burden, especially over a long period. 
Organising side-events during popular events, and exploring alternative exchange methods to 
complement face-to-face dialogue might increase participation levels.   
Adaptive management approach. The process should acknowledge that some decisions might be 
suboptimal. Experimentation, setting indicators, monitoring, and rethinking of actions and priorities 
according to new information should be on the table from the beginning. 
Building on common ground. An attachment to Tasmanian marine environments and a related 
interest in their sustainability is shared across different sectors. This is a starting point for building 
shared meaning, including problem framing, a collaborative consideration of possible solutions and 
implementation of actions. Although MPAs have many benefits, discussions do not need to be 
centred on them. Different alternatives for the sustainable management of marine resources can have 
important advantages, including ecosystem-based management of fisheries, integrated coastal 
management, and MSP. Politicians and other decision-makers are more likely to support solutions 
that are backed by several sectors and that generate less controversy.   
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Eventual institutionalisation.  A collaborative approach can generate necessary conditions for more 
formal actions. The forums and their decisions need to be eventually institutionalised, even if that 
occurs in the long-term. If not, compliance of agreements can become an issue, as non-government 
actors lack the authority to enforce agreements. Trust building processes usually require time, and if 
it stops halfway, outcomes might be lost. If the formalisation of the process is not ensured in the 
long-term, then collaboration can be compromised by fluctuating political will.  
8.3.2 Regulatory reform 
Why is it needed? 
As previously discussed, participatory processes in Tasmania have shortcomings, particularly: non-
systematic selection of key stakeholders; non-tailored methods of engagement; consultations that do 
not start from the beginning of processes (framing of problems and exploration of possible solutions); 
limited on-going dialogue opportunities; and an unclear legal framework. The decision process has 
fundamental flaws: only one person holds the power over the final decision; that person can disregard 
outcomes from consultation processes; this can eliminate the objectivity, inclusiveness and 
transparency that consultation processes intend to secure. Running a consultation that is not reflected 
in final decisions not only wastes time and money, but it also increases distrust in politicians and the 
system, reducing the legitimacy of decisions. Limited leadership and political will also have 
consequences for the implementation of individual MPAs, with inadequate planning, funding and 
monitoring of effectiveness.  
 
Supportive conditions 
Despite the flaws in the decision-making problem, there are a number of positive points that provide 
scaffolding for a more appropriate governance regime: 
 General recognition of Government as the legitimate decision-maker. 
 The TPC is mostly seen as an independent and thorough body, appropriate to mediate 
planning processes. 
 Open and transparent consultation processes. 
 The Tasmanian Government Framework for Community Engagement provides guidance on 
public participation purposes, principles and methods. 
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 Marine science in Tasmania is recognised for their quality, providing a wealth of information 
that can support decisions; information sources include citizen science programs like Redmap 
and Reef Life Survey. 
 Science and systematic planning have been incorporated in policy and management tools, for 
example the TMPAS, the Natural Heritage Strategy, the Natural Values Atlas and the PWS 
Monitoring and Reporting System. 
 
Opportunities for improvement 
Envision implementation and monitoring. Planning processes often extend beyond the original 
timeframes, particularly when conflicts cannot be easily resolved. Appropriate funds need to be 
secured to cover such eventuality. Additionally, resources should be available to implement, monitor 
and adjust action plans. The development, implementation and periodic adjustment of management 
plans for all MPAs should be compulsory shortly after designation. 
Clarifying the legal MPA framework. Both responsibilities and powers of each Government agency 
should be clearly discernible. When two or more agencies need to share a responsibility, a clear 
coordination mechanism should be in place. This would prevent agencies from blaming each other 
for lack of action, or from preventing another of initiating actions. In particular, MPA responsibility 
should not be split between PWS, different branches of DPIPWE and the Police, without a clear 
coordination system. 
Look beyond the basic formal procedures of public involvement. Consultation steps already 
established by law (Figure 4.2) aim to inform and consult the public. At present, those steps are too 
general to account for differences in the issues at hand, or the characteristics of particular regions. 
Key elements of participatory processes are missing, such as stakeholder analysis, meaningful 
dialogue opportunities or consensus-oriented decision processes.   
Institutionalise the Tasmanian Government Framework for Community Engagement. This 
framework is a relevant guide for more tailored and meaningful participation, providing enough 
flexibility to adjust the process according to specific conditions. The implementation of this 
framework is currently voluntary, and depends on the willingness of bureaucrats to engage the 
community. In order to be applied more widely, the framework should be institutionalised, either 
incorporating its prescriptions into planning laws, or closely monitoring and encouraging its 
application. As much as practicable, the views of participants should be reflected in final decisions. 
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Start from the beginning. Actors perceive the marine environment, associated problems and possible 
solutions in different ways. During consultation processes, government bodies usually identify 
problems, gather relevant information and develop preliminary proposals. Starting a consultation 
with pre-conceived proposals, however, can alienate some actors. It is recommended that 
engagement processes start by exploring different ways of seeing the issues, framing the problem 
and discussing possible solutions. In the case of marine conservation, tools other than MPAs can be 
as effective for controlling pressures and increasing ecosystem resilience, and these should 
complement an MPA system. An engagement process therefore should not be solely focused on 
MPA designation, but on identifying the problems that affect the marine environment and devising 
possible solutions.  
Face-to-face ongoing dialogue. A regular forum to discuss marine conservation in an integral way 
should be established. Most problems are not isolated in time or space, so it is appropriate to 
consider them at regular intervals. The scope, principles of engagement, and decision-rules of that 
forum should be clearly established at the beginning, to avoid false expectations. The role of 
stakeholders (information recipients, advisors or co-managers) should also be clear.  
Acknowledge and balance power structures. Leading agencies need to analyse existing power 
structures, including preconceptions, stakeholder hierarchies and levels of influence; this information 
should be used to rectify biases and to ensure equal participation opportunities. Analysis of evidence 
needs to cover ecological, socio-economic and cultural aspects, and use a variety of sources of 
information. When dealing with sensitive issues, pro-active steps need to be taken to deal with 
conflict before polarisation escalates to a political or media level. It is also important to distinguish 
between vocal individuals and legitimate sector representatives. 
Overseeing final decisions. The legal framework should be amended to give the responsibility of a 
final decision to Parliament or at least to a body representing relevant sectors, rather than an 
individual with a direct interest in electoral results. If a body is formed, it should aim at unanimity, 
but if consensus cannot be reached, a decision rule should be clear from the beginning. If the final 
decision is different from the TPC’s recommendations, the decision-making individual/body also 
needs to clearly explain why; the consequences of a different decision should be analysed, and 
mitigating actions implemented. 
Integrated marine planning. Marine conservation is not only about MPAs, but about actions needed 
to minimise cumulative effects of diverse threats. Multiple aspects of marine sustainability should be 
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assessed jointly to account for synergistic effects: fisheries, biodiversity conservation, coastal 
management, pollution, invasive species and climate change. Marine Spatial Planning has been 
proposed as a cyclic process of planning, implementation, monitoring and adaptation (Ehler et al. 
2009). New or adjusted legislation is usually needed to undertake MSP. In Tasmania, this 
new/adjusted legislation could either create a specific authority to coordinate the planning process 
across sectors, or give powers to the TPC to lead such an ongoing process. A change in legislation is 
also needed to facilitate implementation by existing agencies. Stakeholders could participate either as 
advisors or as co-managers. This process is not a replacement of existing management of fisheries or 
MPAs, but an overarching tool to ensure integration of marine management.   
Consider real co-management. Co-management can increase the commitment of relevant actors, and 
improve decision-making processes. It is particularly important to deal with changing conditions in 
Tasmania in an adaptive way. While FACs are supposed to be “part of the [fisheries] co-
management framework …” (Department of Primary Industries Parks Water and Environment 
2015), they are only advisory bodies. More power also increases the responsibilities of stakeholders, 
and can result in more motivation to improve the sustainability of management decisions. This 
empowerment is relevant for the integrated marine planning body. Membership and procedures of 
this body can be determined through a participatory development. It should aim to have an equal 
representation of interests.  
Nested structures of advice/decision-making. As discussed above under “nested structures” for a 
collaborative approach, a nested structure is appropriate to deal with multi-scalar problems. An 
integrated marine planning body at the State level should work in coordination with Australian 
initiatives, as well as bodies that represent local interests.  
 
8.4 General recommendations for MPA governance 
The following recommendations are drawn from the lessons learned in the Tasmanian case study, 
developed in Section 7.8. These recommendations are relevant to different settings, and contribute to 
international MPA governance. For ease of reading, I do not include citations, as all concepts have 
been previously discussed with reference to the relevant literature. 
 Considering that several MPA benefits occur in the long term, an MPA system must be 
envisioned in the long term, well past the designation process. In this way, long-term 
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management actions can be prioritised and financed, to ensure the fulfilment of objectives and 
the social and financial sustainability of each MPA and the system.   
 Local, regional, national and international scales of impact and action need to be considered to 
ensure proper integration of governance scales. Good integration can improve stakeholder and 
institutional support at relevant levels, thus increasing MPA effectiveness. 
 Participatory processes need to follow good governance principles, including inclusiveness, 
fairness, transparency, accountability, legitimacy and performance. Particularly, stakeholders 
need to trust that their input is considered and if possible included in final decisions. Good 
governance principles improve trust in the process and in responsible agencies. 
 A participatory process should start as early as possible, by considering with stakeholders the 
issues at hand and possible solutions. When stakeholders have a chance to participate early on, 
alternative management options can be considered, and are often more innovative and 
appropriate to the particular setting. Ownership and commitment of stakeholders are also more 
likely to increase. If the process involves a meaningful dialogue, trust across sectors can 
improve, reducing thus the negative consequences of polarisation and information 
manipulation.   
 A good evidence base, scientific and socio-economic, can increase trust in the process. 
Stakeholders can be involved in the collection of information, and the generation of new 
information to support decisions. Facilitating agencies need to be perceived as objective and 
meticulous in the management of information.  
 Participatory processes need to be designed to fit each case. Different stakeholders have 
different requirements and skills, which affect their capacity to participate effectively. 
Dissemination of information needs to account for such differences. In the same way, an 
unequal distribution of power can affect the results of a process and its legitimacy, so they 
need to be considered in any process.  
 Understanding informal networks can help identify key social structures and roles, or their 
absence. With this information, it is possible to take advantage, or intervene to improve, 
structures that facilitate coordination and collaboration across sectors. The identification of 
actors that can act as bridges or collaborative relationships across sectors can be useful in the 
establishment of governance alliances. 
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 Formal authorities and rules need to be clear to increase commitment of specific agencies and 
effectiveness of management actions. These authorities need to have the necessary financial 
and political support to accomplish their responsibilities.   
 Governance regimes, authorities and relevant stakeholders need to take an adaptive approach 
to governance, to be able to accommodate change. An adaptive management of MPAs, can 
help to monitor clear objectives and inform new actions to ensure MPAs effectiveness. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Marine environments around the world are facing increasing threats, leading to deterioration of 
ecological health and diminishment of key resources. Several strategies have been devised to improve 
the sustainable management and conservation of the oceans. MPAs are considered one of the most 
important tools for the conservation of biodiversity. In order to provide potential ecosystem benefits, 
MPA systems and complementary initiatives need to be effective. Effectiveness in turn is dependent 
on several factors such as: designation of MPAs based on sound ecological information; proper 
strategic and operational management; appropriate capacity at the site and system level; good 
communication strategies; basic and ongoing generation of knowledge that supports monitoring and 
adaptive management; and an appropriate governance regime (Worboys et al. 2015). While 
governance is just one of the several variables needed for successful MPAs, it can affect all other 
factors. Results from this study provide empirical data that support that notion. In particular, 
disregarding good governance principles can make a considerable difference in the establishment and 
implementation of MPAs, and marine conservation in general. A purposeful study of power 
demonstrates that these structures can have important effects on governance. Power, however, is an 
important feature of human societies, which makes living in groups possible. Leadership, cooperation 
and coordination are only enabled through specific power structures. If well used, these structures can 
result in benefits for the public good. This study shows that in Tasmania, power has had a negative 
impact on governance quality, but at the same time, there are social structures that give hope for a 
more collaborative approach to marine conservation in the future. While governance is only one of 
many important factors in MPA effectiveness, this study empirically demonstrates the importance of 
the quality of governance and of power structures. Findings and recommendations in this thesis can 
substantially enhance future initiatives for the conservation of the marine environments in Tasmania 
and further afield.  
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Appendix 1. Information sheets and consent form for 
participants 
Questionnaire information sheet 
Invitation 
This study is investigating the extent and quality of stakeholder participation in decisions regarding the 
designation and management of marine protected areas (MPAs) in Tasmania. It does not include commonwealth 
MPAs. The study is being undertaken by Dr. Michael Lockwood (Senior Lecturer, Geography and 
Environmental Studies), Dr. Lorne Kriwoken (Senior Lecturer, Geography and Environmental Studies), and 
Carolina García (PhD candidate, Geography and Environmental Studies). The study forms part of the PhD 
requirements for Carolina García. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
(a) To evaluate stakeholder perceptions of the extent and quality of participation opportunities 
regarding MPA decisions in Tasmania. 
(b) To understand how stakeholders and government organisations influence MPA decisions in 
Tasmania. 
(c) To make recommendations to improve the decision making processes for designation and 
management of MPAs in Tasmania. 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You are invited to participate in this study because your organisation has an important role to play in the 
designation, management and/or performance of MPAs. Your participation in the research is voluntary and there 
are no consequences if you decide not to participate. 
What will I be asked to do? 
A link to the survey is attached to the email invitation. Participation in this study involves completing the on-
line survey, which will take approximately 30 minutes. Responses will be anonymous and you will not be 
identifiable in any publications arising from the study. By submitting your responses, you are consenting to 
participate in the study. 
Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
The information from the survey will be used to improve understanding of the extent of participation and 
consideration of stakeholders’ opinions regarding the designation and management of MPAs. The survey results 
will be communicated to stakeholders and decision makers. As a stakeholder, you can potentially benefit from 
any associated improvements to stakeholder participation processes. 
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Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
There are no risks associated with participating in the survey. All responses are anonymous, and information 
will not be used to your disadvantage. Only members of the research team will have access to the data. 
What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
If you decide to discontinue participation during the completion of the online survey, you may do so without 
providing an explanation.  
What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
The survey data will be anonymous, and will be stored for 5 years after the conclusion of the project on a 
password protected computer at the University of Tasmania. After this time, the data will be erased. 
How will the results of the study be published? 
The results of the study will be published in a number of formats, including a report to stakeholders, a PhD 
thesis and papers in academic journals. All information will be treated in a confidential manner, and you will not 
be identifiable in any publication arising out of the research. 
What if I have questions about this study? 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study please feel free to send an email to 
Carolina.García@utas.edu.au (preferably), or contact Dr Michael Lockwood on 6226 2834. Either of us would 
be happy to discuss any aspect of the research with you.  
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee. If you 
have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC 
(Tasmania) Network on (03) 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the 
person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote ethics reference number 
H0014037. 
Please print this information sheet for future reference. To consent to participate in this research please 
complete the online survey. 
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Interview information sheet 
Invitation 
This study is investigating the extent and quality of stakeholder participation in decisions regarding the 
designation and management of marine protected areas (MPAs) in Tasmania. It does not include commonwealth 
MPAs. The study is being undertaken by Dr. Michael Lockwood (Senior Lecturer, Geography and 
Environmental Studies), Dr. Lorne Kriwoken (Senior Lecturer, Geography and Environmental Studies), and 
Carolina García (PhD candidate, Geography and Environmental Studies). The study forms part of the PhD 
requirements for Carolina García. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
(a) To evaluate stakeholder perceptions of the extent and quality of participation opportunities 
regarding MPA decisions in Tasmania. 
(b) To understand how stakeholders and government organisations influence MPA decisions in 
Tasmania. 
(c) To make recommendations to improve the decision making processes for designation and 
management of MPAs in Tasmania. 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You are invited to participate in this study because your organisation has an important role to play in the 
designation, management and/or performance of MPAs. Your participation in the research is voluntary and there 
are no consequences if you decide not to participate. 
What will I be asked to do? 
If you chose to participate, Carolina will arrange a suitable time and place for an interview. At the interview, 
Carolina will ask you questions on stakeholder participation in the designation and management of Tasmanian 
MPAs. Interviews will last a maximum of one hour. A recording will be used to develop a transcript of the 
interview. You will have an opportunity to make changes to this transcript if you wish. 
Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
The information from the study will be used to improve understanding of the extent of participation and 
consideration of stakeholders’ opinions regarding the designation and management of MPAs. The study results 
will be communicated to stakeholders and decision makers. As a stakeholder, you can potentially benefit from 
any associated improvements to stakeholder participation processes. 
Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
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There are no risks associated with participating in the interview. Information will not be used to your 
disadvantage. Only members of the research team will have access to the data. 
What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
If you decide to discontinue participation, you may do so at any time without providing an explanation.  
What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
Your identity will not be connected with the information that you provide. The data will be stored for 5 years 
after the conclusion of the project on a password protected computer at the University of Tasmania. After this 
time, the data will be erased or shredded. 
How will the results of the study be published? 
The results of the study will be published in a number of formats, including a report to stakeholders, a PhD 
thesis and papers in academic journals. All information will be treated in a confidential manner, and you will not 
be identifiable in any publication arising out of the research. 
What if I have questions about this study? 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study please feel free to email Carolina García - 
cgarcia@utas.edu.au, or contact Dr Michael Lockwood on 6226 2834. Either of us would be happy to discuss 
any aspect of the research with you.  
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee. If you 
have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC 
(Tasmania) Network on (03) 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. The Executive Officer is the 
person nominated to receive complaints from research participants. Please quote ethics reference number 
H0014037. 
Please print this information sheet for future reference. To consent to participate in this research please 
sign the consent form before the interview. 
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Consent form for interview participants 
 
1. I agree to take part in the research study named above. 
2. I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study. 
3. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
4. I understand that the study involves participating in a one-hour semi-structured interview at my 
place of work or other nominated location. I understand this interview will be audio-recorded.  
5. I understand that participation involves no foreseeable risks. 
6. I understand that all research data will be de-identified and securely stored on the University of 
Tasmania premises for five years from the publication of the study results, and will then be 
destroyed. 
7. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
8. I understand that the researcher(s) will maintain confidentiality and that any information I supply to 
the researcher(s) will be used only for the purposes of the research. 
9. I understand that the results of the study will be published so that I cannot be identified as a 
participant unless I subsequently agree in writing to be identified as a participant in the publication 
of the study results.  
10. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time without any 
effect.  
If I so wish, I may request that any data I have supplied be withdrawn from the research. 
 
Participant’s name:   
_______________________________________________________  
 
Participant’s signature:  
____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Statement by Investigator  
 I have explained the project and the implications of participation in it to this volunteer and 
I believe that the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of 
participation. 
If the Investigator has not had an opportunity to talk to participants prior to them participating, the 
following must be ticked. 
 The participant has received the Information Sheet where my details have been provided so 
participants have had the opportunity to contact me prior to consenting to participate in this 
project. 
 
Investigator’s name: 
 _______________________________________________________  
 
Investigator’s signature:  
____________________________________________________ 
 
Date:  ________________________ 
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Appendix 2. Questionnaire 
Stakeholder participation in Tasmanian marine protected area (MPA) decisions: A survey of 
your views 
This study is investigating the extent and quality of stakeholder participation in decisions regarding the 
designation and management of marine protected areas (MPAs) in Tasmania.  
The study is being undertaken by Dr. Michael Lockwood (Senior Lecturer, Geography and Environmental 
Studies), Dr. Lorne Kriwoken (Senior Lecturer, Geography and Environmental Studies), and Carolina García 
(PhD candidate, Geography and Environmental Studies). The study forms part of the PhD requirements for 
Carolina García. 
The purpose of this study is to: 
(a) To evaluate stakeholder perceptions of the extent and quality of participation 
opportunities regarding marine protected area (MPA) decisions in Tasmania. 
(b) To understand how stakeholders and government organisations influence MPA decisions 
in Tasmania. 
(c) To make recommendations to improve the decision-making processes for designation and 
management of MPAs in Tasmania. 
You have been invited to participate in this study because your organisation has an important role to play in the 
designation, management and/or performance of MPAs. 
Your participation in the research is voluntary and there are no consequences if you decide not to participate. 
More details are given on the Information Sheet that was attached to the email invitation. 
Your participation in this study involves completing the following series of questions, which will take 
approximately 30 minutes. Responses will be anonymous and you will not be identifiable in any publications 
arising from the study. By submitting your responses, you are consenting to participate in the study. 
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A. First, we would like to understand your experience with and values for the marine 
environment and marine protected areas (MPAs) in Tasmania. 
 
1. What activities link you to the marine environment and to what degree? Please choose one answer for 
each activity. 
How often do you usually engage in this 
activity? 
Almost 
every 
day 
At least 
once a 
week 
At least 
once a 
month 
At 
least 
once a 
year  
Less 
than 
once a 
year 
Never 
Commercial fishing       
Marine farming       
Work with a government agency involved 
in marine issues 
      
Work with a non-governmental agency 
involved in marine issues 
      
Marine-related research       
Providing education/communication 
about marine issues 
      
Coastal or marine care volunteering       
Recreational no-take diving/snorkelling        
Recreational fishing (nets, pots, handline 
fishing, spearfishing, diving for seafood) 
      
Surfing, kayaking, sailing, windsurfing, 
kitesurfing 
      
Boating, jet skiing, water skiing       
Other (please list) ____________________________ 
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2. In your opinion, do MPAs affect the following activities positively or negatively? Please choose one 
answer in each row. 
How is each activity affected by 
MPAs? 
MPAs 
have 
mostly  
negative 
effects 
More 
negative 
effects 
than 
positive 
effects   
Overall, 
MPAs  
have no 
effect  
More 
positive 
effects 
than 
negative 
effects     
MPAs 
have 
mostly  
positive 
effects 
I don’t 
know 
Commercial fishing       
Marine farming       
Recreational no-take 
diving/snorkelling  
      
Recreational fishing (nets, pots, 
handline fishing, spearfishing, 
diving for seafood) 
      
Education and/or research       
Surfing, kayaking, sailing, 
windsurfing, kitesurfing 
      
Boating, jet skiing, water skiing        
 
Would you like to explain in more detail how MPAs affect specific activities? 
_____________________________________________________________ 
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3. Next, we are interested in your level of attachment to the Tasmanian marine environment. Please 
choose one answer in each row. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
I identify strongly with Tasmania’s 
marine environments  1 2 3 4 5 
I am very attached to Tasmania’s marine 
environments 1 2 3 4 5 
Tasmania’s marine environments mean 
a lot to me 1 2 3 4 5 
Tasmania’s marine environments are the 
best places for doing what I like to do 1 2 3 4 5 
My livelihood depends on Tasmania’s 
marine environments 1 2 3 4 5 
Fishing and obtaining seafood from 
Tasmania’s marine environments is an 
important part of my life  
1 2 3 4 5 
Recreation in Tasmania’s marine 
environments is an important part of my 
life 
     
 
Are there particular MPAs in Tasmania to which you feel strongly attached? If yes, please name them 
____________ 
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4. We would like to understand why different stakeholders might value MPAs in Tasmania. Please 
indicate how important each of the following values is to you. Please choose one answer in each row. 
MPA values 
Not 
important 
at all 
Not very 
important  
Somewhat 
important 
Very 
important 
Extremely 
important 
I don’t 
know 
Economic benefits (direct jobs in 
conservation/tourism, direct and 
indirect tourism services-
transport, accommodation) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Recreational 
opportunities(diving, kayaking, 
sailing) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Maintenance of ecosystem 
functions (trophic interactions 
nutrient cycling, water quality) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Conservation of biological 
diversity  1 2 3 4 5 
6 
Research and education 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Sense of personal well being 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Future generations (allowing 
others in the future to enjoy the 
above values) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Do you value other aspects of MPAs not included in this list? ______________ 
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B. In this section, we would like to explore your attitudes to MPA regulations, and your 
perceptions about MPA management. 
 
5. The following items relate to your attitudes towards MPA regulations. Please choose one answer in 
each row. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
I don’t 
know 
Governments have a legitimate 
role in regulating the use of 
MPAs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Most people obey regulations 
that are in the interest of the 
community, even if they 
personally affect them in a 
negative way 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regulations are effective only if 
people understand their 
purpose 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
People are more likely to obey 
regulations if they have 
participated in their design 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regulations are only effective if 
there is a high risk of incurring 
penalties for non-compliance 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Most people obey regulations 
when there is social pressure to 
do so 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Current regulations are 
sufficient to fulfil the objectives 
of each MPA  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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6. Next, we are interested in your knowledge of the MPA system in Tasmania. Please choose one option 
for each MPA. Note that it is fine if you have little or no knowledge of any of the MPAs listed. 
How much you do know about 
the location, rules and 
objectives of the following 
MPAs? 
I haven’t heard 
about this MPA 
I have heard 
about it, but I 
don’t know 
much about its 
location, rules 
or objectives 
I know roughly 
where it is, 
and have a 
general idea 
about its rules 
and objectives 
I know where 
it is, and I am 
familiar with 
its rules and 
objectives 
Governor Island Marine Nature 
Reserve 1 2 3 4 
Kent Group Marine Nature 
Reserve 1 2 3 4 
Macquarie Island Marine 
Reserve 1 2 3 4 
Maria Island Marine Nature 
Reserve 1 2 3 4 
Ninepin Point Marine Nature 
Reserve 1 2 3 4 
Port Davey Marine Nature 
Reserve 1 2 3 4 
Tinderbox Marine Nature 
Reserve 1 2 3 4 
South Arm Marine Conservation 
Area 1 2 3 4 
Monk Bay Marine Conservation 
Area 1 2 3 4 
Cloudy Bay Lagoon Marine 
Conservation Area 1 2 3 4 
Opossum Bay Marine 
Conservation Area 1 2 3 4 
Hippolyte Rocks Marine 
Conservation Area 1 2 3 4 
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7. We are now interested in your understanding of the institutional, socio-economic and environmental 
settings of MPAs in Tasmania. Please state the level of agreement or disagreement with the following 
statements. Please choose one answer in each row. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
I don’t 
know 
I understand the role of each 
government organisation (Parks and 
Wildlife, Marine Resources, Marine 
Police, Planning Commission, 
Ministers) regarding MPAs  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I understand the reasons behind 
each MPA designation and their 
regulations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I know the mechanisms by which my 
opinions can be considered by 
decision makers responsible for the 
designation and management of 
MPAs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I know which Tasmanian marine 
species  are endangered 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I know which are the key habitats 
(e.g. spawning or nursery areas) for 
marine species in Tasmania 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I know when is the reproductive 
season of many marine species in 
Tasmania 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I understand the impacts of different 
industries and activities on marine 
ecosystems 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I know the advantages, 
disadvantages and limitations of 
MPAs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I know roughly the magnitude of the 
economic contributions of each 
marine industry in Tasmania (major 
fisheries, aquaculture, recreational 
diving) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I know roughly how many livelihoods 
depend on marine ecosystems 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I understand the social and 
economic costs of declines in marine 
species and ecosystems 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I understand the reasons behind 
each stakeholder’s position 
regarding MPAs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Currently there are enough MPAs to 
protect Tasmania’s biodiversity 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I am satisfied with the  management 
outcomes for Tasmanian MPAs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
C. In this section, we would like to know about your participation in the designation 
and management of Tasmanian MPAs. 
 
8. Have you participated in any process related to Tasmanian MPAs? 
Yes (If yes, skip to Question 10) 
 
No (If no, go to Question 9) 
 
9. Can you please tell us why you have not participated in any processes related to Tasmanian MPAs? 
Please select all answers that apply to you. 
I haven’t heard about opportunities to participate 
 
I haven’t had time  
 
I didn’t agree with the process  
 
My participation would not make any difference to the outcome 
I am not interested in the outcome 
Other reasons? (please list) _____________________  NOW PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 12. 
10. In which processes related to MPA designation or management have you participated? Please select all 
answers that apply to you. 
Early designations (such as Maria Island, Governor Island)(1991) 
 
Davey and Twofold Shelf bioregions (2003) 
 
Designation of MPAs in the Bruny bioregion, as part of the Tasmanian MPA strategy (2008) 
 
Management decision(s) of _________________ (name of MPA)  
 
 
11. What was your main motivation to participate? Please select all answers that apply to you. 
I wanted to support the biodiversity conservation benefits of MPAs 
 
I wanted to support the social and/or economic benefits of MPAs 
 
I was worried about the negative impacts that MPAs might have on important livelihoods and 
commercial activities  
 
I was worried about the negative impacts that MPAs might have on recreational fishing activities 
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It was part of my job  
 
 
Other reasons? (please explain) ________________ 
 
12. Next, we would like to understand your views on the quality of the past and current participation 
opportunities regarding Tasmania’s MPAs. Please choose one answer in each row 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
I don’t 
know 
There have been plenty of 
opportunities for citizens to 
participate in the designation of new 
MPAs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
There are ongoing opportunities for 
citizens to participate in MPA 
management 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Engagement methods have been 
appropriate to include citizens’ needs 
and expectations in MPA decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
My opinions or the opinions of my 
community/group have been 
considered by decision-makers  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Decisions regarding MPAs clearly 
reflect the input of a variety of 
stakeholders 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Decisions regarding MPAs are biased 
towards certain stakeholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Government institutions clearly 
support their decisions with 
appropriate background information 
(ecological, cultural and socio-
economic)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Decisions regarding MPAs are usually 
informed by the best available 
information 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Decision-makers clearly explain how 
stakeholder contributions were 
considered and are reflected in final 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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decisions 
The reasons for MPA-related 
decisions are clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Decisions regarding MPAs are fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Decision-making processes regarding 
MPAs are run by the most 
appropriate government bodies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I trust the independence of decision 
makers in charge of establishing and 
managing MPAs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Government institutions in charge of 
MPA management do the best job 
they can with the available resources 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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13. How important are the following options to improve opportunities for stakeholders to participate in 
decisions regarding MPAs ? Please choose one answer in each row. 
 
Not 
important 
at all 
Not very 
important  
Somewhat 
important 
Very 
important 
Extremely 
important 
I don’t 
know 
More diverse and tailored 
methods that encourage 
participation of all stakeholders 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
On-going processes, instead of 
one-off consultations, that allow 
all stakeholders and government 
agencies to openly discuss issues 
and identify mutually acceptable 
solutions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Official processes that allow for 
greater stakeholder influence on 
decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Better incorporation of scientific 
knowledge into decisions 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Better incorporation of social 
and/or economic infromation into 
decisions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Communications to stakeholders 
of the reasons why desicison were 
made, and the evidence on which 
they were based 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Are there other ways to improve stakeholder participation in MPA decisions? _______________ 
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14. If the improvements you considered important in Question 13 were implemented, what would be the 
resulting benefits? Please select one answer in each row. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
I don’t 
know 
Trust between different stakeholders 
and government agencies will 
increase 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Acceptance of MPA regulations will 
increase  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Citizen and stakeholder support for 
MPAs will increase 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Decisions will be fairer 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Decisions will be better informed 1 2 3 4 5 6 
MPAs will have a better chance of 
fulfilling their objectives 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Are there other consequences of improving participation in MPA decisions? _______________ 
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D. Next, we would like to know your views about the level of influence of different 
sectors in relation to MPA decisions.  
 
15. From your point of view, how much influence does each sector have on MPA decisions? There is one 
column for each major source of influence, namely economic (e.g. key source of jobs or funding), 
political (e.g. statutory or close connections to decision makers),or informational (e.g. knowledge used 
to inform decisions or capacity to manipulate/withhold certain information). From the drop-down menu 
in each column, please choose the level of influence. 
How much influence does each 
organisation have regarding MPAs? 
Economic Political Informational 
Government departments or agencies 
 No influence 
 Less influence than 
most organisations 
 As much influence as 
other relevant 
organisations 
 More influence than 
most organisations 
 No influence 
 Less influence than 
most organisations 
 As much influence as 
other relevant 
organisations 
 More influence than 
most organisations 
 No influence 
 Less influence than 
most organisations 
 As much influence as 
other relevant 
organisations 
 More influence than 
most organisations 
Public-private partnerships (such as 
NRM or Derwent Estuary Program) [Menu as above] [Menu as above] [Menu as above] 
Commercial fishers [Menu as above] [Menu as above] [Menu as above] 
Recreational fishers [Menu as above] [Menu as above] [Menu as above] 
Divers [Menu as above] [Menu as above] [Menu as above] 
Research organisations [Menu as above] [Menu as above] [Menu as above] 
Conservation organisations [Menu as above] [Menu as above] [Menu as above] 
Community organisations or 
associations [Menu as above] [Menu as above] [Menu as above] 
Mass media (TV, radio, newspapers) [Menu as above] [Menu as above] [Menu as above] 
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16. Which are your sources of information on marine issues and MPAs and how much do you trust or 
distrust them? In each column, please choose one option from the drop down menus. 
How much do you use and trust 
information on marine issues and MPAs 
from the following sources? 
Use Trust 
Mass media (TV, radio, newspapers) 
o Never use it/them 
o Less than once a 
year 
o A few times per 
year 
o Monthly 
o Weekly or daily 
o I distrust all their 
information 
o I distrust most of 
their information 
o I trust some 
information and 
distrust other 
o I trust most of their 
information 
o I trust all their 
information 
o I don’t know 
Peer-reviewed publications (academic 
journals, books) [Menu as above] [Menu as above] 
Bulletins/newsletters/web pages of 
specific organisations [Menu as above] [Menu as above] 
Close friends and family, work 
colleagues or co-members of a 
group/organisation 
[Menu as above] [Menu as above] 
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17. Do you tend to agree or disagree with the views of the following groups regarding MPAs and marine 
conservation? Please circle one answer in each row. 
 
I strongly 
disagree with 
their position 
I mostly 
disagree with 
their position 
I disagree on 
some points 
and agree on 
others 
I mostly agree 
with their 
position 
I strongly 
agree with 
their position 
I am not 
familiar with 
their position 
Government 
departments or 
agencies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Public-private 
partnerships (such as 
NRM or Derwent 
Estuary Program) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Liberal party 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Labor party 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Greens party 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Education organisations 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Commercial fishers 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Aquaculture businesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Tourism operators 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Game-fishing operators 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Divers 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Recreational fishers 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Research organisations 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Conservation 
organisations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Community 
organisations or 
associations 
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E. In this last section, we would like to know about your organisation. 
 
18. Do you work for, or are part of an organisation related to the marine environment and/or MPAs?  
If you belong to more than one, please choose the most important organisation .  
o DPIPWE - Marine 
Resources Branch 
o DPIPWE - Parks and 
Wildlife Service 
o National Parks and 
Wildlife Advisory 
Council 
o MAST - Marine and 
Safety Tasmania 
o Tasmania Police - 
Marine Safety and 
Rescue 
o Department of 
Economic 
Development, 
Tourism and Arts 
o Tasmanian Planning 
Commission 
o NRM South 
o Derwent Estuary 
Program 
o Woodbridge Marine 
Centre 
o Greens party 
o Liberal party 
o Labor party 
o Tasmanian Seafood 
Industry Council 
o Bruny Island Cruises 
o Eaglehawk Dive 
Centre 
o Other dive businesses 
o Sea Charter Boat 
Operators of 
Tasmania 
o IMAS - Marine and 
Antarctic Futures 
o Citizen science 
program (RLS, 
Redmap) 
o IMAS - Fisheries and 
Aquaculture 
o CSIRO Marine and 
Atmospheric 
Research 
o Tasmanian 
Conservation Trust 
o Environment 
Tasmania 
o Birdlife Tasmania  
o Tasmanian National 
Parks Association 
o Friends of Maria 
Marine Protected 
Area 
o Tasmanian Aboriginal 
Centre 
o Tasmanian Game 
Fishing Association 
o Tasmanian 
Association for 
Recreational Fishing 
o Tasmanian Scuba 
Diving Club 
o Other Dive Clubs 
(please specify in 
“other”) 
o The Royal Yacht Club 
of Tasmania 
o Other yacht/boating 
clubs (please specify 
in “other”) 
 
 
19. How long have you been a member/staff of the most important organisation you chose in Question 17?   
________ years 
 
20. How often do you work with/attend meetings of the most important organisation you chose in Question 
17? Please tick one box. 
 
Never 
 
I volunteer/attend meetings less than once a year  
 
I volunteer/attend meetings between 1 and 4 times a year  
 
I volunteer/attend meetings more than 4 times a year 
 
I am a staff member/consultant 
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21. We would like to understand the networks associated with the most important organisation you chose 
in Question 17. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements. 
Please circle one answer in each row. 
 
Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree  
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
I don’t 
know 
Members of this organisation often 
engage with each other in social 
activities  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Most members of this organisation trust 
each other       
When a problem that concerns the 
organisation arises, we get together to 
solve it collectively, rather than 
individually 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
The organisation has strong leadership 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Most members have a common vision 
about the goals of the organisation 1 2 3 4 5 6 
When a project is proposed in this 
organisation, it usually gets done 1 2 3 4 5 6 
The organisation usually gets the 
necessary support (financial and other) 
to implement important projects 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
22. Again thinking about the most important organisation you chose in Question 17, with which sectors, if 
any, has your organisation collaborated in the past 3 years? Please tick all boxes that apply. 
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□ Government institutions/divisions 
□ Multi-sector/multi-level groups or projects 
□ Liberal party 
□ Labor party 
□ Greens party 
□ Education organisations 
□ Commercial fishers 
□ Aquaculture businesses 
□ Tourism operators 
□ Game-fishing operators 
□ Divers 
□ Recreational fishers 
□ Research sector 
□ Conservation organisations 
□ Community organisations or associations 
 
Would you like to mention specific organisations/groups with which your organisation has collaborated? 
_______________________ 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to answer this survey.  
 
If you would like us to send you a summary of the results of this survey, please send an e-mail 
to cgarcia@utas.edu.au 
 
If you would like to participate in an interview so that you can discuss MPA issues in more 
detail, please send me an e-mail: cgarcia@utas.edu.au  
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Appendix 3. Construct table for the questionnaire 
Construct Subconstruct question 
Personal 
attributes 
Link to marine environment Which activities link you to the marine environment? (list of 
12 activities) 
How do MPAs affect activities? (list of 8 activities) 
Place attachment (identity and 
dependence) and values of 
MPAs.  
 Agreement with  identity, attachment and dependence 
statements (List of 6 statements) 
How important is each MPA value? (list of 7 values) 
Acceptance of 
rules 
Reasons for compliance 
(sense of responsibility) 
agreement with different reasons for following rules 
(authority, ethical common interest, benefits, avoid costs, 
social pressure, logic, participation) (list of 7 statements) 
Understanding 
of social-
ecological 
system 
Understanding/perception of 
MPA system 
How much you do know about the location and regulations of 
the following MPAs? (Table of some MPAs and level of 
knowledge  about location and rules) 
Understanding/perception of 
ecosystem, socio-economic 
aspects and governance 
regime  
Agreement with statements on the understanding of ecosystem 
socio-economic issues and governance system (table with 12 
statements) 
Participation 
in relation to 
good 
governance 
principles 
Participation experience Have you participated?  (Yes, No) 
If not, reasons? (list of options) 
Can you recall in which opportunities you participated in a 
process related to MPAs designation or management? (3 
options) 
What was your main motivation to participate? (3 options) 
Quality - good governance 
(frequency, adequate, 
fairness, objectivity, 
transparency and 
accountability, legitimacy, 
performance, effects) 
  
  
Agreement with statements about quality of  past and current 
participation opportunities regarding Tasmania’s MPAs 
(frequency, adequate, fairness, objectivity, transparency and 
accountability, legitimacy, performance, effects) ( 11 
statements). 
How would you improve the participation opportunities 
regarding MPAs decisions? (6 statements) 
Possible consequences of improving participation 
opportunities regarding MPAs? (7 statements) 
Organisation 
attributes 
Organisation/activity linking 
to marine environment 
Do you work or are part of a group or an organisation related 
to the marine environment and/or MPAs? (drop down menu, 
choose the most important) 
How long have you been a member/staff of this organisation?   
( ________ years) 
How often do you work for/attend meetings of this 
organisation? 
social capital organization 
(solidarity, trust, internal and 
external links), leadership and 
agency 
Agreement with statements about social capital of 
organisation (solidarity, trust, social interactions within, social 
links outside), leadership and agency (7 statements) 
Social network analysis From the following organisations, with which one has your 
organisation cooperated in the past 3 years? (12 sectors list) 
From the following organisations, how much do you tend to 
agree or disagree regarding MPAs and marine conservation? 
(list 14 sectors) 
Power information Which are your sources of information on marine issues and 
MPAs and how much do you trust or distrust them? (4 
sources-trust level) 
influence how much influence does each of these organisations have on 
MPA decisions? (list of organisations) 
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Appendix 4. Interview schedule 
1. Which is the relation and position of your organisation regarding MPAs? 
 What are the benefits of having MPAs? 
 What are the problems or impacts of MPAs? 
 What do you think about the current MPA system in Tasmania (state waters)? 
2. Has your organisation engaged in any processes for MPA management or designation in 
Tasmania? 
 Which processes? 
 What was the form of engagement? 
 What was the result? 
3. Do you think that the decision-making processes regarding MPAs have been 
appropriate?  
 What could be improved and how?  
4. With which organisations have you exchanged information about MPAs or marine 
conservation? (List of organisations) 
 
5. Which organisations do you think influence MPAs decisions?  
6. Which organisations influence decisions: 
 based on their capacity to disclose, withhold or manipulate information? 
 based on relevant and accurate knowledge? 
 due to their economic influence? (as an important source of employment in the state 
or as an important source of funding of programs that affect MPAs) 
 based on their political positions or connections?  
7. Are you aware of any coalitions regarding MPAs? 
 
Definitions used during interviews: 
 
Influential: Actors with a demonstrated capacity to: 
1) shape ideas about policy/management,  
2) initiate policy/management proposals,  
3) change or veto others' proposals,  
4) make decisions 
5) affect implementation 
 
Coalitions: Organisations that deliberately get together to unify and strengthen their position in 
relation to specific policy issues. 
Sources of influence: 
1) Political: Statutory powers; close connections to decision makers; electoral pressure. 
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2) Economic: Source of funding; source of jobs; financial capacity for lobby. 
3) Information: Capacity to present, withhold or manipulate information to affect public 
perceptions; use of sensitive information to manipulate people/organisations; capacity to 
build credible arguments. 
4) Expert reputation: Trusted scientists/research institutions; people/organisations with a 
reputation of good negotiators; knowledgeable people/organisations in relevant fields. 
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Appendix 5. Matrix of main organisations used during interviews 
  
sector subsector organisation 
Information 
exchange 
influence level 
Source (Political, 
economic, information, 
expertise reputation) Coalitions 
Political parties 
Greens        
Labor        
Liberals        
Politicians/Ministers 
Houses of Parliament        
Minister for Environment, Parks and 
Heritage 
 
      
Other Ministers        
Planning Tasmanian Planning Commission        
Government 
institutions/divisions 
Fisheries and 
aquaculture 
DPIPWE - Marine Resources Branches        
Fisheries Advisory Committees        
Conservation 
DPIPWE - Parks and Wildlife Service        
National Parks and Wildlife Advisory 
Council 
 
      
Surveillance and 
compliance 
MAST - Marine and Safety Tasmania        
Tasmania Police - Marine Safety and 
Rescue 
 
      
Tourism 
Department of Economic Development, 
Tourism and Arts 
 
      
Multi-sector/multi-level groups or projects 
NRM South        
Derwent Estuary Program        
Education and research organisations 
IMAS        
CSIRO        
University of Tasmania (other 
depts./centres) 
 
      
Woodbridge Marine Centre        
High Schools        
Commercial fishers Aquaculture and Tasmanian Seafood Industry Council        
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Fishing Industry Sector groups (Rock Lobster 
Fishermen’s Association, Abalone 
Council, Commercial divers, 
Scalefisherman association) 
 
      
Tourism 
Tourism operators Bruny Island Cruises        
Diving operators 
Eaglehawk Dive Centre        
Other (Southern Ocean Sport, etc)        
Game-fishing 
operators 
Sea Charter Boat Operators of 
Tasmania 
 
      
Conservation organisations 
Tasmanian Conservation Trust        
Environment Tasmania        
Ocean Planet        
EDO Tas        
Other (please specify)        
Recreational fishers 
Tasmanian Association for Recreational 
Fishing 
 
      
Gamefishing clubs        
Divers Diving Clubs        
Media (Newspapers, TV, radio) please specify        
Other 
(e.g. Boating/sailing clubs, local coastal 
communities) please specify 
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Appendix 6. IUCN management categories: 
(Dudley, 2008) 
Ia Strict nature reserve: Strictly protected for biodiversity and also possibly geological/ 
geomorphological features, where human visitation, use and impacts are controlled and 
limited to ensure protection of the conservation values. 
Ib Wilderness area: Usually large unmodified or slightly modified areas, retaining their 
natural character and influence, without permanent or significant human habitation, protected 
and managed to preserve their natural condition. 
II National park: Large natural or near-natural areas protecting large-scale ecological 
processes with characteristic species and ecosystems, which also have environmentally and 
culturally compatible spiritual, scientific, educational, recreational and visitor opportunities. 
III Natural monument or feature: Areas set aside to protect a specific natural monument, 
which can be a landform, sea mount, marine cavern, geological feature such as a cave, or a 
living feature such as an ancient grove. 
IV Habitat/species management area: Areas to protect particular species or habitats, where 
management reflects this priority. Many will need regular, active interventions to meet the 
needs of particular species or habitats, but this is not a requirement of the category. 
V Protected landscape or seascape: Where the interaction of people and nature over time has 
produced a distinct character with significant ecological, biological, cultural and scenic value: 
and where safeguarding the integrity of this interaction is vital to protecting and sustaining the 
area and its associated nature conservation and other values. 
VI Protected areas with sustainable use of natural resources: Areas which conserve 
ecosystems, together with associated cultural values and traditional natural resource 
management systems. Generally large, mainly in a natural condition, with a proportion under 
sustainable natural resource management and where low-level non-industrial natural resource 
use compatible with nature conservation is seen as one of the main aim 
 
 
